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Case No. CV -09-124 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc. ("Beaver Springs" or 
"Association"), by and through its counsel of record, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, and 
submits the following opposition brief to Plaintiff Thomas Weisel's ("Weisel") Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his motion for summary judgment, Weisel has stirred up a lot of dust in an attempt to 
obscure what is actually an extremely straightforward issue. The only issue in this case is 
whether Weisel should be held to the bargain that he entered into willingly and knowingly with 
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the Association over twenty-six years ago. As expressly set forth in the October 12, 1983 
Agreement, Weisel wanted to unify his two lots in the Beaver Springs Subdivision 
("Subdivision") into one parcel. He also wanted the Association's approval of his development 
plans for the unified parcel, which included constructing two single family homes on Lot 14, and 
not constructing any single family home on Lot 13. As a result of the Agreement, Weisel got 
what he wanted: the Association's agreement that the lot line between the two lots could be 
removed and Weisel could proceed with his desired development plans. 
Despite having gotten exactly what he asked for, Weisel now contends that this Court 
should allow him to back out of the deal because land values have - not surprisingly - increased 
over the past two decades. In support of this remarkable and unprecedented request, Weisel 
presents four arguments: (1) the parties entered into the Agreement as a result of a mutual 
misunderstanding regarding a purported setback encroachment; (2) there is no consideration for 
the Agreement when it was executed because of the purported mutual mistake; (3) the 
consideration "failed" decades later because other homeowners developed their properties in 
accordance with the applicable County or City ordinances, and (4) the Agreement should not be 
enforced because five other owners purportedly were allowed to build guest houses that 
exceeded the size allowed by the zoning ordinances. As set forth below, these arguments fail as 
a matter of law. 
Moreover, these asserted contract defenses are not based on undisputed facts. Instead, 
Weisel' s arguments are based either on a strained interpretation of the Agreement, or on County 
Appraiser records that have no relevance to the City or County's planning function, and are not 
accurate reflections of the information presented to zoning officials by the homeowners. The 
Association, therefore, asks that Weisel's motion for summary judgment be denied in its entirety 
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and that the Association's motion for summary judgment - which is based on issues that can be 
decided as a matter of law - be granted. 
II. STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
Beaver Springs hereby incorporates the Statement of Undisputed Facts set forth in the 
Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 28, 
2009. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. There Is No Reason The Agreement Should Be Construed Narrowly. 
The first assertion made in Weisel's motion for summary judgment is that the 1983 
Agreement should be narrowly construed because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the 
common law right to use land for all lawful purposes. Brief at p. 19. This.legal theory, however, 
should relate only to blanket, non-negotiated, restrictive covenants restricting the use of land in a 
neighborhood. The Agreement at issue in this case does not contain blanket restrictions covering 
the entire neighborhood. Instead, the Agreement is a specifically negotiated bilateral agreement 
that allowed Weisel to unify his two lots and develop it as a single parcel: 
The parties agree that upon execution of this Agreement, Lot 13 and Lot 14 shall 
be deemed one parcel and that such single parcel shall not hereafter be split and/or 
developed as two separate parcels. 
Clark Aff, Ex. A at <J[ 3. In connection with its determination that Weisel would be allowed to 
unify his two lots, the Association made a finding that the removal of the setback lines between 
the two lots would not "cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other lots." Id., at 
<J[ 2. Thus, Weisel was allowed, but not required, to locate a future structure in the former 
setback area. 
Since this Agreement was specifically negotiated, and not simply imposed as a result of 
purchasing a house in a planned neighborhood, there is no legitimate reason to interpret it 
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differently from any other bilateral contract. Indeed, since there is no dispute over the meaning 
of the Agreement, there is no need to construe it narrowly or broadly. The Agreement simply 
means what it says it means - that Lots 13 and 14 are a single parcel and cannot be split or 
developed as two separate parcels. 
B. Weisel's Claims Relating To A Lack Of Consideration And Mutual Mistake Are 
Barred By the Statute of Limitations. 
Weisel asserts that the Agreement is void because (1) it lacks consideration at the time it 
was made, (2) was based solely on a mutual mistake of both parties, and (3) was based on a 
condition precedent that did not occur. These claims, however, should be dismissed without any 
discussion of their merits because they were not timely asserted against the Association. As set 
forth in the Association's motion for summary judgment, these contract claims accrued on the 
day the Agreement was executed: October 12, 1983. Under Idaho Code Section 5-216, any 
"action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be 
brought within five years. Thus, Weisel needed to file these contract claims no later than 
October 12, 1988. He missed this deadline by more than twenty years. Therefore, these claims 
should be dismissed summarily. 
C. Weisel Admits that the Agreement was Supported by Consideration. 
Even if the statute of limitations was not a bar to Weisel's contract claims against the 
Association, the undisputed facts establish that Weisel cannot succeed on the merits of the claims 
as a matter of law. Weisel claims that the Agreement fails because there was no consideration 
for his agreement to unify his two lots. In making this argument, Weisel admits that Idaho Code 
§ 29-103 provides that a written agreement is presumptive evidence of a consideration that can 
be rebutted only by "substantial" evidence. See Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21. 25-26 (1997) 
(appellants failed to meet burden of proof rebutting the presumption of consideration in an option 
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agreement because the record demonstrated that - ten years after the execution of the agreement 
- no one involved had a clear memory of whether the $1.00 recited consideration had actually 
been paid). In this case, Weisel has failed to produce any, let alone substantial, evidence proving 
that he got no benefit whatsoever from the Agreement. 
To the contrary, Weisel merely claims that the Agreement was entered into because the 
improvements in the 1983 development plan were to be constructed in the setback area between 
the two lots. That is, he asserts that the only benefit he sought from the Agreement was the right 
to build in the setback area. Notably, "the motive which prompts one to enter into a contract and 
the consideration for the contract are distinct and different things." 17 A Am Jur 2d, Contracts, 
§115. In fact, the motive to enter into a contract actually does not comprise any part of the 
contract. Id.; see also CJS Contracts § 87 ("where valid consideration for a contract exists, the 
motive for entering into the contract is immaterial"). Consideration is instead a legal concept 
that is defined as any "right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some 
forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." Id. at 
§113. 
Therefore, even if Weisel was able to present substantial evidence that his personal 
motive for entering into the Agreement was due to his belief the improvements were to be 
located in the setback, that evidence is totally irrelevant to whether or not the Agreement was 
supported by consideration. The issue of consideration is whether Weisel obtained any benefit 
whatsoever from the Agreement. As he himself expressly admitted, Weisel did obtain a benefit 
because the Association approved his development plans for Lots 13 and 14. Weisel Depo. at 
99:22-101-15. He also benefitted from the Agreement because he was able to use it to obtain a 
variance from the County, which enabled him to build two single family homes on his property 
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in the Subdivision. Thus, he got something in return for the Association's acquiescence with his 
request to unify the two lots into a single parcel. 
Furthennore, there is no evidence - other than his own self-serving testimony - that the 
Agreement was predicated on the improvements being located within the setback area. In fact, 
all other evidence points to contrary, including the following: 
• The Agreement itself does not state in the recitals that the development plans 
included building in the setback area; it merely states that Weisel "further desires 
to obtain the Association's written consent to combine such lots into one parcel, 
removing the setback lines along the common boundary line of such lots." Clark 
Aff., Ex. A, page 1. 
• The architect that created the 1983 development plan testified that he intentionally 
located all of the development on Lot 14 and never created a design that did not 
respect all of the setbacks. McLaughlin Depo. at 15:25-17:2. 
• The August 18, 1983 site plan that was submitted to the Design Review 
Committee on September 1, 1983 for approval clearly shows that all of the 
development was outside of the setbacks that then existed on Lot 14. Ottley 
Deop., p. 44:15-46:23 and Ex. 5. Thus, the plans submitted to, and approved by, 
the Design Review Committee never included a setback encroachment. 
• Weisel himself admitted in his May 28, 1987 letter to the Design Review 
Committee (which was written in opposition to a neighbor's planned 
development) that it was the "possibility of two families living on one lot" that led 
to his agreement to "give up the right ever to build on the second" lot. Clark Aff., 
Ex. P. He made no mention in this letter of his belief that the Agreement was 
made because he had wanted to locate the development in the setback area. 
• Weisel claims that he moved the location of the caretakers' house prior to 
executing the Agreement because he wanted the ability to sell or build on Lot 13 
in the future as a separate lot. Id., at 41:7-18. If this was his motivation for 
moving the location of the caretakers' home, it makes no sense that he - a very 
sophisticated businessman - would have proceeded to sign an Agreement that 
clearly states that the two lots are unified in perpetuity. 
It is Weisel's burden to establish through substantial evidence that there was no 
consideration for the Agreement. He has failed to satisfy this burden. Instead, after admitting he 
received benefits from making the Agreement, he merely makes an irrelevant assertion that -
more than twenty years after executing the Agreement - he suddenly realized that he did not 
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need to unify his two lots because he did not actually build in the setback area. Therefore, his 
motion for summary judgment should be denied and the Association's motion on this claim 
should be granted. 
D. There Is No Clear And Satisfactory Evidence Of A Mutual Mistake. 
In his motion for summary judgment, Weisel next claims that he is entitled to rescind or 
modify the Agreement because it was purportedly based upon the mutual mistake that the 
improvements were to be located in the setback. To prove the existence of a mutual mistake, 
Weisel has the burden of proving by clear and satisfactory evidence that, at the time the 
Agreement was signed, both he and the Association entered into the Agreement solely because 
they believed the proposed development was located in the setback area between Lots 13 and 14. 
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27 (App. 1997). As set forth above, Weisel has not, and 
cannot, meet his burden of proof on this issue. 
Indeed, it defies common sense that Weisel would have entered into the Agreement after 
he purposeful! y changed the location of the caretakers' house during design review so as to be 
able to develop Lot 13 in the future. Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever that the 
Association entered into the Agreement solely because it believed that Weisel wanted to 
construct the caretakers' house in the setback area. To the contrary, Philip Ottley - a member of 
the Design Review Committee in 1983 - testified that the Association was concerned with the 
fact that Weisel was seeking to build another residence on one lot. Thus "[if Weisel] were to 
develop that Lot 13, or if he were to sell it to his family or a member and they built a building on 
it, they would be exceeding building densities." Ottley Depa. at 53:2-13. 
Since, the Association entered into the Agreement due to its concern regarding the 
number of residences that Weisel wanted to locate on Lot 14, Weisel cannot establish the 
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elements of mutual mistake - that is, that both parties shared a misconception about a vital fact 
upon which they based their bargain. Dennett, supra, at 27. Therefore, Weisel's motion for 
summary judgment should be denied, and the Association's motion should be granted, on this 
issue. 
E. The Agreement Does Not Contain A Condition Precedent. 
Weisel next argues that he should be released from the promises he made in the 
Agreement because constructing the caretakers' house in the setback was a purported condition 
precedent to his obligations. This argument is without merit. A condition precedent is an event 
that is not certain to occur, but which must occur before performance under a contract becomes 
due. World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 887 (1986). Whether the parties 
intended a condition precedent is a question of fact. Id., citing Wilkerson v. School District No. 
15, Glacier County, 700 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1985). Its existence is generally dependent on what the 
parties' intended, "as adduced from the contract itself." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 474 
(2006). Condition precedents, however, are not favored by the courts. World Wide Lease, 
supra, at 887. Therefore, the intention to create a condition precedent must appear in the 
contract expressly or by clear implication. Id. 
In this case, there is no express condition precedent in the Agreement. There is also no 
clear implication in the Agreement that the parties intended that the unification of the two lots in 
perpetuity was conditioned on whether or not Weisel built the caretakers' house in the setback 
area. Indeed, the plans that were reviewed and approved by the Design Review Committee 
showed that the proposed structure was not in the setback. Furthermore, as set forth in the 
Association's motion, the only paragraph in the Agreement that discusses improvements being 
located in the setback is paragraph 2. This paragraph, however, simply mimics the language of 
1103 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8 
I 0353-001 
the Declaration pertaining to the findings that must be made by the Design Review Committee 
prior to allowing the unification of two lots. Thus, the only rational interpretation of this 
paragraph is that the drafter of the Agreement- Weisel's attorney, Roger Crist- copied the 
language of the Declaration to insure that the unification was done properly. As a result of the 
Agreement, Weisel could build in the former setback area at some point in the future because it 
would not result in a diminution in the view from other lots, but he was not obligated to do so. 
Moreover, even if Weisel was able to establish that the unification of his two lots was 
conditioned upon on his locating the caretakers' house in the setback area, the happening of that 
condition was entirely within his control. As such, he had an obligation to make a good faith 
effort to locate the structure in the setback area as originally contemplated by the parties. See 
Johnson, supra, 143 Idaho at 475 ("if the happening of the condition is within the exclusive or 
partial control of the party whose obligation is conditioned upon the event, there may arise an 
implied duty to make a good faith effort to perform that condition"). In this case, the decision to 
locate the caretakers' house was within the exclusive control of Weisel. As a result, he cannot 
now argue that - after obtaining all of the benefits he wanted from the Agreement, including 
using it to obtain a variance from the County - his obligations should be waived because he 
unilaterally chose to construct the caretakers' house in a different location. If the contract was 
dependent upon the location of the caretakers' house, he had a duty to make a good faith effort to 
locate the house in that location. Since, according to his own architect, he never made any effort 
to locate the caretakers' house in the setback, he cannot - as a matter of law - get out of his 
obligations under the Agreement by way of a condition precedent theory. 
F. The Consideration Supporting The Agreement Did Not Fail. 
1104 
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In another attempt to undo the Agreement he knowingly entered into twenty-six years 
ago, Weisel claims that the consideration supporting the Agreement at the time it was entered 
into has now failed, thereby rendering the Agreement unenforceable. A "failure of 
consideration" exists when a proper contract was entered into, but due to supervening events, the 
promised performance does not occur. World Wide, supra, 111 Idaho at 884. In his motion, 
Weisel claims that the consideration failed for two reasons: (1) no structure was ever built in the 
setback area, and (2) the Association's concern with the "density" of the Subdivision purportedly 
no longer exists. 
In making this argument, Weisel is again attempting to equate motive for executing the 
Agreement with consideration. That is, he is claiming that his motive was to build in the setback 
and the Association's motive was "density" considerations - motives that he contends are no 
longer served. As set forth above, however, motive is not the same thing as consideration. 17 A 
Am Jur 2d, Contracts, §115. Indeed, motive is not part of the contract. Id. Therefore, Weisel's 
motivation for executing the Agreement - whether it was to build in the setback, or to build a 
residence near his existing home for his son's caretaker - is not relevant to the question of 
whether the Agreement is supported by consideration. Likewise, the Association's motivation 
for entering into the Agreement is not relevant to the issue of consideration. 
Instead, the issue is whether each party obtained a right or benefit as a result of executing 
the Agreement. If there was no benefit whatsoever - such as not paying the recited consideration 
- there is a lack of consideration. If one party makes a promise, and then is unable to perform 
due to a supervening event, the consideration fails. See Restatement (First) Contracts § 274 
("any material failure of a promised performance by one party, not justified by the conduct of the 
other, discharges that party's duty to perform the agreed exchange"). Unless there is a duty to 
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perform in the future, however, there can be no issue of a failure of consideration. That is, if 
both parties have already performed the terms of the agreement, there can be no later failure of 
consideration because both parties already got the benefit of their bargain. See e.g., Shore v. 
Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,912 (2009) (Court confirmed that, although a verbal agreement to 
reduce an existing contract price is void for lack of consideration, "where an agreement is fully 
executed on both sides, the question of consideration becomes immaterial.") 
In this case, the third recital in the Agreement expressly states that Weisel "desires to 
obtain written approval by the Association of its proposed development of Lot 13 and Lot 14 and 
further desires to obtain the Association's written consent to combine such lots into one parcel, 
removing the setback lines along the common boundary line of such lots." Clark Aff., Ex. A. 
As a result of the Agreement, he got what he desired in 1983. He obtained the Association's 
written approval of his proposed development and he was permitted to combine his lots into one 
parcel and remove the setback lines. Similarly, the fourth recital states that the "Association 
desires the development and unification of said lots into one parcel to be in compliance with the 
Declaration of Restrictions of the Beaver Springs Subdivision." As a result of the Agreement, 
the Association got what it wanted - a unification done in compliance with the terms of the 
Declaration. 
Once both parties got something in return, there could be no subsequent "failure" of the 
consideration. See Shore, supra. Indeed, if someone could argue a failure of consideration by 
simply claiming that his motivation for entering into the contract is no longer being satisfied, the 
enforceability of nearly every contract would be in question. 1 Anyone would be allowed to void 
contractual provisions that they no longer wished to abide by. Such could never be the law. 
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Therefore, Weisel' s request for summary judgment on the basis that the consideration "failed" 
must be denied. 
G. There Is No Legal Support For Weisel's Changed Circumstances Argument. 
As an adjunct to his failure of consideration argument, Weisel also argues that due to the 
Association's purported approval of what Weisel self-servingly describes as "very dense 
development" on other lots in the Subdivision, the original intent of the Agreement has been 
frustrated and, therefore, it should be extinguished. In making this argument, Weisel presumes 
that the Agreement should be analyzed in the same manner as a restrictive covenant that affects 
an entire neighborhood. The Agreement at issue in this case, however, is a specifically 
negotiated bilateral contract between one homeowner and an owners' association regarding the 
unification of two lots into a single parcel - a single parcel that can still be developed in any 
manner allowed by the restrictive covenants governing the Association. 
In fact, none of the law cited by Weisel supports the application of a "change in 
neighborhood" analysis to a single bilateral contract, even if that contract pertains to real 
property. See Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258 (Kansas 1970) (lot owner brought action against 
other lot owner who installed a mobile home in violation of a restrictive covenant governing 
entire neighborhood); Gomah v. Hally, 113 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1962) (lot owner sought relief 
from setback restrictions contained in covenants purportedly restricting all lots in neighborhood); 
Cevasco v. Westwood Homes, Inc. 15 A.2d 140 (NJ. 1940) (plaintiff sought to restrain defendant 
from erecting a building that cost less than $6,500 because a restriction was set forth in the 
covenants contained in all deeds in the neighborhood); Zasvislak v. Shipman, 362 P.2d 1053 
For example, people who are "under water" on their mortgages could argue that they should be 
released from their loan agreements because they entered the agreement for the purpose of making, not 
losing, money on the investment. 
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(Colo. 1961) (owner of lot in a subdivision sought relief from certain restrictive covenants 
covering the entire subdivision); and Shippan Point Assn., Inc. v. McManus, 1993 WL 88348 
(Conn.Super. 1993) ( owner of deed restricted lot in a neighborhood subject to the same 
restrictions sought relief from the one home per lot restrictions). 
There is a reason that all of the case law applying a changed circumstances analysis 
involves neighborhoods where all lots are subject to the same restrictions: it is inequitable to 
allow some owners to violate a restrictive covenant and then enforce it against others. This type 
of inequity, however, is not an issue in the case at hand. In this case, Weisel knowingly unified 
Lots 13 and 14 in perpetuity. He realized that, by doing so, he would have a single lot, which 
would then be governed by the terms in the Beaver Springs Declaration. In other words, he got 
exactly what he asked for from the Association. Therefore, there is no inequity in this situation, 
as there can be in a case involving the uneven application of a universal restrictive covenant in a 
neighborhood. 
Furthermore, if the courts were to allow the application of a changed circumstances 
argument to individual bilateral contracts, enforceability will be a constant issue over time. No 
one will be able to rely on the sanctity of the deal since its enforceability could change. Indeed, 
it could be found enforceable in one litigation, and unenforceable years later in a new litigation. 
Thus, an owner who records a conservation easement against his property would be able to argue 
later that, due to an increase in property prices, he should be allowed to develop his property in 
violation of the easement. Similarly, anyone who grants an easement over his property could 
later argue that he no longer desires to allow the easement to be used because traffic has 
increased. As one can see, allowing the application of a change in circumstances argument to a 
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simple bilateral agreement will lead to an untenable situation in which no one will be able to rely 
on the contracts they sign. 
H. Weisel's Changed Circumstances Argument Is Without Merit. 
Should the Court agree that there is no reason to apply a change in neighborhood analysis 
to a single lot unification agreement, the issue of changed circumstances can be decided as a 
matter of law. That is, the Court can simply review the contract and determine whether any of 
the alleged defenses to its formation are valid and timely. If there is no defense as a matter of 
law, the case is over. 
If, however, the Court determines that the theory of changed circumstances can be 
applied to a single bilateral contract in the same manner as it is applied to a neighborhood 
restrictive covenant, Weisel's motion for summary judgment still fails because it is based on a 
misrepresentation of the Association's concern regarding "density," as well as incompetent 
and/or disputed evidence. That is, Weisel wants the Court to consider parole evidence of the 
purpose underlying the Agreement, even the though the purpose is unambiguously set forth in 
the recitals of the Agreement. Moreover, despite Weisel's attempt to imply differently, there 
simply is no evidence of "changed circumstances." Instead, the Beaver Springs Subdivision has 
developed over the years in the manner that the former planning administrator for both Blaine 
County and the City of Ketchum would have expected. Affidavit of Linda Haavik ("Haavik 
Aff.") at <J[3(d). There is, therefore, no basis for allowing Weisel to present his changed 
circumstances claim to a jury. 
1. Weisel Uses Inadmissible Parole Evidence to Mistate the Purpose of 
the Agreement. 
In his motion for summary judgment on the changed circumstances claim, Weisel a,;serts 
that the Association's only purpose in entering into the Agreement (besides the purported 
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setback "mistake") was to restrict density. The word "density," however, is never even used in 
the Agreement. Instead, the clear and unambiguous Agreement sets forth the purpose in the 
recitals of the Agreement: that Weisel wanted approval from the Association to combine his two 
lots for development purposes and the Association wanted the unification to be done in 
compliance with the Declaration. Clark Aff., Ex. A. There is no other purpose stated in the 
Agreement. Since there is no evidence that this purpose has been frustrated, all parol evidence 
relating to the post-Agreement development in the Subdivision is irrelevant and should not be 
admitted into evidence. The issue of the Agreement's purpose and whether it has been frustrated 
by other development in the Subdivision, therefore, should end here. Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 
483, 484 (1989) ("Where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show 
intent.") Parol evidence is admissible only to explain the parties' intent when the express 
provisions in the written agreement are ambiguous. Id., citing Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, 
Inc., 117 Arix. 357 (App. 1977). 
2. Weisel's Asserted Purpose is Highly Disputed. 
Despite the fact that the parties' intent is unambiguously set forth in the Agreement, 
Weisel would like this Court to accept that the purpose of the Agreement was the density as 
measured by the percentage of lot coverage. Thus, he argues, because the Association has 
allowed "large" homes to be built within the Subdivision, the Association no longer has any 
concern regarding density. From this self-serving and unsupported conclusion regarding the 
Association's concern over density, Weisel then asserts that he should be allowed to subdivide 
his single parcel back into two lots because he believes Lot 13 is worth millions of dollars. 
Parol evidence establishes, however, that lot coverage percentage was not the density 
concern that was voiced by either the Association or the County in 1983 when Weisel executed 
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the unification Agreement.2 Instead, Philip Ottley, a former member of the Design Review 
Committee, testified that the Association's concern with the density of Weisel's 1983 
development plans was that Weisel wanted to put two residences on one lot. Ottley Depo. at 
53:2-13. The problem with Weisel's development plan was that the Declaration and County 
zoning ordinance both limited Weisel to one single family residence per lot. The Association 
was willing to allow two residences on Lot 14 if, through the unification agreement, Weisel 
effectively transferred the right to construct a residence on Lot 13 to Lot 14, thereby maintaining 
the one lot/one residence "density" allowed by both the Declaration and the County zoning 
ordinances. In fact, Weisel himself admitted in his 1987 letter to the Design Review Committee 
that the basis of the Agreement was concern over the "possibility of two families living on one 
lot." Clark Aff., Ex. P. 3 
The Association's one residence per lot density analysis was similar to the one utilized by 
the Blaine County Planning and Zoning Commission at the September 14, 1983 hearing on 
Weisel's application for a variance. As Nick Purdy stated at the hearing: 
2 Percentage of lot coverage - which is based on the footprint of the structures and not their total 
square footage - is also not the Association's density concern today. Instead, in 2008, the Association 
amended its Declaration to limit all development on any single lot- regardless of lot size - to 15,000 
square feet. Rosen berg Aff. at 'l[ 17; Exhibit 117 of Exhibit l of Haemmerle Aff. That is, the Association 
members voted to intentionally allocate a different allowable percentage lot coverage to each lot owner. 
3 Despite this 1987 admission, Weisel now argues that the Court should ignore the Association's 
and County's concerns over having two single family homes on one lot simply because he thinks the 
caretakers' house should be characterized as an "outbuilding" instead of a "residence." Brief at 27. Thus, 
he argues, since there was no limit on the size of an "outbuilding" in the Association's original 
Declaration, the Association should have allowed him to build a caretakers' house of any size. This 
argument, however, is completely irrelevant. If Weisel thought that his caretakers' house was an 
outbuilding, and not subject to any size limitations, the time to object was in 1983, not twenty-six years 
later. Weisel is an extremely sophisticated and successful businessman. No one forced him to agree to 
unify his two lots in exchange for being allowed to construct a second residence on Lot 14. If he felt that 
the terms were not fair, he had every right to object and challenge the Association and the County - but 
that objection should have been lodged in 1983. Instead, as Weisel testified, he entered into the 
Agreement with the undisclosed intention of challenging it later, after memories had faded and 
documents destroyed. Weisel Depo. at 63: 17-64:13. 
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We have goals, which are reflected in the Comprehensive Plan, and we have 
implementations, which are reflected in the ordinances. We try to encourage 
cluster development off of the highway. And getting two residences in a .4 zone 
on 6.7 acres would be good for the county. 
Johnson Aff., Ex. A at p. 13 (emphasis added). Thus, the County allowed Weisel to transfer his 
right to build a residence on Lot 13 to Lot 14, provided that he agree never to develop Lot 13. 
Haavik Aff., at '1[ 41. In fact, Mr. McLaughlin - Weisel' s agent - admitted at the September 14, 
1983 hearing before the Planning & Zoning Commission that Weisel's Agreement with the 
Association was the equivalent of vacating the lot line between Lots 13 and 14. Id. at p. 11. By 
agreeing to the equivalent of the vacation of the lot line, Weisel knew that he would not be 
entitled to construct another single family home on his single parcel in the Subdivision. 
The County's and City's consistent desire over the past decades to limit each lot to one 
single residence is explained in detail in the Affidavit of Linda Haavik at CJ[ 3(b ). Ms. Haavik was 
the Planning/Zoning/ Building Department Administrator for Blaine County from 1992 to the 
end of 2005 and the City Planner and Planning Administrator for the City of Ketchum from 1978 
through 1992. Id., at 'JI 1. She, therefore, has thirty-two years of experience in land use and 
development, zoning, and subdivision matters in Blaine County. As she explains, the evolution 
of the City and County's zoning ordinances regarding accessory dwelling units ("ADUs") 
evidences a consistent desire to ensure that ADUs are limited living spaces that are subordinate 
and inconsequential to the primary use of the land for which it is zoned. Id. at 'JI 3(a). That is, 
there is to be one single family home per lot. The home that Weisel desired to build for his 
caretakers was not considered an ADU; instead, both the County and the Association considered 
it to constitute a second residence because it exceeded the County's limit of 900 square feet for 
an ADU by approximately 700 square feet, and it had more than one bedroom. Id. at gr 5. 
1112 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 
10353-001 
Therefore, Weisel's "evidence" that large residences and pool houses have been built 
throughout the Subdivision has no relevance whatsoever to whether or not the benefits of the 
Agreement have been neutralized or the purpose frustrated. See Restatement 2nd Contracts§ 265 
(a party's obligations may be discharged under the theory of frustration of purpose only if an 
event occurs whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, 
thereby making the party's performance virtually worthless to the other). Likewise, his expert's 
calculations of floor area ratios and lot coverage percentage are meaningless to the case at hand.4 
The only possible issue is whether or not the Association has knowingly permitted so many other 
homeowners in the Subdivision to build more than one single family home on their lots that the 
unification of Weisel's two lots has been rendered "unreasonable, confiscatory, discriminatory, 
or [practically destroys] the purpose for which the restriction was originally imposed." Pettey v. 
First National Bank of Geneva, 225 Ill. App. 3d 539 (1992). As set forth below, Weisel has 
failed to present any competent evidence that such a situation exists today within the 
Subdivision. 
3. Weisel's Changed Circumstances Argument is Based on Incompetent 
and/or Disputed Evidence. 
In making his claim that the Subdivision is now so densely developed that the purpose of 
the Agreement has been rendered useless, Weisel contends that the Association allowed guest 
houses to be constructed on Lots 5, 11, 12, 16 and 20 that exceeded the maximum allowed at the 
time under the applicable county or City ordinances. Brief at p. 29. This contention is based on 
the "evidence" presented in the Affidavit of Garth McClure, a partner with Benchmark, a 
4 As Ms. Haavik explains, neither Blaine County nor the City of Ketchum use floor area ratios or 
lot coverage percentages in their definition of density for residential subdivisions. Instead, in single 
family zoning districts, the primary dwelling unit on any lot is considered the unit of density. Haavik Aff. 
at <j[<j[ 28-30. Thus, each lot in the Subdivision has a unit of density of one ( 1 ). 
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surveying company. In Exhibit 6, Appendix A, of his Affidavit, Mr. McClure sets forth a Build 
Out Report ("McClure Report"), which purports to contain the actual square footages and uses of 
all of the structures currently existing in the Subdivision. Mr. McClure admits that, in 
determining the square footages and uses of the structures, he relied solely on the Blaine County 
Assessor's records. McClure Aff. at~[ 13. As set forth below, however, the Assessor's records 
do not accurately reflect the sizes or uses of the structures in the Subdivision. 
According to Linda Haavik, the Assessor calculates square footage by measuring the 
exterior of a building. Haavik Aff. at 'frll 20-22. In determining the size, the Assessor is not 
concerned about whether or not the structure meets the zoning requirements. Instead, the 
Assessor is merely trying to determine the general size of the structure in order to determine 
property value for tax purposes. Id. Thus, the Assessor may include square footage of 
components that the Blaine County and City of Ketchum zoning officials did not include, such as 
the exterior finishes, interior staircases, mechanical areas, etc. As a result, the zoning officials' 
calculations could very well differ from the Assessor's calculations. Moreover, as Ms. Haavik 
explains, and Mr. McLaughlin confirms, square footage calculations are somewhat subjective 
due to the various methods used. Id. As a result, one cannot use the Assessor's records as proof 
that a homeowner sought approval from the Association (or the City or County) to build a 
structure of that exact size. Instead, the homeowner may have calculated - and represented to 
the Association - a square footage that complied with the zoning ordinances. 
The inability to use the Assessor's records to determine compliance with the then-in-
effect zoning ordinances is exemplified by Weisel' s caretakers' house. When Weisel sought a 
variance from Blaine County in 1983, he represented to the County that he sought to build a 
structure that was 1,570 square feet. Johnson 2nd Aff,, Ex. A. As a result, the County approved 
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his variance and granted him approval to build a 1,570 square foot caretakers' house. The 
Assessor's records, however, state that the caretakers' house is 1,631 square feet. Affidavit of 
Tammy Robeson, Ex. A. That is, the Assessor's records evidence a 61 square foot differential 
from the plans that were submitted and approved by the County (and the Association) and the 
Assessor's exterior measurement. Given the fact that different people will measure square 
footage differently, and for different purposes, the Assessor's records should not be used as 
evidence that other homeowners in the Subdivision sought and obtained approval from the 
Design Review Committee to build structures that exceeded the then-in-effect zoning ordinances 
regarding ADUs. Haavik Aff. at '1I 23. 
Moreover, the McClure Report contains several misrepresentations or mistakes regarding 
the asserted sizes and uses of the five lots that form the basis of Weisel' s argument that, post 
1983, the Association allowed over-sized guest houses for other owners without requiring them 
to relinquish development rights.5 These misrepresentations and mistakes including the 
following: 
• Lot 5: The McClure Report alleges that this lot has a "guesthouse and garage" that is 
2,711 square feet that was built in 1978. Notably, since this structure was built prior 
to the execution of the Agreement, it cannot constitute a "changed" circumstance. In 
any case, the Assessor's records state that there is only 961 square feet of "finished 
living area." The remainder of the building is 1025 square feet of garage space and 
725 square feet of unfinished attic space above the garage. Therefore, given the 
uncertainty with measuring square footage, there is no competent evidence that the 
guest house area exceeds the 900 square feet allowed under the County zoning 
ordinance in 1978. 
5 Weisel also references the Association's willingness to allow the owner of Lots 18 and 19 to 
move the lot line between the two lots so that he could build a pool and pool house without violating the 
setback restrictions. Notably, the owner of these two lots was not seeking to build a second residence on 
one lot. Therefore, the Association's approval of the lot line shift has no relevance to Weisel's changed 
circumstances argument. Indeed, it simply proves that, if the motivation behind the Agreement was 
concern over a setback violation, Weisel could have sought only to move - not vacate - the lot line 
between his two properties. As evidenced by his desire to unify the lots, he sought to transfer the 
development rights allocated to Lot 13 over to Lot 14. 
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• Lot 11: The McClure Report states that this lot has a guest house that is 1,250 square 
feet and a guest apartment that is 1,151 square feet. According to the owner of the 
lot, Jeff Greenstein, this assertion is not accurate because there is no separate guest 
apartment on his property. Affidavit of Jeff Greenstein at 'I[ 2. The main house has a 
garage attached to it, and attached to the other side of the garage is a bedroom and 
office. There are no separate cooking facilities in these rooms. As for the 
guesthouse, which was converted from a barn in approximately 1999, Mr. Greenstein 
is not aware of the square footage. There is, however, no competent evidence that the 
previous owner sought to exceed the 1200 square feet allowed under the Ketchum 
zoning ordinance. To the contrary, according to the City of Ketchum's Planning 
Assistant, since the Subdivision was annexed into the City in 1990, no homeowner in 
the Beaver Springs Subdivision has sought approval for any building plans that 
violated the then current City ordinances regarding building sizes. Affidavit of 
Rachel Martin at <JI 2. 
• Lot 12: The McClure Report states that this lot has a guest house that is 1,280 square 
feet. Again there is no competent evidence that the building exceeded the square 
footage allowance as the City zoning officials measured square footage or that the 
owners of the property informed the Association or the City that they were building a 
structure that exceeded the City's maximum of 1,200 square feet. To the contrary, no 
variance applications were filed by any Association member since the Subdivision 
was annexed into the City in 1990. Id. 
• Lot 16: The McClure Report states that this lot has a guest house that is 1,568 square 
feet According to the owner, Kiril Sokoloff, this contention is not accurate. Instead, 
this detached building has two separate levels. The top level has a guest sleeping area 
and game room, which is attached to a garage area. There is no kitchen in that upper 
level. The lower level, which does have a kitchen, is a caretaker's apartment that is 
approximately 700 square feet. The caretaker's apartment is completely separate 
from the guest area above and has its own entrance. Affidavit of Kiril Sokoloff at <JI 3. 
The Assessor's records state that this caretaker's area is 784 square feet, not 1,568 
square feet. 
• Lot 20: According to the McClure Report, this lot has a guest house that is 1,423 
square feet. Again, this contention is not accurate. Instead, according to Janet Jarvis, 
the architect employed by the then-owners of the lot, she created a guest wing that 
added approximately 1100 square feet to the end of the existing house, which already 
contained the garage and a maid's room. Affidavit of Janet Jarvis at <JI 2. The size set 
forth in the Blaine County Assessor records includes the pre-existing square footage 
of the maid's room. The owners, however, did not intend for the maid's room to be 
part of the guest wing and the City planners never questioned Ms. Jarvis about the 
issue. Instead, the City simply approved an approximate 1100 square foot guest wing 
addition to the house. Id. at <JI 4. 
In addition to these mistakes regarding the five guesthouses identified by Weisel as 
constituting his "changed circumstances" argument, the McClure Report also contains a mistake 
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regarding Lot 7. The McClure Report states that Lot 7 contains a house, attached garage and 
attached guest house. This contention is not correct. Instead, this lot has no guest house 
whatsoever. Jarvis Aff., at <J[ 6. There is a room above the garage, but it was designed as a 
recreation/media room only, and has no kitchen facilities. Id. 
As a result, Weisel has failed to present any evidence establishing that, post 1983, the 
Association knowingly allowed anyone to construct a guest house that was larger than what was 
allowed under the then-in-effect zoning ordinances. Instead, the only owner expressly allowed 
by the Association to construct a second residence on one lot was Weisel. Since there is no 
competent and undisputed evidence to support a changed circumstances argument, Weisel's 
motion for summary judgment must fail. 
4. The Subdivision has been Built Out as Expected. 
As set forth in detail in the Association's motion for summary judgment, and as Weisel 
himself admits, the standard for invalidating a restrictive covenant is very high. Brief at 31-32, 
citing Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258 (Kansas 1970) (the change "must be so great or radical as 
to neutralize the benefits of the restriction and destroy its purpose."); see also Deak v. Heathcote 
Assoc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Supr. Ct. N.Y. 1993) (invalidation of a restrictive covenant requires 
proof that the purpose of the restriction was incapable of being accomplished). In this case, the 
Association still benefits from the unification of the two lots. Indeed, Weisel admits that a lack 
of development on Lot 13 increases the value of Lot 14, and, thus, every other lot in Beaver 
Springs. Weisel Depo. at 182:14-18. Therefore, even if Weisel's evidence was competent, it 
does not establish a radical change in the neighborhood that destroys the underlying purpose for 
requiring the unification of the two lots. 
To the contrary, the development in the Subdivision has been as one should have 
expected to occur over the years. According to the former planning administrator, the Beaver 
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Springs Subdivision was proposed and approved as a residential subdivision in a zoning district 
that permitted one single family residence per lot as its primary use in addition to variety of 
accessory, subordinate uses that could be located on the same lot. Haavik Aff., at <j[ 38. As she 
further opines, despite the lack of exact data on the square footages of the buildings in the 
Subdivision, it has developed in the manner that was permitted by the zoning in both the County 
and the City. Id. at en 40. That is, the lots contain single family homes and allowable 
outbuildings. 
I. Weisel's Claims Should Be Dismissed Under The Doctrine Of Laches. 
As set forth above, Weisel relies solely on the Assessor's records to create an issue as to 
whether or not the Association knowingly allowed others in the Subdivision to violate the then-
in-effect zoning ordinances without also requiring them to unify two lots. According to Linda 
Haavik, however, the Assessor's records do not reflect the square footages that were presented 
by the homeowners to the building departments. Haavik Aff. at <J[ 26. Instead, the only 
documents that should be relied upon to determine zoning compliance are the building plans that 
were submitted to the Design Review Committee and the applicable building department.6 Id. at 
en 27. These documents, however, are no longer available for the parties to review. Id. Instead, 
Blaine County maintained only the building permit application forms from 1980 to present and 
these forms contain little or no information about the size of the buildings or the type or purpose 
of the building being permitted. Id. 
Furthermore, as a matter of housekeeping, the Association discarded all of the non-
current building plans that had been submitted to the Design Review Committee several years 
prior to 2004. Affidavit of Karen Roseberry ("Roseberry Aff.") at en 2. Weisel filed this suit in 
6 It must be noted, however, that the City of Ketchum records evidence not a single request for a 
variance to build any structure in a manner not compliant with the zoning ordinances. See R. Martin Aff. 
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February 2009. Due to the fact that these documents are no longer in existence, the Association 
is unable to show the Court the building plans that other homeowners submitted to the Design 
Review Committee for review and approval, which would establish that the Association did not 
knowingly approve any structure that violated the then-current zoning ordinances. 
Weisel's delay in bringing this lawsuit, therefore, has caused prejudice to the 
Association's ability to present its defense to this "changed circumstances" argument, as well as 
the other contract claims. As such, all claims in the Amended Complaint should be summarily 
dismissed under the theory of laches. The affirmative defense of laches is a creation of equity. 
Kootenai Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Lamar Corp. 2003 WL 23914538 at *10 (Dist. Ct. 2003). The 
necessary elements to establish the defense of laches are: 
(1) Defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; 
(2) Delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity 
to institute a suit; 
(3) Lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and 
( 4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the 
suit is not held to be barred. 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352 (2002). 
In this case, each of the elements of the affirmative defense is satisfied. First, according 
to Weisel, the Association invaded his rights by allowing various other homeowners to violate 
the zoning ordinances, all of which occurred according to the McClure Report prior to 2003. 
Indeed, according to Weisel, the Association invaded his rights back in 1983 when it purportedly 
"forced" him to sign the Agreement even though the Declaration did not restrict the size of 
"outbuildings." 
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The second element of the defense is whether Weisel delayed in bringing his claims 
against the Association. This element is clearly established. Indeed, Weisel testified at 
deposition that he signed the Agreement in 1983 with the undisclosed intention of later getting 
out of it and building on Lot 13. Weisel Depo. at 63: 17-64: 13. That is, he knew he was going to 
challenge the enforceability of the Agreement back in 1983. Despite this fact, he waited until 
2009 to file the suit. Moreover, even if the Court was to look solely at Weisel's changed 
circumstances argument, Weisel still delayed in bringing this claim. According to the Assessor's 
records, the last guest house built in the Subdivision was on Lot 12 and it came on to the 
Assessor's records in 2003. Thus, Weisel delayed a minimum of six years after the current 
development situation was created before bringing suit. In addition to supporting a claim of 
laches, this six year delay also constitutes a violation of the statute of limitations, which is five 
years for actions based on a written contract. Idaho Code §5-216. 
The third element of the laches defense is whether the Association lacked knowledge that 
Weisel would assert a claim against it. The first time that Weisel began challenging the 
Agreement was in 2004. Clark Aff., Ex. R. Thus, although Weisel knew he was going to 
challenge the Agreement back in 1983, the first time Weisel said anything about the Agreement 
to the Association - which did not constitute a demand - was in 2004. Weisel then waited 
another five years before filing suit. 
The final element of the defense is whether the Association has been prejudiced by 
Weisel's delay in filing suit. It has been. The Association discarded the building plans that had 
been submitted to it by the homeowners several years prior to 2004. Roseberry Aff. at <J{ 2. At 
that time, it had no knowledge of Weisel's intent to claim that the Association had knowingly 
' 
approved development plans that violated the County or City zoning ordinances. Thus, it cannot 
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establish with the best evidence possible that it did no such thing. Furthermore, the Association 
is prejudiced by the natural fading of memories that happens when a quarter of a century passes. 
The members of the Association have no clear memory of the negotiation of the Agreement 
because the events occurred twenty-six years ago. Weisel should not, therefore, be allowed to 
base his claims on parol evidence regarding the unstated purpose of the Agreement~ especially 
since he has been planning this challenge to the Agreement since he signed it. Instead, the 
Agreement should be interpreted solely by the express - and undisputed - terms of the 
Agreement itself. 
Therefore, the Association respectfully requests that the Court summarily dismiss the 
entire Amended Complaint because Weisel should have brought the claims sooner so as not to 
prejudice the Association's ability to defend itself. 
J. Weisel Cannot Establish As A Matter Of Law That Neither The County Nor Jim 
Dutcher Are Not Indispensable Parties. 
The final issue contained in Weisel's motion for summary judgment is a request that the 
court find, as a matter of law, that there are no indispensible parties in this action. Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. Rule 19(a)( 1), if a party is necessary, they must be joined if feasible. There are two 
separate tests for determining whether a party is necessary. The first test is if "in the person's 
absence, complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties." Id. The second test 
is whether a person claims an interest relating to the subject of the litigation and their absence 
would either impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or would leave any of 
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple and inconsistent 
obligations. Id. 
In this case, if the court determines that Weisel's claims should go to a jury, the issue of 
indispensible parties must be addressed. The Association claims that there are two indispensible 
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parties: Blaine County and Jim Dutcher. They are indispensible parties because they may have 
third party rights under the Agreement. 
Under Idaho law, "if a party can demonstrate that a contract was made expressly for his 
benefit, he may enforce that contract, at any time prior to rescission, as a third party beneficiary." 
Baldwin v. Leach, 115 Idaho 713, 715 (Ct. App. 1989). The issue of whether someone is a third 
party beneficiary depends on whether the transaction reflects an intent to benefit the party. Id. If 
another party is a third party beneficiary, once that party has relied or acted upon the existence of 
that contract, the contract cannot be rescinded without his consent. Id., citing Restatement 2nd 
Contracts§ 311(1981). Thus, if Blaine County or Jim Dutcher is a third party beneficiary of the 
Agreement and acted in reliance upon it, the Agreement cannot be rescinded without that party's 
consent. That is, complete relief in this action to rescind the Agreement cannot be accorded 
without their presence. 
With regard to Blaine County, it is clearly a third party beneficiary of the Agreement. 
The County demanded, as a condition of approval of Weisel's variance application, that "a 
declaration or deed restriction be written satisfactory to the Zoning Administrator, which will not 
allow the construction of a residence upon lot 13." 2nd Aff. of Custodian of Records, Ex. C. In 
response, Weisel's attorney, Roger Crist, sent the Agreement to Blaine County Planning & 
Zoning stating "I believe the Agreement will satisfy the requirements of the county in this 
regard." Therefore, there are facts clearly indicating that the County was an intended beneficiary 
of the Agreement, and that it relied on the Agreement when it granted the variance to Weisel. 
Weisel, however, contends that the County is no longer a third party beneficiary because 
it has no interest in enforcing the Agreement. This statement is based solely on the Affidavit of 
Timothy Graves, the Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County. In his affidavit, Mr. 
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Graves "opines" that the County had no interest in enforcing any lot restriction on Weisel' s 
property because the lot had been annexed into the City of Ketchum. This "opinion," however, 
does not constitute a finding by the Blaine County Board of Commissioners that the County has 
no interest in enforcing the Agreement. There is no evidence whatsoever that this issue was 
raised at an open hearing before the Commissioners and voted upon. Therefore, Mr. Graves' 
opinion does not eliminate the County's status as a necessary party to this litigation. 
Weisel's next argument is that the County no longer has jurisdiction over the "subject 
matter" because the property was annexed by the City. In making this argument, Weisel relies 
on the language in Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789 (1977). In Blaser, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that a county cannot bind a municipality by a regulatory decision taken by the 
county affecting the property prior to annexation by the municipality. Id. at 791. Thus, a city 
has the right to rezone the property after annexation provided it respects non-conforming uses. 
Id. This statement of Idaho law, however, does not have any bearing on whether a County, as a 
third party beneficiary of a land use agreement, loses its right to enforce it after the property is 
annexed by the City. The County's potential desire to enforce its rights as a third party 
beneficiary of a bilateral contract is not the equivalent of trying to enforce a previous zoning 
ordinance. Its third party rights vested when it relied on the Agreement and approved the 
variance application and Weisel has set forth no law supporting a theory that these rights 
disappeared upon the annexation. Therefore, should the court allow Weisel to proceed on his 
claims, the County should be joined as an indispensible party. 
With regard to Jim Dutcher, he has asserted to the Association that he is a third party 
beneficiary of the Agreement. Affidavit of Bill Fruehling, Ex. B. Weisel asserts that Mr. 
Dutcher is not a third party beneficiary because he believes that Mr. Dutcher was not an intended 
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beneficiary of the Agreement. The Agreement, however, was executed by the president of the 
Association to benefit all of its members. Indeed, the Association acts only for the benefit of its 
members. Mr. Dutcher then claimed to the Association that he relied on the existence of the 
Agreement when he purchased his lot in Beaver Springs. Id. As a result, there is at least an 
issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Dutcher is a third party beneficiary of the Agreement. If he 
is, there is every reason to join him as a party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Beaver Springs requests that the Court deny Weisel's 
motion for summary judgment in its entirety and instead dismiss all of Weisel's claims against it 
with the exception of his claim for reimbursement of any assessment he should not have been 
requested to pay during the period from 2005 to the present. 
DATED this 2.. day of February 2010. 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
By: ~J:t-.--:-::: 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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his sole and separate property, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-09-124 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDG:MENT 
COMES NOW Defendant Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc. ("Beaver Springs" or 
"Association"), by and through its counsel of record, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, and 
submits the following Reply Brief to Plaintiff Thomas Weisel's ("Weisel") Response Brief: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although Weisel's Response Brief is over forty pages long, it is entirely based on the 
following two allegations: (1) the only reason the 1983 Agreement was executed was to allow 
Weisel to build in the setback area between his two lots; and (2) the Association's concern 
regarding "density" in the Beaver Springs Subdivision has been thoroughly thwarted due to the 
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large homes that have been built since 1983. Despite having the burden of establishing these 
allegations through admissible evidence to survive the Association's summary judgment motion, 
Weisel relies solely on his own self-serving "recollection" and irrelevant and inaccurate "facts" 
regarding subsequent development within the Subdivision. 
With regard to Weisel's claim that the "only possible purpose" of the Agreement was to 
enable him to build in the setback area, Weisel has the burden of proving this purported sole 
purpose by clear and satisfactory evidence, not merely by a preponderance. The evidence he 
presents, however, does not even come close to satisfying his burden. Instead, Weisel appears to 
have adopted the theory that, if he repeats something enough times, it will become fact. Thus, in 
his Response Brief, Weisel completely ignores the evidence submitted by the Association -
including Weisel's own admissions - that conclusively and unambiguously establish that the 
purpose of the Agreement was to obtain the Association's approval for his 1983 development 
plans, which included building two residences on the combined lots. Realizing the futility in 
arguing against the express terms of the Agreement and his own admissions, Weisel instead 
focuses on an irrelevant and inaccurate theme that the Association has some sort of personal 
vendetta against him. 1 The Association, however, is not motivated by personal feelings; it 
merely wants Weisel to live up to his end of the bargain. 
The second allegation underlying Weisel's claims against the Association is that the 
Association ha<; allowed other homeowners to develop their properties in a manner that Weisel 
considers dense. To prove this contention, Weisel presents the non-expert opinion of an 
For example, Weisel alleges that the Board elected Jamie Dutcher to the Board after he resigned 
and has allowed her to participate in matters relating to the Agreement even though her husband, Jim 
Dutcher, has claimed to be a third party beneficiary of the Agreement. This allegation is false. Jamie 
Dutcher did in fact recuse herself from the entire issue of the Agreement after the Association members 
elected her to the Board. Affidavit of Jamie Dutcher at CJ[ 3. 
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employee of a surveying company who claims - not surprisingly - that there is more 
development in the Subdivision now than there was in 1983. Weisel also relies on the 
Assessor's records as proof that other lot owners have been able to exceed the City and County 
size restrictions. As set forth in the Affidavit of Linda Haavik, however, the Assessor's records 
are not competent evidence of what size information was presented to the zoning officials or the 
Design Review Committee at the time of construction when seeking approval to build. 
Therefore, Weisel has not presented adequate evidence to satisfy his burden of proving that the 
Association knowingly allowed the Subdivision to change so radically and completely that the 
purpose for the Agreement has been destroyed. 
Weisel has not satisfied his burden of presenting sufficient admissible evidence to prove 
his claims. Nor has he provided an adequate legal rationale for why he should not be held to the 
statute of limitations. His complaint against the Association, therefore, must be dismissed. 
II. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Mutual Mistake Argument Is Based On A False Premise. 
Weisel' s claim of mutual mistake is entire! y based on the assertion that a "fundamental, 
express premise of the Agreement was the location and construction of improvements in the 
setback along the boundary between Lot 13 and Lot 14." To establish a mutual mistake, Weisel 
must show by clear and satisfactory evidence - not just a preponderance - that at the time of 
contracting, both parties shared a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain. Restatement 2nd Contracts§ 152. The only "facts" submitted by 
Weisel to support his claim that both he and the Association entered into the Agreement solely 
on the mistaken belief that the improvements were in the setback area are the following: (1) 
there is a single phrase in the Agreement that states that the Association will allow the removal 
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of the setbacks because "the improvements to be constructed in the setback lines along the 
common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 will not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from 
other lots;" (2) Philip Ottley "recollected" that at some point in the process the caretaker's unit 
was located in the setback; and (3) the plans changed over time. As set forth below, these three 
pieces of "evidence" do not satisfy the clear and satisfactory burden required to prove that the 
Association based its decision to enter into the Agreement on the location of the improvements, 
especially when viewed in opposition to the undisputed evidence presented by the Association. 
Indeed, it must be noted that Weisel failed to address most of the evidence submitted by 
the Association in support of its motion for summary judgment, including the following: 
• Weisel's architect testified that he never located the caretakers' house in the 
setback area. McLaughlin Depa. at 22:24-23:11. 
• The drawings submitted to, and approved by, the Design Review Committee sited 
the planned caretakers' house outside of the setback lines on Lot 14. Ottley 
Depa., pp. 44: 15-46:23 and Ex. 5. Therefore, there was no reason for the 
Association to believe that the caretakers' house was located in the setback area. 
• Weisel admitted in a 1987 letter to the Design Review Committee that it was the 
"possibility of two families living on one lot" that led to his agreement to "give 
up the right ever to build on the second" lot. Clark Aff., Ex. P. 
• Weisel would not have signed the lot-unification Agreement if its sole purpose 
was to enable him to build in the setback area because Weisel testified that he 
intentionally moved the location of the caretakers' house during the design 
review process for the purpose of being able to build on Lot 13 later. Weisel 
Depa. at 41:7-18. 
• Weisel's architect informed the County's Planning & Zoning Commission that 
Weisel wanted the caretakers' house to be close to the existing main house on 
Lot 14, not near Lot 13, because it was to house the person that was taking care 
of his teenage son. First Aff. of Custodian of Records, Ex. A at p. 11. 
Instead of rebutting the undisputed evidence set forth above, Weisel primarily focuses on 
the single phrase in the "Removal of Setbacks" paragraph of the Agreement. He does not, 
however, address the several other provisions in the Agreement that expressly set forth the 
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understanding of the parties and the reasons for why they executed it. In fact, Weisel completely 
ignores the recitals in the Agreement, even though they set forth the expressed desires of the 
parties. The second recital states that "Lot 13 and Lot 14 are conterminous and Weisel desires to 
combine and develop said lots as one parcel."2 The next recital states that Weisel desired to 
obtain the Association's written approval for his proposed development of the two lots and their 
unification. The final recital states that the Association desired the development and unification 
of the two lots to be in compliance with the Declaration. These recitals do not say that Weisel 
desired to unify the two lots so that he could locate the development in the setback area. It is 
inconceivable that, if the Agreement was solely premised on the location of the development in 
the setback, the recitals would not state that fact. 
In addition to the clear expression of purpose set forth in the recitals, there is a rational 
explanation for the phrase in the Agreement that forms the basis for Weisel's mutual mistake 
argument. The phrase in the Agreement upon which Weisel bases his entire mutual mistake 
theory is: 
"the improvements to be constructed in the setback lines along the common 
boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 will not cause unreasonable diminution of the 
view from other lots." 
Paragraph 17 of the Declaration, which governs whether two lots may be unified, provides: 
"any improvements to be constructed within these setback lines will not cause 
unreasonable diminution of the view from other property." 
Since it was the Association's desire that the unification be done in accordance with the 
provisions of the Declaration, it needed to find that any improvements that may ever be 
2 Thus, the Agreement expressly states that it was Weisel that desired to unify his lots and develop 
them as one. There is no stated limitation or condition to this desire. Had this recital not been true, 
Weisel - with his sophisticated business background - certainly would have objected to it. He did not. 
Instead, he signed the Agreement acknowledging that it was his unconditioned desire - not acquiescence 
to an Association demand - to unify his two lots for development purposes. 
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constructed in the setback area not impair the views from other lots. Thus, the drafter of the 
Agreement likely adopted the language from the Declaration into the "Removal of Setbacks" 
paragraph. Notably, Weisel presents no evidence or argument in his Response Brief to rebut this 
explanation. 
The second piece of evidence relied upon by Weisel to support his theory that a setback 
encroachment was a vital fact underlying the Agreement is the testimony of Philip Ottley. Mr. 
Ottley stated that he recalled that, at some point, the caretakers' unit was located in the setback. 
This testimony, however, must be viewed in connection with the fact that Mr. Ottley was 
deposed twenty-six years after the Agreement was executed, he was no longer a member of the 
Association, and he had recently reviewed the Amended Complaint filed by Weisel, which 
claims that the location of the caretakers' unit changed during the design review process. 
Therefore, whether he testified as to a true recollection or to what he thought he should 
remember is unclear. His "recollection" also could have been based on the fact that the location 
of Weisel's proposed garage structure- which was part of the 1983 development plan - was 
changed because it was originally located in the front setback. Aff. of Kathleen Rivers, Ex. 6. 
Mr. Ottley could simply be remembering that a setback issue existed with Weisel's plans and 
superimposing that issue onto the caretakers' house. Unfortunately, given Weisel's intentional 
decision to wait twenty-six years before filing this lawsuit, getting a clear recollection from any 
witness is very difficult. 
The final piece of evidence presented by Weisel is that the "undisputed documentary 
evidence shows that the plans were changed many times." Brief at 11. This "fact," however, 
does not prove the existence of a mutual mistake. Instead, the evidence merely proves that the 
design was first created with drawings dated July 20, 1983 and were amended on August 18, 
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1983, before they were submitted to the Design Review Committee on September 1, 1983. 
Then, the only documented change was on September 23, 1983 when Mr. McLaughlin informed 
Jean Smith of the Design Review Committee that the garage was moved to a new location 
because the County Planning & Zoning Department realized that it was encroaching into the 
front setback. Rivers Aff., Ex. 6. Nothing in this evidence even implies that the location of the 
caretakers' house was initially located in the setback area, or that its location was a fundamental 
premise of the Agreement. 
Realizing that the evidence does not support his claim regarding the sole purpose of the 
Agreement, Weisel then reverts to a logic argument. That is, Weisel asserts that the "only 
possible purpose" of unifying the two lots was to build in the setback area. The apparent basis 
for this argument is that the Association had no authority upon which to deny Weisel's 1983 
development plan unless the development was to be located in the setback area. This contention 
is simply incorrect. Under the Declaration, every lot is limited to one single family home. Clark 
Aff., Ex. B at ')[13. As Weisel admitted in his 1987 letter to the Design Review Committee, he 
sought to build two single family homes on one lot. Id., Ex. P. The Association, therefore, had 
the right to deny his development plans. Although Weisel now characterizes his caretakers' 
house as an outbuilding, in 1983 both the Association and the County considered it to be a 
primary residence. Thus, as clearly expressed in the Planning & Zoning hearing notes on 
Weisel's variance request, Weisel was permitted to construct two primary residences on Lot 14 if 
he gave up his right to build a residence on Lot 13. Affidavit of Custodian of Records, Ex. A. 
This condition was satisfied by the Agreement. Therefore, Weisel's "only possible purpose" 
argument is unavailing. 
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Weisel has the burden of establishing by clear and satisfactory evidence that the location 
of the caretakers' house in the setback area was a vital fact upon which both parties based the 
Agreement. The evidence presented by Weisel does not meet this burden. His claim of mutual 
mistake, therefore, must be dismissed. 
B. The Agreement Is Support By Consideration. 
The entire crux of Weisel' s lack of consideration claim is based on his assertion that the 
only possible consideration for the Agreement was the location of the development in the setback 
area. As set forth above, Weisel has not presented adequate evidence to meet his burden of 
proof. Furthermore, in making this argument, Weisel implies that there can be only one form of 
consideration. That is, if he did not get the benefit he claims to have desired. there can be no 
consideration whatsoever for the Agreement. Consideration, however, is a legal concept that is 
defined as any right or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance given by the other. 
17A Am Jur 2d Contracts§ 115. Thus, if Weisel obtained any benefit or right, there was 
consideration for the Agreement. 
Clearly, Weisel did obtain a benefit from the Agreement: he obtained the Association's 
approval of his development plan, which included constructing a second residence on Lot 14. 
Weisel even admitted this fact - an admission that he does not address in his Response Brief. 
Clark Aff., Ex. P. Weisel then used the Agreement to obtain a variance from the County. See 
Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 42 (2007) (Court affirmed lower court's finding that 
consideration for an agreement may be provided by a third person). He, therefore, got something 
in return for unifying the lots in accordance with the terms of the Declaration - especially since it 
was Weisel himself that desired to unify his two lots. 
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Despite his admission, Weisel continues to claim that the Agreement was not supported 
by consideration. In making this argument, Weisel first asserts that the Association "admitted" 
that the consideration for the Agreement was the removal of the setbacks in lieu of a lot line shift 
to accommodate the development plan. Response Brief at 14. This contention is an outrageous 
attempt to prove a fact through highly unreliable hearsay evidence. Indeed, it is based entirely 
on the notes from a 2004 Board of Director's Meeting in which some unidentified member made 
a statement regarding the removal of the setbacks in lieu of a lot line shift. The truth of this 
statement, however, is not proven simply because someone said it. Indeed, it could have been 
Weisel himself who made this statement. Weisel's misleading evidence supporting this 
purported admission, therefore, should be stricken from the record. 
Weisel' s only other "support" for his lack of consideration argument is, once again, his 
unsupported assertion that the Association had no right to deny Weisel's development plans back 
in 1983. In addition to the fact that this assertion is false because both the Association and the 
County had the right to deny Weisel's request to locate two single family homes on one lot, this 
argument should have been made back in 1983, not today. If Weisel believed that the 
Association did not have the right to limit him to two single family homes for his two lots, he 
should not have signed the Agreement. He should have filed this lawsuit against the Association 
(and, presumably, the County) back in 1983 and tried to get an order enabling hiim to build what 
he wanted to build. Weisel did not do this because he knew that his proposed development 
exceeded the Association's and County's requirements. 
C. Weisel's Rescission Claim Must Be Dismissed. 
In its motion for summary judgment, the Association correctly claimed that the rescission 
claim must be dismissed because - even if Weisel could establish a mutual mistake or failure of 
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consideration - the parties cannot be put back to their pre-contract positions. O'Connor v. 
Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904,909 (2008). As set forth below, not one of Weisel's 
responses rebuts this claim. 
First, Weisel claims that the Association's attorney admitted that the Agreement can be 
rescinded. This assertion is purposefully misleading. The Board of Directors was advised that it 
could vote to rescind the Agreement if it believed that it was in the best interest of the 
Association to do so. That is, the Association, as a party to the Agreement, had the right to 
cancel Weisel's obligations under the Agreement if it chose to do so. This legal opinion, 
however, is totally unrelated to whether or not the parties can be put back into their pre-contract 
positions. Instead, it is merely an opinion that the parties to an agreement can agree amongst 
themselves to cancel an agreement should they so desire. 
Second, Weisel appears to argue that the City and County ordinances are unimportant to 
the issue at hand because the City annexed the Subdivision without reference to the restriction. 
This fact, however, has no bearing on whether or not the parties can be put back to their pre-
contract status. Prior to executing the Agreement, Weisel had one single family home on Lot 14 
and he had no right to build a second primary residence on Lot 14. After executing the 
Agreement, he was allowed to build a second primary residence on Lot 14. This structure is still 
located on Lot 14. Notably, if Weisel wanted to try and build it today, he would have to obtain a 
variance from the City, and the approval of the Design Review Committee, to build the structure 
because it does not conform to the current zoning ordinances for accessory dwelling units. 
Therefore, simply because Weisel's second residence is considered "legally nonconforming" by 
the City and the Association, it does not follow that the parties can be put back to their pre-
contract status in which there was only one single family home on Lot 14. 
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Third, Weisel argues that he is not barred by the doctrine of unclean hands from seeking 
an equitable remedy such as rescission. The Association based its request for the application of 
this doctrine on Weisel's admission that he purposefully entered into the Agreement with the 
belief that he could obtain its immediate benefits and later challenge its enforcement against him. 
Instead of rebutting this proof of his unfair, dishonest and deceitful conduct while negotiating 
and executing the Agreement, Weisel sets forth a list of irrelevant and/or untrue assertions that 
he contends proves he has been "seriously disadvantaged" by the Agreement because the 
Association has allowed others to develop their properties in the manner they desired. In making 
this claim, Weisel does not present any evidence that any other homeowner sought the 
Association's approval to develop their property in a manner that exceeded the then-in-effect 
zoning ordinances. There is, therefore, no evidence that the Association has treated him any 
differently than it would treat any other homeowner. Instead, the evidence proves that the 
Association accommodated Weisel's development desires in 1983 because Weisel dishonestly 
informed it that he and his heirs would never attempt to split and/or develop the single parcel as 
two separate parcels. Given this evidence of unclean hands, Weisel should not be allowed to 
seek an equitable remedy. 
D. Weisel's Contract Claims Are Barred By The Statute Of Limitations. 
Weisel next claims that, although he waited twenty-six years before filing his lawsuit 
against the Association, he is not barred by Idaho's five year statute of limitations for bring an 
action based on a written contract. Weisel first relies on the case of Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 
Idaho 315, 318 (2007) for the proposition that there is no statute of limitations defense to a lack 
of consideration claim. The issue in Thompson, however, was whether a fifty-year lease of a 
garage in violation of the recorded covenants was void from the beginning because there was no 
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authority for its execution. That is, since the lease was deemed never to have existed in the eyes 
of the law, it could not have life breathed into it simply because more than five years had passed 
since its execution. Notably, the plaintiff in Thompson could not have filed suit within five years 
of the execution of the lease agreement because he was not yet a member of the association 
affected by the lease agreement until after the time period expired. Thus, the issue in Thompson 
was whether or not an agreement that was never legally authorized could become enforceable by 
the passage of time. The Thompson Court found that it could not. 
This finding by the Thompson court is not instructive to this case because Weisel' s 
assertions that the Agreement lacked consideration and/or was based on a mutual mistake - even 
if true - do not void all possible enforcement of it. Instead, a contract that lacks consideration 
can still be enforced under a theory of promissory estoppel. Under the theory of promissory 
estoppel, "a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action ... on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such action ... is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 90. Thus, even if the 
contract lacks consideration, life can be breathed into the contract if one side acted in reliance on 
the promise. Similarly, a contract based on a mutual mistake may be ratified by either party if 
that party accepts the benefits accruing under it. 17 CJS, Contracts, § 82. As such, an 
agreement based on a mistake is not a contract that is deemed never to have existed in the eyes of 
the law. Id. 
In fact, in Schmidt v. Grand Forks Country Club, 460 N.W.2d 125, 128 (N.D. 1990), the 
North Dakota Supreme Court addressed an issue very similar to the one at hand. The plaintiff in 
Schmidt sought the rescission of a 1963 land purchase agreement he entered into with the seller. 
He filed suit in 1987, claiming he was entitled to rescission due to a failure of consideration in 
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that the defendant never sought approval of the preliminary plat that it had created at the time of 
the land sale. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for rescission, the Court held that "an action for 
rescission based on failure of consideration accrues when the facts which constitute the failure of 
consideration have been, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been, discovered 
by the party applying for relief." Id.; see also 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions§ 238 ("Where 
equitable relief is sought on the ground of mistake, the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to 
run when the mistake is discovered or from the time when, by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, it might have been discovered.") 
Weisel, however, claims that the statute of limitation is never a bar to a claim that a 
contract is not supported by consideration or is based on a mutual mistake. Response Brief at 23. 
As support for this assertion, Weisel cites to 53 CJ .S, Limitation of Actions, § 104 and claims 
that it expressly states that the "statute of limitations is not available as a bar to a defense of 
mistake, absence or failure of consideration, in whole or in part of the contract sued on." 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of this section of the treatise for the Court's review. As 
one can see, Section 104 of 53 C.J.S, does not either expressly or impliedly make this statement. 
Instead, as seen by Exhibit B, Section 23 8 of that treatise expressly provides that the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the mistake is or should have been discovered. 
In this case, Weisel had all of the facts underlying his claim for rescission based on a lack 
of consideration and mutual mistake at the time he executed the Agreement. Indeed, he testified 
that he purposefully moved the location of the caretakers' home out of the setback area during 
his negotiation of the Agreement so that he could later argue that the Agreement was not 
enforceable against him. Therefore, he has no legitimate basis for arguing that the statute of 
limitations should not have started accruing on the day the Agreement was executed. 
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E. Weisel Is Not Entitled To Two Votes On Association Matters. 
The Association also moved for summary judgment on Weisel' s claim that it breached 
the Declaration when it found that Weisel was entitled to only one vote on Association matters. 
The basis for the motion was that, under the terms of both the original and First Amended 
Declarations, an owner who unifies two lots into a single parcel is entitled to one membership in 
the Association and, thus, one vote on Association matters. In response, Weisel first claims that 
the Association's determination is unfair because the owner of Lots 17 and 18 is allowed two 
votes. What Weisel fails to acknowledge in this argument, however, is that the owner of Lots 17 
and 18 never unified his two lots into a single parcel. Therefore, he continues to have two 
memberships in the Association. Had Weisel never asked to combine his two lots into one 
parcel, he too would still have two memberships and two votes. 
Weisel next argues that there is no express statement in the Agreement about the number 
of votes he would have after unifying the two lots. This argument, however, is irrelevant. As set 
forth in the Association's motion, the Agreement resulted in the permanent unification of the two 
lots. Clark Aff., Ex. A ("Lot 13 and Lot 14 shall be deemed one parcel and that such single 
parcel shall not hereafter be split and/or developed as two separate parcels.") Under the terms of 
the Declaration, which governs Weisel's membership in the Association, this unification resulted 
in a single membership in the Association. Therefore, the fact that the Agreement itself is silent 
as to the number of votes has no bearing on whether or not the Association breached the 
Declaration by determining that Weisel has one vote on Association maters.3 
3 Weisel's reliance on Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584 (2007) is also 
misplaced. In Lane Ranch, the Court analyzed an annexation agreement and found that it did not provide 
that the plaintiff was barred from seeking a rezone of the area at a later date. This holding has no 
applicability to the case at hand because the issue of one vote versus two votes is not dependent on any 
disputed interpretation of the Agreement. Instead, it is based on the terms of the Declaration. 
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Weisel then argues that there is nothing in the Declaration providing that a unification of 
two lots "strips" the owner of one vote. While the word "strip" admittedly is not utilized in the 
Declaration, it does in fact state that there is one membership in the Association for each Lot and 
each membership is appurtenant to the title to a particular Lot or other property area. Clark Aff. 
Ex. B. The result of Weisel's request to unify his two lots was that he had a single parcel of 
land. The only rational interpretation of the Declaration is that this single parcel entitled Weisel 
to a single membership and, thus, a single vote. 
Despite the obvious meaning of the Declaration, Weisel argues that he is entitled to two 
votes simply because the recorded plat still identifies his single parcel as two separate lots. In 
making this argument, however, Weisel fails to address the Association's arguments to the 
contrary. These arguments include: 
• The Declaration defines "lot" as any tract described in a recorded 
instrument and the Agreement unifying the two lots into one is a recorded 
instrument; 
• Weisel's agent represented to the County that the Agreement was the 
equivalent of the vacation of the lot line between the two lots; 
• Under paragraph 7 of the Agreement, Weisel agreed to execute any 
documentation necessary to carry out and give effect to the terms of the 
Agreement, which obviously can include an official vacation of the lot 
line; and 
• Weisel' s unified property constitutes the "other property area" to which, 
under the Declaration, a single membership attaches. 
Weisel did not address these arguments because he knows that the Agreement resulted in his 
ownership of a single lot, which entitles him to a single vote. 
Weisel further argues that he is not subject to the express provision in the First Amended 
Declaration because he entered into the Agreement prior to the adoption of the First Amended 
Declaration. This argument is entirely based on Weisel's assertion that restrictive covenants can 
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only be applied prospectively. He does not, however, cite any direct law for this proposition. 
Instead, Weisel relies on the general statement that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the 
free use of land. The language of the First Amendment could not be more clear. There is no 
ambiguity in its provision regarding the number of votes one has after unifying two lots. 
Therefore, the general law regarding ambiguities in restrictive covenants has no bearing in this 
case. Moreover, there is no rational reason that Weisel - who did not even vote against the First 
Amendment - should not be subject to its terms. 
Finally, Weisel argues that the right to vote runs with the land, is appurtenant to each 
platted lot and cannot be taken away from Weisel. The Association does not disagree with the 
assertion that the voting rights are appurtenant to the properties in the Subdivision. There is, 
however, no ban on an Association recording a Declaration that provides if you choose to unify 
two separate lots into one, you reduce your number of memberships from two to one. Indeed, 
the case relied upon by Weisel, Twin Lakes Village Property Association, Inc. v. Twin Lakes 
Investment, 124 Idaho 132 (1993), does not even support the proposition that voting rights 
cannot be reduced in conjunction with the number of memberships one has in a homeowners 
association. In Twin Lakes, a majority of the association members voted to amend the bylaws so 
as to delete the prohibition against depriving any member of then-existing rights and privileges. 
The majority then voted to amend the bylaws such that the voting structure was changed from a 
weighted system based on square footage to a one-lot, one vote system. The court held that this 
amendment was improper because, due to the express language in the bylaws, they could not be 
amended to deprive a member of an existing right. That is, the very act of voting to delete the 
express prohibition on depriving a member of an existing right was a violation of an existing 
right and, therefore, was void. In this case, none of the Association's governing documents, 
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including the bylaws and the Declaration, contain a prohibition on depriving a member of an 
existing right. Furthermore, since Weisel voluntarily agreed to the unification of his two lots, 
thereby reducing his voting rights from two to one, he was not deprived of an existing right; he 
agreed to eliminate an existing right. 
Therefore, Weisel's claim that he should be allowed to have two votes on Association 
matters fails as a matter of law. 
F. Weisel Cannot Establish A Right To Quasi Estoppel. 
The Association moved to dismiss Weisel' s quasi estoppel claim because he has not 
presented any evidence to establish both elements of the claim, which are: (1) the Association 
intentionally asserted a position regarding Weisel' s voting rights that is inconsistent with a 
previous position; and (2) allowing this change in position would be unconscionable. 
Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 919 (1988). The Association argued that Weisel 
has not, and cannot, establish the required "unconscionability" element because Weisel admitted 
that (1) he never looked into whether he suffered any monetary damage as a result of the 
Association's 2006 determination that he is entitled to one vote, and (2) he has not suffered any 
non-monetary damage as a result. Furthermore, Weisel cannot identify any vote of the 
Association that would have been different had he had two votes. That is, Weisel cannot show 
that the Association has gained a benefit or he suffered a disadvantage as a result of having one 
vote instead of two. 
As a result of the Association's motion, Weisel has the burden of presenting evidence of 
how he has been disadvantaged or the Association benefited by the change in position. Weisel 
has failed to meet this burden. In his Response, Weisel first claims that the Agreement does not 
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expressly say anything about eliminating a voting right. This claim, however, does not establish 
any advantage or disadvantage to either party. It is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
Weisel next asserts that the Association benefitted because it collected assessments from 
Weisel from 1983 through 2006. This fact, however, does not establish any advantage to the 
Association that flowed from an intentional change in position. Indeed, since the Association 
benefitted from the collection of the assessments, it was actual! y to its detriment ( and Weisel' s 
benefit) to change its position. The evidence merely proves that the Association made a mistake 
after the Agreement was executed in that it failed to immediately change its membership records. 
That mistake continued over the years due to the change in management of the Association. 
Indeed, many members did not even know the Agreement existed. Affidavit of William 
Fruehling at <j[ 3; Affidavit of Vicki Rosenberg at 'I[ 11. Furthermore, Weisel obviously knew that 
he had unified his two lots into one single parcel and that he should not have been assessed for 
two lots. Weisel could have, and should have, informed the Association of its mistake. He 
chose not to so that he could one day argue that the Association's mistake constitutes extrinsic 
evidence of an interpretation the Declaration, even though no such evidence should be admitted 
because the Declaration is unambiguous. 
Since Weisel has been unable to present any evidence of a monetary or non-monetary 
damage to him resulting from the Association's determination that he has a single membership in 
the Association, or a benefit gained by the Association as a result of the identification of its 
mistake, his claim for quasi-estoppel must be dismissed. 
G. The Assessment Reimbursement Issue. 
The Association moved to dismiss Weisel' s claim for reimbursement of the double 
assessments he paid from 1984 through 2004. The grounds for this motion were that, since 
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Weisel waited until 2009 to file his claim for reimbursement, he can seek reimbursement only for 
the double payments made during the applicable statute of limitations, which is five years. That 
is, Weisel should not be allowed to seek reimbursement for monies paid prior to 2005. 
Weisel's sole objection to the Association's motion is that the Association should be 
estopped from claiming the statute of limitations defense. Equitable estoppel may be applied to 
prevent the assertion of the statue of limitations only if the defendant's conduct caused the 
plaintiff to refrain from prosecuting an action during the limitation period. Johnson v. McPhee, 
147 Idaho 455, 210 P.2d 563, 572 (App. 2009). Weisel cannot establish the elements of this 
claim. Indeed, the Association realized its mistake regarding the voting/assessment issue in 
2006. Weisel did not, however, file a claim for reimbursement at that time. Instead, Weisel 
waited three additional years before filing this lawsuit against the Association. Weisel, therefore, 
cannot establish that his delay in filing the suit was caused by the Association's conduct. 
Moreover, Weisel knew that he had a single lot and was obligated to pay only a single 
assessment since 1983. He continued to pay the double assessments because he intended to use 
the fact as extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the Agreement. That is, Weisel paid the 
assessment so that he could contend that, despite the clear and unambiguous language of the 
Agreement, the parties did not intend to unify the two lots in perpetuity. Given that Weisel 
wanted to pay the extra assessment, he cannot now claim that he was lulled by Association's 
conduct into failing to file a lawsuit earlier. 
Finally, as made clear in Weisel's Amended Complaint, Weisel desires to have two votes 
and is willing to pay two assessments to get them. The undisputed evidence establishes that 
during the years that Weisel paid two assessments, he was allowed two votes. Therefore, the 
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Association's mistake - which Weisel admits he was aware of from day one - did not cause 
Weisel to suffer any identifiable injury. 
As a result, the Association's motion to dismiss any claim for reimbursement of overpaid 
assessments prior to 2005 should be granted. 
H. Weisel's Changed Circumstances Argument Is Unavailing. 
In his final claim against the Association, Weisel claims that the Association's "density" 
concerns have been frustrated and, therefore, the Agreement should not be enforced against 
Weisel. As set forth in the Opening Brief, and not rebutted by Weisel, there appears to be no 
published case applying a changed circumstances analysis to a single homeowner' s agreement to 
combine two lots in perpetuity for development purposes. Therefore, this agreement should be 
analyzed like any other bilateral agreement, which includes the defense of frustration of purpose. 
Under the theory of frustration of purpose, a party's obligations may be discharged only if an 
event occurs whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, 
thereby making the party's performance virtually worthless to the other. See Restatement 2nd 
Contracts § 265. In this case, Weisel has presented no competent evidence that the parties based 
the Agreement on the assumption that other members of the Association would never build large 
homes or pool houses. Nor did Weisel present any evidence that Weisel's continued 
performance under the Agreement is virtually worthless to the Association. 
If, however, the Court concludes that Weisel can proceed with a changed circumstances 
claim, the evidence he presents similarly does not satisfy his burden of proving that the purpose 
for which the restriction was originally imposed has been utterly destroyed. See Pettey v. First 
National Bank of Geneva, 225 Ill. App. 3d 539 (1992) (for a change in circumstances "to cancel 
the enforcement of a restriction, it must be so radical and complete as to render the restriction 
unreasonable, confiscatory, discriminatory, or as practically to destroy the purpose for which the 
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restriction was originally imposed.") As set forth in detail in the Association's Opposition to 
Weisel's Motion for Summary Judgment, Weisel relies on inaccurate and incompetent evidence, 
which even if true, does not satisfy the strict test for establishing the equitable claim of changed 
circumstances. 
To analyze the viability of Weisel' s changed circumstances claim, one must start with 
determining what, in fact, was the purpose for which the restriction was originally imposed. 
Weisel would like the Court to accept that the purpose was "density" and that "density" can only 
mean overall square footage or lot area coverage. Response at 34. This contention is absurd. 
Indeed, the only rationale provided for this conclusory statement is that, in 1983, there was no 
square footage restriction on outbuildings. The fact that the original Declaration did not have a 
square footage limitation on outbuildings, however, does not mean that the only meaning of 
"density" is overall square footage or lot area coverage. To the contrary, as Weisel himself 
admitted, he unified the two lots because he wanted to build a second primary residence (not an 
outbuilding) on Lot 14. Clark Aff., Ex. P. In order to comply with Weisel's development needs, 
the Association agreed that he could transfer his right to build a single family home on Lot 13 to 
Lot 14 provided he unified the two lots in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration. 
Thus, the express and admitted purpose of the Agreement was to ensure that no more 
than two residences could be built on the combined lots. Weisel has not presented any 
competent evidence that this purpose has been thoroughly destroyed. Weisel, instead, relies 
solely on the Assessor's records - which do not represent the square footages that were presented 
by the homeowners to either the Association or the applicable zoning officials to prove that the 
owners of other lots have built large homes. This fact is completely irrelevant to a finding of 
whether the true purpose of the Agreement has been nullified. 
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As to the remainder of Weisel' s arguments contained in his Response Brief regarding his 
claim of changed circumstances, the Association incorporates its Opposition to Weisel's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This opposition addresses each of one of Weisel's misstatements 
regarding the development that the Association has knowing! y approved in the Subdivision. In 
fact, as set forth in the Opposition Brief, Weisel is the only homeowner in the Subdivision that 
has ever been allowed to build two primary residences on one lot. Therefore, he has not been 
treated arbitrarily or unfairly by the Association. 
In fact, the Agreement exists because the Association was trying to cooperate with 
Weisel's development plans in 1983. Weisel wanted to combine his two lots. He knew he 
would have to combine his two lots so as to get the County to agree to his variance request. Both 
the Association and the County were concerned about the density of his plans - with density 
defined in the County ordinances as one residence per lot. Affidavit of Linda Haavik at <JrJl 29-
33. Thus, in order to enable Weisel to build his caretakers' house close to his existing house, as 
he stated he needed, the County and the Association allowed him to transfer the density 
allowance of Lot 13 to Lot 14. Furthermore, in order to enable Weisel to start building this 
caretakers' house quickly, the County allowed this Agreement to be recorded against Lot 13 as 
opposed to forcing Weisel to formally vacate the lot line. Weisel is now attempting to use these 
accommodations to argue that he has been treated unfairly. Weisel is far too sophisticated a 
businessman to allow himself to be treated unfairly. His claims against the Association, 
therefore, should be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Beaver Springs requests that the Court grant it motion to 
dismiss all of Weisel' s claims against it with the exception of his claim for reimbursement of any 
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assessment he should not have been requested to pay during the period from 2005 to the present. 
DATED this q day of February 2010. 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
By:~ 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this11 th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Fritz X. Haemmerle, Esq. 
Haemmerle & Haemmerle, PLLC 
400 South Main Street, Suite 102 
PO Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
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IV. Limitations Applicable to Particular Actions 
E. Liabilities Created by Statute 
Topic SummaryReferencesCorrelation Table 
§ HM.Liability of corporate officers or stockholders 
West's Key Number Digest 
West's Key Number Digest, Limitation of Actions€=:>34(5) 
The limitation relating to liabilities created by statute applies to an action to enforce the statutory liability of a 
stockholder of a corporation for a corporate debt, and also to an action against a director or officer, under a statute 
making him or her liable for certain acts or omissions. 
The limitation relating to liabilities created by statute applies to actions against the directors and officers of a 
corporation, under statutes making them liable for certain acts or omissions.[l] This limitation applies to actions for 
acts or omissions of the directors or officers of a bank. [l] 
The liability of a stockholder for a debt of a corporation is a liability created by statute within the meaning of 
limitation acts, and the period of limitation applicable is that governing other actions founded on statutory liability ,QJ 
even though the action is equitable in nature and \aches are not shown.[1] The limitation applies to an action to enforce 
the liability, created by statute, of the stockholders of an insolvent financial institution or moneyed corporation,~ 
such as a bank,[_§.] or a national bank.[1] 
IFNI I N.Y.-Van Schaick v. Aron. 170 Misc. 520. 10 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup 1938). 
[FN21 Ohio-Sguire v. Guardian Trust Co., 79 Ohio App. 371, 35 Ohio Op. 144, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 203. 72 
N.E.2d 137 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1947). 
Failure of president to file annual statement 
Ark.-Love v. Couch, 181 Ark. 994, 28 S.W.2d 1067 ( 1930). 
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[FN5J Ohio-Everard v. Kroeger, 60 Ohio App. 123, 13 Ohio Op. 275, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 19 N.E.2d 964 
{2d Dist. Franklin County 1938). 
IFN6) Okla.-Lawhead v. Knappenberger, 1937 OK 436, 180 Okla. 388, 70 P.2d 62 (]937). 
Enforcement of assessment on stock 
Ark.-Vandover v. Lumber Underwriters, 197 Ark. 718, 126 S.W.2d 105 (1939). 
[FN7l U.S.-Briley v. Crouch, 115 F.2d 443 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1940). 
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VI. Accrual of Particular Rights of Action 
D. Fraud; Mistake 
3. Mistake 
Topic SummarvReferencesCorrelation Table 
§ 238.Generally 
West's Key Number Digest 
The principle which governs the running of the statute of limitations in cases where relief is sought on the ground 
of mistake is substantially the same as that applicable in cases of fraud.[l] However, the cause of action must be one 
for relief on the ground of mistake, and not one as to which the mistake is merely collateral or incidental,[l] or an 
action based on a mere mistake of law.lJ.] 
The general rule, which often is applied in suits to correct or reform deeds and other written instruments,[1:] is that 
if a plaintiff is ignorant of the mistake, without any fault or neglect on his or her part, the statute begins to run only 
when the mistake is discovered,11] or from the time when the plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, might 
have discovered his or her error.[§_] Under some authority, however, the statute of limitations begins to run from the 
time the mistake was made,[1] unless discovery of the mistake was prevented by fraud or intentional concealment by 
the person benefited by the mistake,[li] or there existed a fiduciary relationship between the parties.[.2] 
The general rule does not dispense with the necessity of diligence on the part of the complainant where the means 
of discovery are at hand, and in such cases the statute of limitations runs from the time when he or she acquires such 
knowledge as would put an ordinarily intelligent person on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of 
the mistake. [l..Q] That is, the applicable statute of limitations will run from the time when by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence the mistake might have been discovered.[ll] 
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What will constitute reasonable diligence to discover the mistake and when the mistake might have been dis-
covered by the exercise of such diligence are necessarily questions which must be determined from all the facts and 
circumstances in each particular case.[Jl] There must be circumstances to excite the plaintiffs suspicion or charge 
him or her with notice of the mistake,Ul] and no duty to make inquiry arises where the defendant has so conducted 
himself or herself, to the plaintiffs knowledge, as to lull the plaintiff into a sense of security and justify him or her in 
believing that no mistake has been made.ll±] Additionally, where conduct subsequent to the mistake on the part of 
both parties demonstrates a belief that no mistake existed, the plaintiff may avoid the bar of the statute of limita-
tions.[12.l 
Shortage in quantity of land sold. 
In case of a mistake as to the quantity of land sold, the statute of limitations begins to run when the mistake is 
discovered, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should have been discovered.[lfil The failure of the purchaser to 
make a survey within the period of statutory limitations may show an absence of due diligence,UlJ but such failure is 
not conclusive.[.li] Whether a survey should have been made in a given case depends on the particular conditions and 
facts,Ll.2] but where the land is of an extended area, with irregular and indefinite lines and boundaries, failure to have 
the survey made may strongly, if not conclusively, manifest an absence of due diligence.11.Q] 
[FN]] Ala.-Lewis v. Daniel, 387 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1980). 
Cal.-Davis Welding & Manufacturing Co. v. Advance Auto Body Works, 38 Cal. App. 2d 270, 100 P.2d 
1067 ( I st Dist. 1940). 
Okla.-Hoskins v. Stites, 1938 OK 259, 182 Okla. 455, 78 P.2d 413 (1938). 
As to the accrual of causes of action for fraud, generally, see§ 230. 
IFN21 Ky.-Francis v. Francis. 288 Ky. 685. 157 S.W.2d 289 (1941 ). 
N.C.-Thacker v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland. 216 N.C. 135. 4 S.E.2d 324 ( 1939). 
Equitably sufficient mistake 
The mistake of the parties must be recognizable as equitably sufficient in order to toll the statute of limita-
tions. 
Tex.-Kenney v. Porter. 604 S.W.2d 297, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. I 095 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1980), 
writ refused n.r.e., (Apr. 8, 1981). 
[FN3] Neb.-Jones v. Johnson. 207 Neb. 706,300 N.W.2d 816 (1981). 
Mistake of law not covered by common-law tolling doctrine 
The common-law tolling doctrine does not allow a statute of limitations to be tolled on the basis of a mistake 
of law. 
U.S.-Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2004). 
[FN4 J La.-Freeman v. Williams. 450 So. 2d I 030 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir. 1984), writ not considered, 456 So. 
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2d 162(La. 1984). 
N.C.-Hice v. Hi-Mil. Inc .. 301 N.C. 647. 273 S.E.2d 268 (1981). 
N.D.-Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143 (N.D. 1980). 
~ Ala.-Lewis v. Daniel, 387 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1980). 
Cal.-Arthur v. Davis, 126 Cal. App. 3d 684. 178 Cal. Rptr. 920 (4th Dist. 1981 ). 
La.-Freeman v. Wil Iiams. 450 So. 2d I 030 (La. Ct. App. l st Cir. 1984 ), writ not considered. 456 So. 2d 162 
(La. 1984). 
N.C.-Lee v. Keck. 68 N.C. App. 320. 315 S.E.2d 323 (1984). 
Mistake as exception to statute of limitations in insurance coverage cases 
N.H.-Craftsbury Co .• Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 149 N.H. 717, 834 A.2d 267 (2003). 
As to the accrual of rights or causes of action under the discovery rule, generally, see .§___li_Q_. 
[FN6J La.-Freeman v. Williams, 450 So. 2d I 030 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir. 1984), writ not considered, 456 So. 
2d l 62 (La. 1984 ). 
Neb.-Mangan v. Landen. 219 Neb. 643. 365 N.W.2d 453 ( 1985 ). 
N.C.-Lee v. Keck. 68 N.C. App. 320,315 S.E.2d 323 ( l 984). 
As to the necessity that the plaintiff act diligently in seeking to discover a cause of action, see lil.1. 
[FN7J U.S.-Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd .• 757 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Mass.-Salinsky v. Perma-Home Corp .. 15 Mass. App. Ct. l 93, 443 N.E.2d 1362 ( 1983 ). 
Pa.-Hunsicker v. Connor, 318 Pa. Super. 418. 465 A.2d 24 (1983). 
[FN8J U.S.-Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd .. 757 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Mass.-Salinsky v. Perma-Home Corp., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 443 N.E.2d I 362 ( I 983). 
[FN9J Mass.-Salinskv v. Perma-Home Corp., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 193,443 N.E.2d 1362 (1983). 
[FNl OJ Idaho-Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Boise City Nat. Bank, 61 Idaho 124, 98 P.2d 637 (1940). 
If:NW Cal.-Miller v. Bechtel Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 868. 191 Cal. Rptr. 619. 663 P.2d 177 ( 1983). 
Mont-Gregory v. City of Forsyth. l 87 Mont. 132, 609 P.2d 248 (I 980). 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 1154 
CJS LIMITATION § 238 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 238 
[FNl 21 Mont-Gregory v. City of Forsyth, 187 Mont. 132. 609 P.2d 248 ( 1980). 
[FNJ 31 U.S.-White v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, 122 F.2d 770 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1941 ). 
Mont-Gregory v. Citv of Forsyth, 187 Mont. 132. 609 P.2d 248 (1980). 
l.fil.ill Tex.-Broyles v. Lawrence, 632 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App. Austin 1982). 
[FNl5J N.C.-Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc .. 301 N.C. 647. 273 S.E.2d 268 (1981). 
N.D.-Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143 (N.D. 1980). 
Tex.-Broyles v. Lawrence, 632 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App. Austin 1982). 
Ifill.fil Cal.-Twining v. Thompson, 68 Cal. App. 2d I 04. 156 P.2d 29 {2d Dist. 1945). 
Ky.-Jordan v. Howard, 246Ky. 142, 54 S.W.2d 613 (1932) . 
.l£liUI Ky.-Harlan v. Buckley, 268 Ky. 148, 103 S.W.2d 946 ([936). 
[FNl8l Ky.-Jordan v. Howard, 246 Ky. 142, 54 S.W.2d 613 (1932). 
(FN19J Ky.-Jordan v. Howard, 246 Ky. 142, 54 S.W.2d 613 (1932). 
[FN20l Ky.-Jordan v. Howard, 246 Ky. 142. 54 S.W.2d 613 ( l932). 
Westlaw. © 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
CJS LIMITATION§ 238 
END OF DOCUMENT 






















FRITZ X. HAEMMERLE 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
400 South Main St., Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
FILED~-~ 3 \"lC 
FEB C 9 2010 
Tel: (208) 578-0520 
FAX: (208) 578-0564 
E-mail: fxh@haemlaw.com 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Count\·, Idaho 
ISB # 3862 
Attorney for Plaintiff, THOMAS WEISEL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man 
dealing in his sole and separate property, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS 




) Case No. CV-09-124 
) 












COME NOW the Plaintiff, Thomas Weisel ("Weisel"), by and through his 
attorney of record, Fritz ,X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & Haemmerle, P.L.L.C., and 
hereby files this Reply Brief to Defendant, Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc.'s 
("Association") Response to Weisel's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. REPLY 
The 1983 Agreement ("Agreement) expressly refers to "improvements to be 
constructed in the setback." No improvement was ever constructed in the setback. Even 
if allowance of development in the setback was not the consideration, the Association has 




















undermined and rendered worthless what it claimed was its consideration - the approval 
of a "size and the quantity of the buildings that were substantially larger than what was 
ever envisioned for the subdivision." (Frnehling Depa., p. 41, 1. 20-22). 
In spite of this, the Association obstinately insists that even though every other lot 
owner can now build out to a greater density than Weisel, and even though the 
Association violated the Amended Declaration for many years by allowing owners to 
build guest/caretaker's units in excess of the 900 square feet, and even though Weisel 
never violated any version of the Declaration, Weisel should be held to the "bargain" he 
made and that his desire to be relieved from it is "remarkable and unprecedented." 
By this Declaratory Judgment action, Weisel is simply seeking relief from the 
covenant he entered into 27 years ago, a covenant which was based on improvements that 
were to be constructed in the setback on Lot 14, and a covenant that has become 
oppressive and purposeless by the Associations actions. In the intervening 27 years, Lot 
13 has remained vacant and neither the City of Ketchum nor the County would prevent 
Weisel from building on that 3.1 acre parcel. In that same 27 years, the Association 
enjoyed 3.1 acres of open space at no cost, all the while permitting other owners in the 
Subdivision to build larger and larger buildings, some in excess of the Amended 
Declaration, to the point of expressly approving density on other lots well in excess of 
Weisel's 1983 development plan. It is the Association that has not held up its part of the 
"bargain." 
Based upon the unbiased, documentary evidence in this case, there is no question 
of fact that Weisel is entitled to summary judgment on his Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment that the 1983 Agreement was either void from the beginning or has failed. The 




















improvements were never constructed in the setback and the Association's approval of a 
"size and the quantity of the buildings that were substantially larger than what was ever 
envisioned for the subdivision," has in the 27 years since the Agreement, nullified it. 
A. THE 1983 AGREEMENT RESTRICTS THE FREE USE OF WEISEL'S PROPERTY AND 
SHOULD BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED. 
Idaho law is crystal clear. Since, covenants restricting the right to use land are in 
derogation of the common law, the courts will not extend by implication any restriction 
not clearly expressed. Berezowski v. Schuman, 141 Idaho 532 (2005), 112 P.3d 820 
(quoting Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 
(2003). Further, no matter whether a covenant is deemed unambiguous or ambiguous, 
Idaho courts are to construe it strictly and in favor of the free use of property. Id. 
Citing no authority whatsoever, the Association argues that this well established 
principle should only be applied to "blanket, non-negotiated, restrictive covenants 
restricting the use of land in a neighborhood." The Association made this same argument 
in Section I. 1. of its Opening Brief and Weisel has already responded to it in Section H. l. 
of his Response Brief. 
In short, the Association's argument is wrong and completely contrary to Idaho 
law. 
As has been said with respect to the provisions of contracts creating 
building restrictions claimed to be covenants running with the land, if 
parties desire to create mutual rights in real property they must say so and 
must say it in the only place where it can be given legal effect, namely, in 
the written instrument exchanged between them, which constitutes the 
final expression of their understanding . . . .; and a provision in an 
instrument claimed to create such a servitude is strictly construed, any 
doubt being resolved in favor of the free use of the land. 
West Coast Power Co. v. Buttram, 54 Idaho 318, 323, 31 P.2d 687, (1934). 




















Neither the Idaho courts nor any other court has ever adopted such a severe 
limitation on the construction of covenants restricting the free use of land. See e.g. 
Perelman v. Casiello, 920 A.2d 782 (N.J. 2007) (court applied well established law that 
restrictions two parties placed on the land were to be strictly construed). 
The 1983 Agreement expressly states that it is a covenant and that it runs with the 
land, and the only reason the Agreement was made at all was due to the covenants of the 
Original Declaration that were applicable to the entire Subdivision. Had there been no 
such covenants, the Agreement would not have been made. 
B. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR COUNTS ONE THROUGH THREE. 
The Association's Opposition Brief restates the arguments it made on this issue in 
Section E of its Opening Brief and Weisel has already responded to it in Section D of his 
Response Brief. In short, the Association's argument that Counts One through Three are 
barred by the statute of limitations was recently rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315,318, 160 P.3d 754, (2007). 1 
The statute of limitations is never a bar to the claim that a contract is not 
supported by consideration, or is one based on mutual mistake, or that the consideration 
fails. 53 CJS, Limitation of Actions, § 104, pp 1088-1089: "The statute of limitations is 
not available as a bar to a defense of mistake, absence or failure of consideration, in 
whole or in part of the contract sued on." See also, Madison National Bank v. Lipin, 226 
N.W.2d 834 (Mich.App. 1975). 
There is no question that if Weisel had simply gone forward and built on Lot 13 
and the Association attempted to stop him from doing so claiming that he was in breach 
1 The Association's counsel is well aware of the Thompson case because counsel for Weisel and counsel for 
the Association litigated that case. 




















of contract, Weisel could have raised the defenses of lack of and failure of consideration 
and mutual mistake to prevent the Association from prevailing on its action. Instead, 
Weisel has sought declaratory relief as to the validity of the Agreement. No statute of 
limitations has begun to run because there has been no breach of contract. 
C. LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
1. William Freuhling's I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) Deposition and the Haavik 
Affidavit. 
Weisel sent an I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice to the Association. The 
Association produced the President, William Frehuhling, to testify. One of the items 
designated for questioning was a "witness with knowledge of the reason for and the 
drafting and execution of the 1983 Agreement between Thomas Weisel and the 
Association." (Id., Exhibit 45). 
Freuhling answers as to the reasons for the Agreement ran the gamut from stating 
a concern about the "mass" of development, (Fruehling Depo., p. 41, 1. 19; p. 42, 1. 2; p. 
65, I. 2-6; p. 67, 1. 10-11) to allowing "the construction of guest quarters lager than what 
the County ordinance was at that time." (Id., p. 84, 1. 18 - 20). Yet, amidst all of the 
various reasons Fruehling posited, nowhere, not once, did he mention that the 
consideration or purpose for the Agreement was allowing Weisel a "second primary 
residence." 
Despite this, the Association is now impeaching Freuhling's testimony with the 
Affidavit of Linda Haavik, who opined that the consideration for the 1983 Agreement is 
allowing Weisel a "second primary residence." This is not, and should not be, 
permissible. The case law on 30(b)(6) depositions is fairly strict. Some jurisdictions 
hold that answers given in 30(b)(6) depositions are binding. See e.g., Marker v. Union 




















Fidelity Life Inc. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121 (1989); see e.g. contrary holding, Astenlohnson, 
Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213 (3 rd Cir. 2009). The reason for the rule is that 
since there is a duty to prepare a corporate 30(b)(6) witness to respond, to prevent 
corporate "flip-flopping," the witnesses' answers in a 30(b)(6) deposition should be 
binding. 
Whether or not Freuhling's answers are binding, the Court should reject the 
Affidavit of Linda Haavik under the "sham" affidavit rule. Under this rule, a party cannot 
impeach its own witness in a summary judgment proceeding in an attempt to create a 
material issue of fact. This rule was expressed by the Ninth Circuit Court in Kennedy v. 
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1991), wherein the Court stated: 
The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue 
of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony. If a 
party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue 
of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior 
testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as 
a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact. 
Id. at 265. 
Idaho has not expressly adopted the "sham" affidavit rule announced in Kennedy. 
However, the rule and the Kennedy holding were considered in Frazier v. J.R. Simplot 
Company, 136 Idaho 100, 29 P.3d 936 (2001). The Court stated "we need not decide 
whether to adopt the ruling ["sham" affidavit rule] of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
[in Kennedy] because there was not sufficient conflict between Frazier's deposition 
testimony and her statements in her affidavit." Id. at 102. 
In this case, the Court should deem the Affidavit of Linda Haavik a "sham"" 
because it creates new factual issues not previously disclosed or shared by Freuhling, the 
Association's designated 30(b)(6) witness. Again, Freuhling never stated that the 




















consideration was a "second primary quarters." This is an entirely new fact or opinion 
that is directly contrary to any fact or opinion Freuhling testified to in his 30(b)(6) 
deposition, and therefore, should be struck. 
At the very least, it should be noted that the Association, by submitting the 
Affidavit of Linda Haavik is necessarily impeaching its own 30(b)(6) witness, President 
William Freuhling. 
2. Reply to Association's arguments on consideration. 
The Association's position as to its consideration for the Agreement has taken a 
winding path as the Association has been confronted with the contradictions of its various 
positions. 
Yet, the best evidence of the consideration for the Agreement is the language of 
the Agreement itself. It stated that Weisel desired to obtain the Association's approval of 
his development plan for Lot 13 and Lot 14 and the Association's "written consent to 
combine such lots into one parcel, removing the setback lines along the common 
boundary line of such lots" and the Association "determined that the improvements to be 
constructed in the setback lines along the common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 will 
not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other lots." 
Construing the Original Declaration and the 1983 Agreement narrowly, the only 
possible basis for the denial of the development plan was the construction of 
improvements in the setback since the plan did not otherwise violate the Original 
Declaration in any way. Ottley's deposition testimony was emphatic that there was a 
setback problem. He stated the following: 




















• "I do recall that in the application of Mr. Weisel, he had a proposed building 
on the north side of his property that had some concerns about setbacks. 
Ottley Depo., p. 42, 1. 22-25. 
• "I think there was an earlier concern, and that this was a revised print, I 
suspect. That I remember clearly. It was much closer to the line. We asked 
that it be pulled back." Id., p. 45, 1.25 - p. 46, 1. 1. 
• "I recall that there was some at that time that we were talking about a setback 
concern." Id., p. 46, 1. 5-7. 
A few years ago, the Association admitted that the consideration for the 
Agreement was the removal of the setbacks in lieu of a lot line shift to accommodate the 
development plan. (Response to Second Request for Admissions No. 7, admitting Exhibit 
20). 
Faced with the express language of the Agreement and the non-violation of the 
setback, the Association then moved on to claim that the consideration was the approval 
of the larger size, quantity, and mass of buildings in the development plan. Well before 
this lawsuit, William Fruehling stated that what the Association was concerned about was 
the "mass of the project." (Fruehling Depo., Exhibit 54). Also well before this lawsuit, 
Jean Smith made the following statement as to the consideration for the Agreement. 
As time went by, it became apparent that people wanted bigger homes 
and more outbuildings. In Thom Weisel's case ... I was the head of design 
review in those days. We let Thom put in larger than required buildings, 
that were not consistent with our CC&Rs, because he made an agreement 
with us to put his two lots together and develop it as one. 
(Robert Smith Depo., Exhibit 8, Jean Smith's Letter dated December 21, 2005). 
Consistent with this, Jean Smith stated in her deposition that 
Q. So you base your opinion that Lot 14 was overbuilt based on the size of 
structures. 
A. Yes. 




















(Jean Smith Depo., p. 43, 1. 2-4). 
Again, during this lawsuit, Weisel noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of the 
Association and William Fruehling appeared on behalf of the Association. As to the 
consideration for the Agreement, he stated the following: 
• "[T]he size and the quantity of the buildings were substantially larger than 
what was ever envisioned for the subdivision, and that bothered the design 
review committee at that time. Therefore, they made a condition to agree to 
his development plan if Mr. Weisel agreed to never build on Lot 13 and 
combine the two lots into one and never subdivide them again." (Fruehling 
Depo., p. 41, 1. 19; p. 42, 1. 2). 
• "I think that the design review committee, as I stated previously, is concerned 
about the mass of the buildings and as a result asked Mr. Weisel to give up his 
development rights on Lot 13, which he did." (Id., p. 65, 1. 2-6). 
• "It's the mass of the project, the mass of the project." (Id., p. 67, 1. 10-11). 
If greater "density" was the Association's consideration, the Association has 
rendered its approval completely worthless. As already shown in Weisel's previous 
Briefs, since the 1983 Agreement, the Association has approved huge homes, guest 
houses and caretaker's units in excess of the 1986 Amended Declaration, and by its 
recent adoption of the 2008 Amended Declaration to the Original Declaration, density 
well in excess of Weisel' s 1983 development plan. 
Weisel's 1983 development plan was for approximately 11,533 square feet of 
buildings on 3.7-acre Lot 14. (McLaughlin A.ff., <j[ 3). Neither the number nor size of the 
buildings in that plan violated the Original Declaration. (Id; Response to Second Request 
for Admissions, Response No. 30, admitting Exhibits 4, Third Amendment to 
Declaration). 
The Association now allows 15,000 square feet of structures on 2-acre lots. 
(Response to Second Request for Admissions No. 1, admitting Exhibits 117, Third 




















Amendment to Declaration). It cannot be seriously disputed that by allowing such 
density in the Subdivision, the Association has rendered its approval of increased density 
for Weisel worthless. Instead of Weisel continuing to receive the benefit of the 1983 
approval of greater density than the other lots, that approval has become a tremendous 
detriment because Weisel is forever limited to density much less than virtually all other 
lot owners. Futhermore, ifhe makes any changes to his property, his density will be even 
further reduced due to the 2008 Amended Declaration. 
Faced with this contradiction, the Association now argues, for the first time, that 
the consideration for the Agreement was the Association's approval that Weisel could 
build "two single family homes" on Lot 14. This theory of consideration should be 
rejected for many reasons. First, and foremost, if the Agreement was made to allow 
Weisel to have a larger than allowed guest quarter under the County zoning laws in 1983, 
it should be noted that both the County, who originally approved the Agreement, and the 
City who currently has jurisdiction of the Subdivision, have stated that they do not claim 
any interest in the Agreement. (See, Affidavits of Timothy Graves and Sandy Cady). 
Second, there is nothing in the Agreement about the Association's approval for 
Weisel to build "two single family homes." The only person advancing this as the basis 
for the Agreement is Linda Haavik, who surmised that the Agreement was based on 
Weisel having a "second primary residence" on Lot 14. Not only did Haavik not work 
for the County at the time, she was not involved in, nor has any personal knowledge of 
the making of the Agreement. In fact, her involvement in the case began a few weeks 
ago and coincides with the Association's first ever presentation of this theory of its 
consideration for the Agreement. 




















Third, in reviewing Weisel's 1983 variance and conditional use permit request 
before the County, there is absolutely no mention or any decision granting Weisel a 
"second primary residence." The application was for a variance (size) and conditional 
use permit (allowable servant's quarters). (McLaughlin Aff., Exhibit 5 and 6). The 
County noted that there was an employment agreement on file proving that it was only an 
accessory use. Also, none of the Assoication's correspondence or documents predating 
this lawsuit ever addressed a "second primary residence" on Weisel's lot and the 
Agreement does not make any mention of the County or this concept at all. 
Fourth, as previously indicated, Weisel sent the Association an I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) 
Deposition Notice to the Association. Again, nowhere, not once, did Freuhling, 
testifying on behalf of the Association, mention the consideration was a "second primary 
residence." The Court should not allow the Association to impeach Freuhling's 
testimony with their contrary opinions set forth in the Affidavit of Linda Haavik in an 
attempt to create a material issue of fact. 
Aside from Haavik's unsupportable opinion, the only evidence the Association 
can point to support this new theory of consideration, that it allowed a "second primary 
residence" on Wesiel's lot, is a citation to a statement made by Ottley in his deposition. 
Yet, this citation does not support this theory of consideration. Ottley's statement about 
two residences on one lot stemmed entirely from the developers' concerns that "we didn't 
want owners getting to profit from commercial ventures in the densities." (Ottley Depo., 
p. 54, 1. 17-25). 
The Association was not concerned about an owner having a caretaker's unit and 
a main house together on a lot because Ottley himself had a detached caretaker's unit on 




















his lot, and Davies had a guest house on their lot. (Ottley Depo., p. 76, 1. 8 - p. 77, 1. 4; 
Jean Smith Depo., p. 16, 1. 17-25; McClure Aff., Exhibit 4). 
Q. [By Haemmerle] Okay. Did you have a guest quarters? 
A. [By Ottley] We called them servants' quarters. 
Q. Was it a separate building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you allow someone not a member of your family to occupy that building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who that might have been? 
A. Yes. Marlo Near {phonetic} she still lives here, she's married, has another 
name. 
Q. How long did she occupy that quarter? 
A. Six, seven years. 
Ottley Depo., p. 76, 18 - p. 77, 1. 4 
Furthermore, just two years later, William Fruehling built a caretaker's unit on his 
property so that he had two "residences" on his property. (Fruehling Depo., p. 9, 1. 25;p. 
10, 1. 7). Yet, the Association showed no concern at all about that because it was not the 
"use" that bothered the Association. 
In sum, the 1983 Agreement fails because the consideration for Weisel's 
agreement to restrict development on Lot 13 was illusory. The improvements were not in 
the setback between Lot 13 and Lot 14, and the development plan did not otherwise 
violate any provision of the Original Declaration. 
D. MUTUAL MISTAKE. 




















The Agreement was based upon the fundamental mutual mistake that the 
improvements were located in the setback. The Association argues that there is no clear 
and satisfactory evidence that the parties believed that the proposed development was 
located in the northern setback of Lot 14. Here again, the Association completely ignores 
the clearest statement as to what the parties believed, the plain language of the 
Agreement. 
The Agreement could not be clearer. It expressly states the fundamental fact that 
the improvement is to be constructed in the setback line along the boundary between Lot 
13 and Lot 14. (See Exhibit A attached to Weisel's Opening Brief). "Where the 
language of the contract makes the intentions of the parties clear, the interpretation and 
legal effect of the contract are questions of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 212 P.3d 992, 996 (2009). 
In addition, evidence beyond the plain language of the Agreement also supports 
this fundamental fact. As already shown in Weisel's prior briefs, the undisputed 
documentary evidence shows that the plans were changed many times. (See, Wesiel's 
Opening Brief, Section C., and Response Brief, Section A). Also, Ottley was clear that: 
• "I do recall that in the application of Mr. Weisel, he had a proposed building 
on the north side of his property that had some concerns about setbacks. 
Ottley Depa., p. 42, 1. 22-25. 
• "I think there was an earlier concern, and that this was a revised print, I 
suspect. That I remember clearly. It was much closer to the line. We asked 
that it be pulled back." Id., p. 45, 1.25 - p. 46, 1. 1. 
• "I recall that there was some at that time that we were talking about a setback 
concern." Id., p. 46, 1. 5-7. 
Yet, none of the buildings approved under the plans referenced in the Agreement 
were located or constructed in the northern setback of Lot 14. This case is much like 




O'Connor v. Harger Construction, 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846 (2008), where a 
purchase contract was rescinded because an easement set forth in the agreement never 
came to fruition. 
There is no dispute that a fundamental, express premise of the Agreement was the 
location and construction of improvements in the setback along the boundary between 
Lot 13 and Lot 14. The parties shared a misconception about a basic assumption or vital 
fact upon which they based the Agreement. For these reasons, a mutual mistake occurred 
at the time of contracting, and the Agreement should be rescinded. 
E. FAILURE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT. 
The construction of the improvements in the setback was a condition precedent to 
the requirement that Weisel not develop Lot 13. The Association argues that there is no 
clear implication that the parties intended that the unification of lots was conditioned on 
the construction of the improvements in the setback. 
Again, the Association is asking the Court to ignore the plain language of the 
Agreement which states the future event of "the improvements to be constructed in the 
setback lines along the common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14." There can be no 
dispute that the "event" was not certain to occur because Weisel could have chosen not to 
build, and the Association could not have forced him to do so. Had Weisel chosen not to 
build, it would be absurd for the Association to continue to hold Weisel to the 
Agreement. The only way to construe the Agreement, without reaching absurd results, is 
that the Agreement with the Association was in the nature of an executory contract 
whereby Weisel became bound to the Association to restrict development on Lot 13 
when the improvements were constructed in the setback. 
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The plain language of the 1983 Agreement states that it was based upon an event 
not certain to occur, which was the construction of improvements in the northern setback. 
In fact, Weisel chose not to build the improvements in the setback and thereafter, the 
Association continued to assess him for two lots and accord him two votes. The 
Agreement can only be understood, and only makes sense, if the construction of 
improvements in the setback was a condition precedent to Weisel's agreement not to 
develop Lot 13. To construe it otherwise would be to render Wesiel's agreement with the 
Association not to develop Lot 13 as gratuitous. 
F. FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. 
The Association's only argument on this issue is that Weisel got what he wanted, 
approval of his development plan and the Association got what it wanted, an eternal 
restriction against building on Lot 13. Yet, the Association had no authority to 
disapprove the plan unless it violated the Original Declaration. Since there were no 
restrictions against size of buildings, the number of buildings was less than allowed under 
the Original Declaration, and guest houses and caretakers quarters were accepted and 
already existed as outbuildings, the only authority the Association would have had to 
deny the plan was if the setbacks were violated. 
As already shown by Weisel's previous Briefs, none of the buildings approved 
under the 1983 Application were built in the northern setback of Lot 14. No building has 
ever been built in the setback of Lot 14. (Weisel Depa., p. 55, l. 12-15, 64, 1. 21-24, and 
Exhibit 3; McClure Aff., Exhibit 6; Jean Smith Depa., p. 29, 1. 16-18; Fruehling Depa., 
p. 41, 1. 5-9). The Association had no other authority to deny the development plan since 
it was not in violation of the Original Declaration or the practices of the Association in 




















allowing guest houses and caretaker's quarters. Therefore, the only consideration cited in 
the 1983 Agreement (i.e. approval of construction of improvements in the setback) failed 
when construction never occurred in the setback. 
Furthermore, even accepting the Association's position that it had complete 
authority to deny the development because of its greater mass, size, and number of 
buildings than what existed in the Subdivision, (a position that is not supported by the 
plain language of the Agreement), supervening events have caused that promised 
performance to fail. The Association approved and acquiesced in comparable and 
substantially larger development of the rest of the Subdivision over the ensuing 27 years 
culminating in its express approval of much denser development than that in Weisel' s 
plan. Had the Association continued to limit the size, mass, and number of buildings, the 
failure would not have occurred and Weisel would have gotten what the Association 
claims he bargained for, much greater development than every other lot in the 
Subdivision in return for the restriction. Instead, the opposite has occurred, and Weisel 
is now restricted to development far less than what is allowed for his neighbors. 
Even more egregious, the 2008 Amendment now restricts Lot 14 to no more than 
15,000 square feet of development (except for the existing square footage and number of 
buildings which is grandfathered in), and the 2008 Amendment treats Lot 13 as though it 
does not exist. The result is that development on Lot 13 and 14 together are forever 
limited to 19,000 square feet. Therefore, if any change is made to the grandfathered 
buildings, Weisel will then be bound by the 15,000 square foot and the three building 
limit, even further restricting the property. 




















There is no dispute that no setbacks were violated and supervening events have 
caused the Association's consideration to fail. Weisel is entitled to summary judgment 
on this issue. 
G. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. 
1. Courts routinely apply the doctrine of changed circumstances to 
def eat restrictions on land use made by agreement. 
The Association's Opposition Brief restates the arguments it made on this issue in 
Section 11. of its opening brief and Weisel has already responded to it in Section H.1. of 
his Response Brief. 
In short, the proposition advanced by the Association that the "changed 
circumstances" doctrine only applies to restrictive covenants that cover entire 
neighborhoods and not to individual restrictions found in agreements between two 
parties, has no basis in the law. 
Not surprisingly, the Association has cited no authority to support such a limited 
application of the changed circumstances doctrine. Instead, the doctrine is well 
established and routinely applied to agreements between two parties. See e.g., Cortese v. 
United States, 782 F.2d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 1986); Coury v. Robison, 976 P.2d 518 (Nev. 
1999); Perelman v. Casiello, 920 A.2d 782 (N.J. 2007); Thompson v. Rorschach, 416 
P.2d 898 (Old. 1966). 
The doctrine of changed conditions operates to prevent the perpetuation of 
inequitable and oppressive restrictions on land use and development that 
would merely harass or injure one party without benefiting the other .... 
[It] is an equitable doctrine which stays enforcement of unreasonably 
burdensome restrictions on land use, notwithstanding an agreement 
between the parties specifying the intended duration of the restrictions. 
Cortese v. United States, supra, at 782 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1986). 




















Moreover, according to the Association, the Agreement was necessary because of 
its absolute authority under the Original Declaration to approve or disapprove Weisel's 
development plan. Had there been no Original Declaration, the Agreement would not 
have been made. Thus, a change in circumstances in the density of the neighborhood 
bears directly on the continuing validity of the Agreement. 
2. The evidence that no improvements were constructed in the setback 
and the course of development in the Subdivision since the restriction 
was placed on Lot 13 in 1983, is exactly the type of evidence relevant 
to issue of whether the restriction should be extinguished. 
Once again citing no authority, the Association argues in both Section H.1. and 
Section H.2. of its Opposition Brief that none of the "density" evidence is admissible on 
the change of circumstances issue because the approval of a development plan of greater 
density than existed in the Subdivision was not the consideration or purpose for the 
Agreement. This argument is without merit for the reasons already set forth above and 
herein. 
The fact that the improvements were not constructed in the setback and the course 
of development of the Subdivision over the past 27 years is exactly the type of evidence 
relevant to the issue of whether changed circumstances supports the extinguishment of a 
covenant. 
Where the restriction is made with reference to the continuance of existing 
general conditions of the property and its surroundings, and there has 
occurred such a change in the character of the neighborhood as to defeat 
the purpose of the restrictions and to render their enforcement inequitable 
and burdensome, a court of equity will refuse to enforce them." 
Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258 (Kansas 1970). 
The "continuance of existing general conditions of the property" has indisputably 
changed -- no improvements were constructed in the setback, and it is not disputed that 




















the Association now expressly allows density well in excess of that to which it objected 
with Weisel's 1983 development plan. 
Moreover, the Association's position in this section is an about face from 
everything the Association has been asserting until it filed its Opposition Brief As 
already shown, the Association has for the past several years claimed that the purpose of 
the Agreement was because Weisel's 1983 development plan exceeded the density or 
"mass" that was intended in the Subdivision. Yet now, after being confronted with its 
actions in approving increasingly larger homes and outbuildings to the point of now 
expressly allowing approving density well in excess of that it would only conditionally 
approve for Weisel in 1983, the Association for the first time claims that density or 
"mass" concerns was not the purpose of the Agreement. 
Well before this lawsuit and before it retained the services of Haavik, the 
Association's position has been that it had complete authority to deny the development 
plan for any reason. Under this blanket authority, the Association asserted that it had 
complete discretion to conditionally approve Weisel's 1983 development plan because it 
wished to limit what it perceived as a high density or "mass" development which was 
greater than existed in the subdivision. 
Until Haavik was involved, the Association stated that the purpose for the 
Agreement was: 
• Concern about the "mass of the project". Fruehling Depa., Exhibit 54 
• "As time went by, it became apparent that people wanted bigger homes and 
more outbuildings. In Thom Weisel's case .. .I was the head of design review 
in those days. We let Thom put in larger than required buildings, that were 
not consistent with our CC&Rs, because he made an agreement with us to put 
his two lots together and develop it as one." (Robert Smith Depa., Exh 8, Jean 
Smith's Letter dated December 21, 2005). 




















• "Although Lot 14 was overbuilt, this was tolerable because Lot 13 would 
remain open land." Id., Exhibit 6. Letter dated December 21, 2005 from Bob 
Smith to the Board of Directors). 
• "Q. So you base your opinion that Lot 14 was overbuilt based on the size of 
structures. A. Yes." Jean Smith Depo., p. 43, 1. 2-4. 
• "The size and the quantity of the buildings were substantially larger than what 
was ever envisioned for the subdivision, and that bothered the design review 
committee at that time. Therefore, they made a condition to agree to his 
development plan if Mr. Weisel agreed to never build on Lot 13 and combine 
the two lots into one and never subdivide them again." (Fruehling Depo., p. 
41, 1. 19- p. 42, 1. 2). 
• "I think that the design review committee, as I stated previously, is concerned 
about the mass of the buildings and as a result asked Mr. Weisel to give up his 
development rights on Lot 13, which he did." (Id., p. 65, 1. 2-6). 
• "It's the mass of the project, the mass of the project." (Id., p. 67, 1. 10-11 ). 
Weisel was not the one to raise the density or "mass" issue. It has always been 
Weisel's position that the purpose for the Agreement is exactly what is stated in the 
Agreement - the approval of construction of improvements in the setback in return for the 
restriction on Lot 13. However, since the Association has been adamant that the purpose 
of the Agreement was because Weisel was allowed to build to a greater density or "mass" 
than what existed in the Subdivision, Weisel addressed that issue. 
Faced with the evidence of development in the subdivision well in excess of what 
it would only conditionally approve for Weisel in 1983, the Association now, for the first 
time, talces an about face and refutes its own position, asserting "the Association's one 
residence per lot density analysis" was the purpose for the restriction. (Opposition Brief, 
p. 16). It is hard to believe the Association can malce this argument in light of the fact 
that both before and after the Agreement was entered into, the Association allowed guest 
houses and caretalcer units without extracting any conditions from various owners. 




















Worse yet, Phil Ottley, a member of the Design Committee who considered 
Weisel's 1983 development plan, had a separate caretaker's unit in which his caretaker 
lived for six or seven years. Jean Smith acknowledged that another lot owner by the 
name of Davies had four buildings on his property, including a separate guest house. A 
couple of years later, Fruehling added a caretaker's unit to his property. (Fruehling 
Depo., p. 9, 1. 25 - p.10, 1. 7). Yet, none of these owners was required to surrender 
development rights for having two "residences" on their lots. (Id.) 
The Association should not be permitted to refute everything it has been claiming 
for years, namely that it was the "mass" and density of Weisel's development plan that 
bothered the Association. 
Very simply, the Association's arguments in Section H.1 and H.2 are neither 
supported by law or by the position it has taken for years. 
3. The Association has not raised a material dispute of fact about the 
development of the Subdivision since the Agreement. 
While in Section H.3. of its Opposition Brief, the Association goes to lengths to 
cast doubt on whether the various guest/caretaker's units exceed the 1200 square foot 
limit of the County or City zoning codes, it does not dispute at all that the units violated 
the Amended Declaration. From 1986 until 2008, the Amended Declarations restricted 
such units to 900 square feet or less. Even if Haavik's Affidavit raises an issue as to the 
exact measurement of the units or whether they violated City or County zoning codes, 
there is no dispute that the units violated the Association's Amended Declarations. The 
Association insists that Weisel should be held to his Agreement, yet there was no 
reciprocal effort by the Association to hold its members to their contractual obligations 
under the Amended Declarations. 




















Furthermore, as far as the reliability of the Assessor's records, the Affidavit of 
Garth McClure in response to the Affidavit of Linda Haavik states that the Assessor's 
records are a more reliable, single source of data as to the "as built" units than the plans 
submitted to the planning and building departments by owners and their architects. 
Haavik speculates that the Assessor's square footage data is not accurate. However, she 
presents no data in place of the Assessor's numbers, leaving the Assessor's data 
undisputed. 
As for the particular lots in violation of the Amended Declaration, even accepting 
the Affidavit of Linda Haavik as true, she does not dispute certain facts. For example she 
does not dispute that the guest/caretaker's units on Lots 11 and 12 are approximately 
1,200 square feet. In fact, the application for the unit on Lot 12 is for a 1,200 square foot 
unit. (Garth McClure Affidavit in Response to Haavik Affidavit, Exhibit 1). 
As for Lot 20, the Assessor's records list a "Guest House 1st floor 1423 sq.ft." It 
is true that the Assessor and Janet Jarvis may be in disagreement as to what the various 
parts of this wing are called and when the various parts were built. Jarvis calls the part 
she designed a "guest house" and the part that was in existence a "maid's room." 
However, it is not disputed that the total square footage of the entire living area is 1,423 
square feet and that the "maid's room" is configured exactly like the two other bedrooms 
with an inner door to the living room and kitchens. (Garth McClure Affidavit in 
Response to Haavik Affidavit, Exhibit 2). 
As for Lot 16, the Assessor's records measure the guesthouse at 1,568 square feet. 
Neither the owner nor Haavik dispute the overall size of the building. Rather, they 
distinguish the two floors of that building, calling one floor a "guest area" and the other 




















floor a "caretaker's unit." The Assessor and the owner may be in disagreement as to 
exactly what each floor is called and to the exact square footage of each floor. However, 
there is no dispute that the Assessor did not include the "garage" space in its total 
calculation of 1,568 square feet for the guest/caretaker's unit and that figure accurately 
represents the square footage of the total living area of the building. 
As for Lot 5, Haavik's only dispute is to whether the total square footage of the 
caretaker's unit includes the "unfinished" part of the second floor of the building. Haavik 
does not dispute the total size of that second floor. 
Finally, McClure admits there was a typo as to Lot 7. Thus, there are at least five 
other properties that contain a "second residence," four of which were allowed in 
violation of the Association's Amended Declaration. 
If the Court reviews the Assessor's records, it will see that the records are detailed 
and comprehensive. It goes without saying that if an owner felt that the records 
overstated what exists on his property, that owner could, and likely, would challenge and 
correct such records. 




















4. The Association has allowed violation of the Amended Declaration 
and now approves development in the Subdivision far in excess of 
Weisel's development plan, such that the continued restriction on 
development of Lot 13 is inequitable and oppressive. 
A party's conduct, changed circumstances, or the relevant equities will preclude 
enforcement by that party or will warrant modification of the restrictive covenant. See, 
RESTATEMENT, supra,§§ 7.1, 7.10. 
"Where circumstances have changed and enforcement of a restrictive covenant 
would impose an oppressive burden without any substantial benefit, the covenant must 
undergo modifications." Cevasco v. Westwood Homes, Inc., 15 A.2d 140, 141 (NJ. 
1940). "There must be a change in the character of the surrounding neighborhood 
sufficient to make it impossible any longer to secure in a substantial degree the benefits 
sought to be realized through the performance of the building restriction." Hecht v. 
Stephens, 464 P.2d 258 (Kansas 1970). 
Id. 
"The right to enforce the restrictions may be lost by acquiescence in the 
violation of the provisions of such restrictions. Additionally, where the 
restriction is made with reference to the continuance of existing general 
conditions of the property and its surroundings, and there has occurred 
such a change in the character of the neighborhood as to defeat the 
purpose of the restrictions and to render their enforcement inequitable and 
burdensome. a court of equity will refuse to enforce them." 
In Section H.3. of its Opposition Brief, the Association claims that the 
"Subdivision has been built out as expected." The only evidence the Association cites in 
support of this statement is the Affidavit of Linda Haavik, who cites no foundation for her 
knowledge as to the expectations of the developers or owners within the Subdivision. In 
fact, Haavik's opinion necessarily contradicts the Association's assertion that it could 
have denied any owner's development plan for any reason it chose. If that were the case, 




















how would Linda Haavik have any clue as to how the Subdivision might have 
developed? 
Haavik bases her opinion totally on what was permitted under the applicable 
zoning ordinances. However, if the Association's expectations as to how the Subdivision 
would develop coincided with the applicable zoning codes, then the Association would 
allow lot owners in the Subdivision to build to a density of 25% lot coverage (the city 
limitations on lot coverage), which it expressly does not allow. 
In contrast to Haavik's opinion, the Association has always been insistent that the 
Subdivision did not develop as expected. As stated by Jean and Bob Smith, two of the 
original developers of the Subdivision, the intent for the Subdivision was to have a 
"country feel." (Robert Smith Depo., Exhibit 8, Jean Smith's letter dated December 21, 
2005). However, the Association believed that the original intent of a development with 
a "country feel" was not being met because it had allowed larger and larger development 
over the years. 
• "As time went by, it became apparent that people wanted bigger homes and 
more outbuildings. In Thom Weisel's case .. .I was the head of design review 
in those days. We let Thom put in larger than required buildings, that were 
not consistent with our CC&Rs, because he made an agreement with us to put 
his two lots together and develop it as one." (Robert Smith Depo., Exh 8, Jean 
Smith's Letter dated December 21, 2005). 
• "The size and the quantity of the buildings were substantially larger than what 
was ever envisioned for the subdivision, and that bothered the design review 
committee at that time. Therefore, they made a condition to agree to his 
development plan if Mr. Weisel agreed to never build on Lot 13 and combine 
the two lots into one and never subdivide them again." (Fruehling Depo., p. 
41, 1. 19 - p. 42, 1. 2). 
In 1985, the Association acknowledged that lot owners were building bigger and 
bigger guest houses, caretaker's units, and other structures on their lots and requesting 




















approval to build outside the building envelopes. (Beaver Springs Response to Second 
Request for Admission No. 16, admitting Exhibit 103, Letter to Homeowners dated March 
2, 1985). Following the December 26, 1985, annual meeting, the Association sent a letter 
to homeowners on January 26, 1986, acknowledging that "time and the makeup of the 
Beaver Springs neighborhood has outdated the original Declaration of Restrictions." 
(Beaver Springs Response to Second Request No. 17, admitting Exhibit 104). In the 
Annual Minutes from the December 27, 1990, the Association again acknowledged that 
owners were building larger and larger homes. (Beaver Springs Response to Second 
Request No. 21, admitting Exhibit 108). Owners continued to modify the building 
envelopes that had been laid out. (Beaver Springs Response to Second Request No. 22, 
admitting Exhibit 109). Bill Fruehling admitted that times had changed and the 
Declaration needed to be updated. (Beaver Springs Response to Second Request No. 25, 
admitting Exhibit 112). 
Based on the Associations' own records, Haavik's opinion as to the development 
of the Subdivision is completely contrary to the how the developers and the Association 
perceived the development over time. 
In sum, when the other units and dense development approved by the Association 
and the 2008 Amended Declaration are viewed together, there has been a change so 
"complete as to render the restriction unreasonable, confiscatory, discriminatory, and as 
practically to destroy the purpose for which the restriction was originally imposed." 
The difference between the 1983 and 2005 aerial photos, which are attached as 
Exhibits 4A and 5 to McClure's Affidavit, makes the point clear. Weisel's 1983 
development plan called for approximately 11,533 square feet of buildings on a 3.7-acre 




















lot, the number and size of which did not violate the Original Declaration but which, 
according to the Association, was greater than what existed or was intended for the 
Subdivision. 
Then, in 2008, the Association expressly put its stamp of approval on 
development up to 15,000 square feet of structures on any lot, including the much smaller 
2-acre lots. This now allows lot owners to build to a lot coverage greater than 16%, a 
density well in excess of Weisel's 1983 development plan and well in excess of the 4.8% 
lot coverage for Lot 13 and 14. In addition to that, due to the new limits, Weisel cannot 
remove any of his grandfathered structures without suffering even greater restriction on 
his property. 
There is no dispute that the 1983 Agreement was "made with reference to the 
continuance of existing general conditions of the property and its surroundings, and there 
has occurred such a change in the character of the neighborhood as to defeat the purpose 
of the restrictions and to render their enforcement inequitable and burdensome." Hecht v. 
Stephens, supra. For all these reason, the Court should find that a change of 
circumstances has occurred, which renders the 1983 restriction null and void. 
I. LACHES. 
The Association claims that since the Association and building departments threw 
the owner's plans away, Weisel is prevented by laches from raising his change of 
circumstances argument. The Association's argument lacks any merit for many reasons. 
First, under its Original Declaration and subsequent Amendments, the Association 
had an affirmative duty to "keep a permanent record of all such reported action" of the 
Design Committee. This requirement has survived each and every amendment to the 




















Declaration. (Beaver Springs Response to Second Request for Admission No. 1, 
admitting Exhibit 4; Response to Second Request for Admission No. 30, admitting Exhibit 
117). If there are scant or no records, it is because the Association did not follow its own 
rules. 
Second, the documents that were kept by the Association negate any inference 
that the missing documents would have helped the Association's case. For example, the 
documents obtained from the Association in discovery show that as to Lot 20, the plans 
dated May, 2002, depict a 1,050 square foot (at least), two-bedroom guest house with a 
kitchen was presented to and approved by the Association, the size of which violated the 
Amended Declaration. (McClure Affidavit, Exhibit 2). Likewise, the 2003 plans for Lot 
12A were for a 1,200 square foot caretaker's unit which ended up being 1,280 square 
feet. (Id., Exhibit 1). The Association approved those plans. (Id.) Therefore, the 
Association's own documents do not support its laches claim. 
Third, the Association's argument hinges on an interpretation of the "change of 
circumstances" that is based solely on what changes the Association did or did not 
approve in the Subdivision. Yet, on a claim of change of circumstances, the inquiry is 
much more expansive than that. 
The jurisdiction of equity to enforce covenants restnctmg the use of 
property is not absolute. The right to enforce the restrictions may be lost 
by acquiescence in the violation of the provisions of such restrictions. 
Additionally, where the restriction is made with reference to the 
continuance of existing general conditions of the property and its 
surroundings, and there has occurred such a change in the character of the 
neighborhood as to defeat the purpose of the restrictions and to render 
their enforcement inequitable and burdensome, a court of equity will 
refuse to enforce them. 
* * * 




















The extent of change in a neighborhood which will justify refusal to 
enforce restrictive covenants has not given rise to any hard-and-fast rule. 
Each case must rest on the equities of the situation as it is presented. A 
basic principle woven as a thread throughout all the decisions is that to 
warrant refusal of equitable relief, the change in conditions must be so 
great or radical as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction and destroy 
its purpose. 
Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258, 262 (Kansas 1970). 
Putting aside the documents related to Lot 20 and Lot 12 that show the 
Association approved units in excess of the Amended Declaration, and assuming for the 
sake of argument that the Association was completely unaware of the larger and larger 
homes being built in the subdivision and the construction of guest houses and caretaker's 
units in violation of the Amended Declaration, simply the increasingly dense 
development in the Subdivision in the past 27 years alone can support the extinguishment 
of the restriction. 
Finally, the claim that the Association was prejudiced by Weisel's delay in 
bringing his change of circumstances argument is circular and makes no sense. The very 
essence of a change of circumstances claim is a lapse of time. To extinguish a covenant 
due to change of circumstances, one must show that a change of circumstances has 
occurred. Laches relies on a change of circumstance to prevent such an action. The two 
are mutually exclusive. Indeed, virtually all cases applying the change of circumstances 
doctrine involve the passage of many years. See e.g, Shippan Point Assn., Inc. v. 
McManus, 640 A.2d 1014 (Conn.App. 1994); Zavislak v. Shipman, 362 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 
1961); Cevasco v. Westwood Homes, Inc., 15 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1940); Gomah v. Hally, 113 
N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1962); Hecht v. Stephens, 464 P.2d 258 (Kansas 1970); Cortese v. 




















United States, 782 F.2d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 1986); Coury v. Robison, 976 P.2d 518 (Nev. 
1999); Perelman v. Casiello, 920 A.2d 782 (N.J. 2007). 
With the 2008 Amendment, the Association for the first time has put it express 
stamp of approval on development far in excess of that it would only conditionally 
approve with Weisel. Weisel's Declaratory Judgment action was instituted within a short 
period thereafter. 
In sum, there is no basis for the Association's argument that Weisel is prevented 
by I aches from prevailing on his "change of circumstances" claim. 
J. NECESSARY PARTY - THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
The Association has not raised any issues with respect to necessary parties or 
third-party beneficiaries that were not thoroughly addressed by Weisel in his Opening 
Brief. Therefore, Weisel stands on those prior arguments. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, the Court should grant Weisel's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and deny the Association's Motion for Summary judgment. 
~1:' 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -/-- day of February, 2010. 
~MMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
FRffZXHAEMMERLE 




















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this X day of February, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Ed Lawson 
Erin Clark 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney(s) at his 
offices in Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attorney(s) at the telecopier number 
_______ , and by then mailing copies of the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
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FRITZ X. HAEMMERLE 
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Jolynn Drage, Clerk D1stnct 
Cou/1 Blaine County, Idaho 
Attorney for Plaintiff, THOMAS WEISEL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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) Case No. CV-09-124 
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THOMAS WEISEL, a married man 
dealing in his sole and separate property, 
Plaintiff, 
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GARTH MCCLURE, being sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an individual residing in Blaine County, Idaho. I am over the age of 
18 and make the averments contained herein of my own personal knowledge and would 
testify to the facts as presented herein if called upon to do so. 
2. On February 2, 2010, I received Linda Haavik's Affidavit dated January 
26, 2010. I was able to analyze and evaluate it on Wednesday and Thursday, February 4 th 
and 5th• I previously submitted my Affidavit in this legal proceeding. At the time I 
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executed my Affidavit, Ms. Haavik's Affidavit was not available to me for any kind of 
evaluation. Prior to February 2, 2010, I did not know she had been identified as a witness 
in this matter, and therefore, I did not have an opportunity to comment on her opinions. 
3. My Report evaluates the build out of Beaver Springs Subdivision and its 
compliance with the CC&R's, as amended over time, but does not include an evaluation 
of compliance with County or City Zoning regulations. 
4. On Page 10, 119 Haavik states: 
"It is my understanding that, based on these purported square footages, Weisel is 
arguing that there are several guesthouses within the Subdivision that exceed the size 
restriction in the applicable City or County zoning ordinances. The conclusion however 
cannot be made from the information contained in the McClure Report." 
My Response: My report evaluates the size of accessory dwelling units and their 
compliance with the CC&R's (not City of County zoning regulations) in effect at the time 
the units were built. The report does not include an evaluation of compliance with Blaine 
County zoning regulations. 
5. On Page 10120 Haavik states: 
"The McClure Affidavit states that he relied solely on the Blaine County 
Assessor's records .... " 
My Response: I relied solely on the Blaine County Assessor's records because it 
is the best available single data base, from one single source which reflects the "as-built" 
square footages for the entire life of the subdivision. This data was used because it is 
more consistent and reliable than Blaine County Planning Department's or City of 
Ketchum. 
6. On Page 10 121 Haavik states: 
"The Blaine County Zoning and Building Department method of calculating 
square footage for ADU' s changed over time, while they struggled with how to measure, 
which results in inconsistent data." 
My Response: I used Blaine County Assessor's data for the exact reason of 
avoiding that inconsistency. 
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7. On Page 11 ,r22, Haavik discusses the "subjectivity" of square footage 
calculations. Her statement actually supports the use of Blaine County Assessor's 
records because it is one singJe source and not a source which used various methods. 
8. On Page 11 ,r23, Haavik states: 
"the Assessor's records do not aJways reflect the square footage that 1s 
represented to the building and zoning authorities at the time of construction." 
My Response: This is true and supports the use of the Assessor's "as built" 
records. In my experience working for various govemmentaJ entities, including the city 
of Sun Valley and the city of Ketchum, the Assessor's records are the most reliable for 
the anaJysis used in my Report because they reflect "as-built" square footage rather that 
what is represented in the plans submitted to the building and planning departments by 
the owner or his architect. A buiJding will usually not get buiJt to exactly the square 
footage number planned. Neither the planning department nor the building department 
have adequate resources to enforce with any vigor the size or use limitations once the unit 
gets built. An example of that is shown by Lot 12A. Exhibit I shows the application for 
and approval by the City for a 1,200 square foot dwelling unit in 2003 but the unit was 
eventually built to 1,280 square feet. This is in excess of the 1986 Amended Declaration. 
9. On Page 12 ,r24, Haavik states that "connecting zoning, building permit, 
and Assessor's records infonnation is nearly impossible." 
My Response: Again, the intent was not to evaluate zoning compliance. The use 
of "built years" in the McClure report was not used to reflect the year the zoning 
regulations applied, and this is not implied in the report. 
10. On Page 12 ,r2s, Haavik discusses my calculations as to certain 
guest/caretaker's houses. 
My Response: 
Lot 5: In Appendix A, the Building 2 improvements list "Guest House & Garage". 
Haavik is wrong. I did not represent that the guest house alone was 2,711 square feet. 
Lot 7 A: This is a typo. Haavik is correct, according to the Assessor's Records there 
is no guest house, and the house was built in 1977. 
Lot 16: The Assessor's records list the Guesthouse at 1568 square feet as shown in 
Appendix A Haavik and the owner divide the building into a guest area on one floor 
and a caretaker's unit on the other floor but they do not dispute they are in the same 
building. The Assessor and the owner may be in disagreement as to exactly what 
each floor is called and to the exact square footage of each floor, but it is clear that 
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the Assessor did not include the "garage" space in its total calculation of 1,568 square 
feet for the guest/caretaker's unit and that figure accurately represents the square 
footage of the total living area. 
Lot 20: The Assessor's records list a "Guest House I st floor 1423 sq.ft. The Assessor 
and Janet Jarvis may be in disagreement as to what the various parts of this wing are 
called since Jarvis calls part of it a "guest house" and part of it a "maid's room." 
However, Jarvis does not dispute that the total square footage of the entire living area 
is 1,423 square feet. The Assessor has included the "maid's room" in the square 
footage for the guest house. In reviewing Hascoe's plans that were obtained from the 
Association, the maid's room is attached to and enters into the guest house and the 
"guest house" has a kitchen. (See attached Exhibit 2). The Assessor's data does not 
appear to be inaccurate. 
11. On Page 13 126, Haavik states that my Report is not a reliable 
representation of the structures contained in the Subdivision because the Assessor is 
concerned with property values and because it misstates the information contained in the 
Assessor's records. With the exception of the guest house for Lot 7, there is no 
difference between what is in my Report and the Assessor's records. Further, my Report 
did not evaluate compliance with zoning ordinances. Finally, the Assessor is concerned 
about property values and in order to create values, the Assessor uses size and use of 
structures so that the data is relevant. The Assessor's method of obtaining the square 
footage data is not disputed by Haavik. ·· 
12. On Page 13 ,21, Haavik states that the building plans should be relied on. 
However, as I mentioned previously, the "as built" square footages more accurately 
reflect what was in fact built. Haavik also points out that the building plans have not 
been kept and the applications between 1980 and 1990 contain little or no information 
about the size of buildings or type or purpose. This again supports using Blaine County 
Assessor's records, not the sparse records of the Blaine County Planning and Building 
Department. 
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13. On Page 14 -;[28, Haavik dismisses floor area ratios and lot coverage as 
indicators of density. Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and Lot Coverage are both widely use 
methods throughout the United States to determine development density on a given 
parcel ofland. The two methods are widely used in the land use planning profession and 
are used as a regulatory tool in municipal and county zoning and subdivision regulations. 
In addition, my report does not evaluate compliance with County or City ordinances. 
14. Even though Haavik says in 128 that lot coverage does not have any 
relevancy to density, on Page 14129, Haavik shows in this paragraph that it is being used 
by the city of Ketchum in other zone districts. 
15. On Page 14 130, Haavik states that ADU's are not included in density 
calculation for the City zoning compliance. However, they can and should be included 
for a "real picture" evaluation within a private subdivision. 
16. Haavik dismisses using FAR on Page 15, 131, because it is not used as a 
regulatory tool in residential districts in the city of Ketchum. However, FAR is a valid, 
tested and accepted method in the planning profession for determining density. 
17. On Page 15 133, Haavik mentions that the County used to require double 
the lot size for Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs). The fact that the County at one time 
required double the lot size for detached ADUs shows their concern about ADUs 
contributing to lot and subdivision density. 
18. In Page 16 ,r36, Haavik makes a statement about the fact that the Assessor 
does not ensure compliance with zoning codes. I never said otherwise. It is true that the 
Assessor does not enforce zoning codes. However, the Assessor records are valid for 
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detennining "as-built" square footage of structures on a lot. Haavik does not dispute this 
fact. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED thisB!h. day of February, 2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i+"- day of February, 2010. 
~'?Yd-f' N TARYPUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: ~lw C! SI I ShcuhQM., j.J 
Commission expires: ~--- tc., ~ .:,cD..3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
q-1;, 
I hereby certify that on the -I- day of February, 2010, I served a true and 




LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney( s) at his 
offices in Hailey, Idaho. 
By telescoping copies of same to said attorney( s) at the telecopy number 
______ ___. and by then mailing copies of the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, rdaho. 
h 
Fritz X. HaemmerI;' 
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Lacerte Accessory Dwelling 
Unit Design Review 








KETCHUM PLANNING AND ZONING 
COMMISSION - FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
OWNERS: Larry and Joyce Lacerte, verified August 12, 2003 with Assessor 
REQUEST: Design Review Approval of an Accessory Dwelling Unit 
LOCATION: Lot 12A, Beaver Springs Subdivision (110 Adam's Rib Lane) 
NOTICE: Adjacent property owners 
ZONING: Limited Residential - Two Acre (LR-2) 
FLOOR AREA: PROPOSED 1,200 sq.ft. 
LOT AREA: 103,680 square feet (2.38 acres) 
LOT COVERAGE: 7.3 percent (25 percent a11owed) 
BUILDING HEIGHT: 24 feet 
PROPOSED SETBACKS: 
.. FRONT: 70 feet REAR: 280 feet SIDE: 100 feet SIDE (main house): 42 feet 
REQUIRED SETBACKS: 
FRONT: 15 feet REAR: 20 feet SIDE: 12 feet SIDE: 12 feet 
CURB CUT: 12.5 percent (35 percent allowed) 
PARKING SPACES: one ( 1) for ADU ( 1 required) 
REVIEWER: Stefanie Webster, City Planner 
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The applicant is requesting design review approval of a 1,200 square foot studio/one 
(1) bedroom accessory dwelling unit (ADU). The lot size is 2.38 acres and the applicant is 
allowed to build a 1,200 square foot ADU on the property. A primary residence is existing. 
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FOUND: 
Additional mature landscaping is proposed to the north of the ADU to further buffer the unit 
from adjacent neighbors. Mature vegetation presently exists to buffer the ADU from the 
view of neighbors and traffic on Adam's Rib Lane. 
STANDARD 17.108.01 0(M)(3 )(b ): 
Exterior lighting shall not have an adverse impact upon other properties and/or public 
streets. 
FOUND: 
One ( 1) exterior light fixture that shines down will be installed over the front door. All 
exterior lighting shall conform with the City of Ketchum Dark Sky Ordinance. 
STANDARD 17.108.010(M)(3)(c): 
fftiildmg- design snoiild iricfude weather protection whicn prevents wafer from dffpping or 
snow from sliding on areas where pedestrians gather and circulate or onto adjacent 
properties. 
FOUND: 
The plans do not indicate the use of weather protection devices. 
STANDARD 17.108.010(M)(4)(a): 
Traffic shall flow safely within the project and onto adjacent streets. Traffic includes 
vehicle, bicycle, pedestrian and equestrian use. Consideration shall be given to adequate 
sight distances and proper signage. 
FOUND: 
The existing ingress and egress traffic pattern on the project site is via a private driveway 
that is accessed from Adam's Rib Lane, a private road. Adam's Rib Lane is accessed off of 
Adam's Gulch Road which connects to State Highway 75. No sidewalks are located in the 
vicinity of the project site. 
STANDARD 17.108.010{M)(4)(b): 
Parking areas have functional aisle dimensions, backup space and turning radius. 
FOUND: 
Space for one (1) parking space measuring nine (9) feet in width by twenty (20) feet in 
length is available in front of the ADU. The vehicle is able to back directly out from the 
space and onto the private driveway in order to exit the property. 
STANDARD 17.108.0 IO(M)(4)(c): 
Location of parking areas is designed for minimum adverse impact upon adjacent properties 
with regard to noise, lights and visual impact. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The City of Ketchum is a municipal corporation organized under Article XII of the 
Idaho Constitution and the laws of the State ofldaho, Title 50, Idaho Code. 
2. Under Chapter 65, Title 67 of the Idaho Code, the City has passed a land use and 
zoning code, Title 1 7. 
3. The Commission has authority to hear the applicant's Design Review Application 
pursuant to Chapter 17 .108 of Ketchum Code Title 1 7. 
4. The City of Ketchum Planning Department provided adequate notice for the review 
of this application. 
5. The project does meet the ·standards of approval under Chapter 17.108 of Zoning 
Code Title 17. 
DECISION 
THEREFORE, the Ketchum Planning and Zoning Commission approves this Design 
Review Application this 25th day of August, 2003, subject to the following conditions: 
l. Ketchum Water, Sewer, Fire and Building Department requirements shall be 
met; 
2. Design review approval shall expire six (6) months from the date of approval; 
3. Design review elements shall be completed prior to occupancy; 
4. This Design Review approval is based on the plans and information presented 
and approved at the meeting on the date noted herein. Building Permit plans 
must conform to the approved Design Review plans unless otherwise approved 
in writing by the Commission or Planning and Zoning Administrator. Any 
building or site discrepancies which do not conform to the approved plans will 
be subject to removal; 
5. The accessory dwelling unit shall be secondary m nature to the primary 
residence; 
6. The accessory dwelling unit shall noq be sold separately from the primary 
residence; 
7. The accessory dwelling unit shall be limited to long-term rental ( 60 day 
minimum); 
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U~SIGN HEVIEW Al'PLICATlON 
l'rojccl Nome: Lacerte Guest Cottage 
Owner: 1 Mery and ,lnyc:e Lacerte l'lione No.:214-265-4800 
Mnl ling Address: 5323 Pick , o Da I} as TP~~~ 75220 
A rel Ii ta:.1/llcpresentnli ve:~Fo"'g,111eu.) roiu.a11-1o ... o..,_J .... ou..C---------- l'ho11c No.; 208-726-97 42 
Molll11g At.lc.lrcss: p o Box 62AO Ketchum JD 83340 
Architect Llccitllc No.: ___________________________ _ 
EnBlncer License No.: Mnrrel I Enql11eerl119 __ 1f6589 _________________ _ 
All tlc~lgn review 11ln1111 n11d tlrnwl11~s for 1111l,llc co111111c,dnl 11n~ccl21, 1CAidc11ti11I h11ihli11l:~ cu11l11i11i11g 
more 1hn11 four ( ,t) ti wclll 11g 1111 l1s n111I 11 c vcl op111c11\ project~ t:1111111i11illl{ more I l1n11 four ( 11 ) 1hvc II iug 
1111ils shnll he pre1inrcu hy n11 ltlul10 llccmctl 1m:htlcd ur uu ltl11l111 lit:cmicd c11gi11ccr. 
l'rcn1111liculiu11 l;cc:_______ l>utc l'ni,1: ______ ~ 
l)cslg11 llcvlcw Fee: ·>200.00 ____ Unlc l'nitl: t ·· 1,7 -0:, 7':,L.w 
Lcgnl untl DcscriJ1tion: Lot \2B a roval of En'<lelope Shift, otherwise It Is Lot 12A) 
l,ol Arca: 101680 sQ ft 2 38 acres Znulng Ui!!lricl:-"'L.;.;.R-..;2;...... _________ _ 
Ovcrlny District: Flood /\Ynlu11chc l'ct.lcstri1111 Mo1111t11h1 
J\nliclpRlcJ 
U1e:_...Ji1i~;w.ci.L..uu....--------:--:-------:-:--::-:---------::-:------
Type Co11slrucilo11: New X llct11otlcl ALlultluu OIiier 
Number of Rcslucullnl Unltll:_~--------- Numhcr of I lolel Unlls: _____ _ 










l'crcenl of llullJiug Cuvcrago:__,._.... ______________________ _ 
Floor Arco ll.atlo (CC Zone): ______________________ _ 
Sclbocks: Frout ~15-' __ SiJc 100' Sic.le .!.Q.'. __ llcnr 20' ---
I lclght:--,;......,. _____ _ l'n1ll11g Spnccs l'rovklctl: __ T_wo __________ _ 
Co11.1tn1cllon l'l11ul11a: ___________________________ _ 
WIii 11rojccl be co11du1ul11lu111lz.ctl·1 Yes No J....._ 
WIii project be tO\Yllhouset17 YCll Nu J....._ 
WI 11 n 11 or cxcnvntlon l>e ('C(11.1lrcd·1 Ye.a No .x.__ 
WIii existing lrtt:S or vegetntlo11 be rc111ovctl'/ Yea No ..x..__ 
Wnler SyJlc111: Mu11lcl11nl Scrvlco___ Kclcl111111 S11rl11g Wulcr__ Private well Water _2{,_ 
NOTE,: The lcnu ur Ucslg11 ltnlcw Ap11rnv11I ab11II be 11il (fi) 111011fhs fru111 lhc Llnlo 11p11rov11I I~ 
i:1·1111tc1I. l'uilui-c lit Ille n co11111lclc Hnlldlu,: l'cn11lf A1111llc111ln11 for n 1,rujri:I wllltln ~11111 ~Ix (fi) 
munllu .,h11II c111Uc .!mhl np11rnv11I lu he unll nud vnld. (frum Onllunncc Nntnhc1· 411'>) 
The A1111lh:1111I ngrct's ht Ute cvcnl 11f A dl111111lc co11ccrnln~ lhc lnl~q,rcl11ll011 u1· t'11fotcc111c11I of 
the l)e11lg11 llcvlc1v A1111llcnlhn1 In "·hlch llt<? City or Kcldnt III l:ii 111, 11rcv11\1111g 1111rf y 111 1111r lhc 
rc11su1111lilc nllurMt)' rees, tuchullng nllornry forll 011 111111ral, 1111d upc11se1 uf Ilic Uty ur Kckh11111. 
I, l h c uuc.lcnlgm:cl, cerllry lh•I All lufor111Allon snluu lllcd ,.1111 nml 1111011 thb 111111llc11ll011 runu I! 
true 1111d 11ccurntc lo lhe bcsl of 111y kno,vle1lge a111I ltclld. 
~l:lureof ~(1li4l /6 0 f ;;J /1,wa,, .Q < lJ,ie: 7-. :J f - () S 
Ap11ro~e11lcd ( -· l)nte: Cb~i ~ 2{.()~ 
~ COMl'LETE Al'l'LICATIUN, Irot1lt ~ SICTS UI' l'LANS ANIJ 1r1rn MUST Im 
SUUMlrrtW m,~trmur, NOON A MlNIMUM OI' TWl~NTY {2.0) 1)/\ Y:5 l'lllOll 
TO Tl I It COMMISSION M lmTIN~. 
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BBAVBR SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Box 3934 
August 18, 2003 
Englemann, Inc. 
Attn: Cindy Mann 
660 2nd Street South 
P. 0. Box 6240 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Via FAX 726-9793 
Ketchum., Idaho 83340 
Re: Lacerte Residence Guest House 
Dear Cindy, 
The Beaver Springs Design Review Committee has approved the plans submitted 







June 7, 20D2 
The Jarvis Group 
Attn: Bobbie 
P. o. Box 626 
Ketc~um, ID B3340 
208-7'26-4031 I 
' 2 0 8 - 7 2 6'"4 0 9 7 FAX 
BEAVER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Box 3934 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
RE: Design Review - Lot 20, Beaver Springs Subdivision/Rascoe Residence 
Pl.an dated May 22, 2Q02 - G_uest House 
Dear Bobbie: 
The Design Review Committee of Beaver Springs Subdivision has approved the 
above referenced plans for the 1050 sq.ft. guest house. The association 
also has approved the modification to the building envelope. This approval 
has been made with the understa-nding that the landscaping adjacent to Lot 
19 will be installed under the supervision and approval o,f Lori Sarchett. 
As a reminder, please make sure all contractors park on site and not on any 
Beaver Springs Roads. 
































HASCOE GUEST HOUSE 
SCALE: 1/4" = 1'-0" 05/22/02 
PREVIOUS PLAN 1196 SQ FT 
NEW PROPOSED PLAN 'IIE!Psa FT 























































































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF nu: f:JITH ,JlJDICIAL OlSTIUCT OF THE 
STA TE OF LOAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man } 
dealing in his sole and separate property, } 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS 











_______ ..:Dc,c'-'fe"'n"dan=tsc.· __ ) 
Case No. CV-2009-124 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On February 16, 2010, the cross motions for summary judgment came on regularly for 
hearing, The plaintiff was reprcscnlcd by counsel, f ritz X. Haernme.rle. The defendant was 
rcprest:nted by counsel, Ed Lawson aod Erin Clark. After considering the briefs, evidence and 
argwnent of counsel the Court took the matter under advisement for a \.\'Titlcn decision. 
J. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action concerns an agreement entered into on October 12~ 1983 between lhe plaintiff 
and defendant combining two adjoining lots owned by lhe plaintiff. 
The Beave.r Springs Subdivision (the Subdivision) consists of 21 residendaJ lots which 
range in size from 2 to 4 acres and ·was originally planed i.n. March 1978 nonh of lhe City of 
I • MEMORANOUM OtCIS)ON RE; CROSS MOTfONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1203 
Ketchum in Blaine County. The Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc. (the Association) was 
formed on April 4, 1978. The Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&R's) for the 
Association were first recorded on April 6, 1978. The original CC&R's in Article II paragraph 
13 limited the development of the Lot to "one single family dwelling with no more than four 
detached outbuildings" and further provided that the "Single family dwelling shall have a 
minimum floor area on the ground floor of 1500 square feet." Article II, paragraph 17 provides 
in relevant part as follows: 
17. Two or more adjoining Lots, or other parcels of property of the same land 
classification which are under the same ownership may be combined and developed as 
one parcel. Setback lines along the common boundary line of the combined parcels may 
be removed with the written consent of the Design Committee, if the Design Committee 
finds and determines that any improvements to be constructed within these setback lines 
will not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other property. If setback lines 
are removed or easements changed along the common boundary lines of combined 
parcels, the combined parcels shall be deemed one parcel and may not thereafter be split 
and developed as two parcels. 
The CC&R's have been amended on three separate occasions by the Association and the 
amendments were approved by at least two thirds of the membership as required by the CC&R's. 
The first such amendment, recorded on November 14, l 986, amended Article II, paragraph 13 to 
limit Lot development to one single family dwelling and three detached outbuildings and further 
limited a guest house, domestic servants' quarters, or horse stables to 900 square feet and sheds 
to 200 square feet. The first amendment further amended Article V, paragraph 2 to read as 
follows: 
2. There is and shall be one (1) membership in the Association for each Lot. The 
owner or owners of each Lot or other property area automatically becomes the owner or 
owners of the membership for that Lot or other property area and automatically have the 
benefits and are automatically subject to the burdens attributable to such membership. 
Each membership is and shall always be appurtenant to the title to a particular Lot or 
other property area and shall automatically pass with the transfer of title to the same. 
Each membership is entitled to one (l) vote in matters submitted to a vote of the 
membership of the Association. If two (2) or more Lots are combined under single 
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ownership, as provided by paragraph 17 of Article II, above, with permanent restrictions 
encumbering the combined Lots to permit the construction of only one (1) single family 
residence and other improvements as herein permitted for a single Lot, the combined Lots 
shall thereafter become and be treated as a single Lot entitling the owner to a single 
membership and one (1) vote in the Association. 
The second amendment was recorded January 31, 2005 and it contained a definition for a 
single family residence to be "A structure designed to accommodate no more than a single 
family, its servants and occasional guests, plus an attached or detached garage with the capacity 
for not less than two (2) or more than six ( 6) automobiles .... " 
The third and final amendment was recorded January 17, 2008. It amended Article II, 
paragraph 13 which effectively reduced the permitted detached outbuilding from three to two; 
the maximum square footage for all buildings was limited to 15,000 square feet, and of that total 
square footage, the size of a detached garage was limited to 2,500 square feet; the size of a 
detached guesthouse or servant quarters was increased from 900 square feet to 1200 square feet; 
and horse facilities were limited to 1500 square feet. 
The Subdivision was governed by Blaine County planning and zoning regulations until it 
was annexed by the City of Ketchum on September 17, 1990. 
On February 19, 1982, Thomas Weisel (Weisel) purchased Lot 14 and on January 21, 
1983 he purchased Lot 13 in the Subdivision. Lot 13 consisted of approximately 3.01 acres and 
Lot 14 consisted of approximately 3. 70 acres and the two lots are adjoining. 
In 1983, Weisel retained the services of James McLaughlin, an architect to design 
improvements for Lot 14 consisting of ( 1) a main residence of approximately 6,148 sq. ft.; (2) a 
barn of approximately 2,645 sq. ft.; (3) a garage of approximately 1,100 sq. ft.; and (4) a guest 
house of approximately 1,640 sq. ft., for a total of approximately 11,533 sq. ft. of development. 
At the time of the proposed design for the improvements to Lot 14, the CC&R's for the 
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Association limited buildings on a Lot to "one single family dwelling with no more than four 
detached outbuildings" and provided for setbacks consisting of a 15 foot side yard setback, and a 
25 foot front and rear yard setback. While there was a requirement of a minimum size of the 
family dwelling, there was no limit placed on the maximum size of any buildings on the Lot. 
However, the Blaine County planning and zoning regulations concerning accessory dwellings 
were conditionally permitted on lots one acre or larger, but the size limit for such dwellings was 
900 sq. ft. 
On October 12, 1983, Weisel and the Association entered into a written agreement 
(Agreement) whereby Lots 13 and 14 were to be combined as one parcel and Weisel agreed that 
the two lots "shall not hereafter be split and/or developed as two separate parcels." The 
Agreement was recorded in the Blaine County records on December 7, 1983. On October 14, 
1983, the Blaine County Commissioners approved Weisel's application for a Conditional Use 
Permit on the condition that all buildings be located outside the 100 foot setback from Highway 
75 and that "a declaration or deed restriction be written satisfactorily to the Zoning 
Administrator, which will not allow the construction of a residence upon Lot 13." The 
Commission also approved the granting of a variance for the construction of the guest house in 
excess of 900 sq. ft., i.e. 1,570 sq. ft. 
According to Garth McClure (Appendix "A"), the improvements to Lot 14 were built in 
1985, although at oral argument, counsel indicated that the existing improvements were built 
between 1993-1995. The improvements consisted of: (1) Main Residence with attached Garage, 
12,770 sq. ft.; (2) Guest House, 1,631 sq. ft.; (3) Pool House/Rec. Building, 3,266 sq. ft.; and (4) 
Pilot House and Garage, 1,600 sq. ft The total sq. ft. of developed floor area of Lot 14 is 
19,266 sq. ft. As developed none of the improvements encroach into what would have been the 
4 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1206 
setback between Lots 13 and 14. The record is silent as to how Weisel's development of Lot 14 
went from approximately 11,533 sq. ft. in 1983 to 19,266 sq. ft. in 1985 or 1995. The parties at 
oral argument do not appear to dispute that the original development proposed by McLauglin 
was constructed between 1983 and 1985 and that additional improvements were made by Weisel 
between 1993 and 1995, expanding the development of Lot 14 to approximately 19,266 sq. ft. 
On May 28, 1987, Weisel wrote a letter to the Design Committee expressing concern 
over another Lot owner's proposal to construct an outbuilding which he described as a "self-
sustained living quarter." He stated: "In order for us to have been allowed to build our care 
takers house, we had to own two lots and give up the right to ever build on the second." 
In 2004, Weisel sought to have the Association modify or rescind the Agreement. Weisel 
retained the services of an attorney to represent him in his effort to rescind or modify the 
Agreement. His attorney wrote a letter to the Association on July 14, 2005 and acknowledged 
that Blaine County required Weisel to give up his development rights on Lot 13 in exchange for 
the approval of his variance as to the size of the guest house. The letter further stated that "There 
is no question that in hindsight giving up development rights on lot 13 to obtain Blaine County 
approval for less than 1000 additional square feet of the guest house was not a good deal." The 
request of Weisel was submitted to the Association's Board and the request was rejected on 
December 18, 2007. 
II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate only when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally 
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construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 
517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 
154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "[T]he motion must be denied if evidence is such that conflicting 
inferences may be drawn there from, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions" 
I 
unless the trial court is to be the ultimate fact finder, in which case the court itself may res~lve 
the conflicting inferences. Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 
(1990). However, a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient 
to withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could 
I 
[ 
reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal 
Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 (1969). Where, as here, both parties file motions for 
summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the judge, as the trier of fact, 
! 
may resolve conflicting inferences if the record reasonably supports the inferences. Riverside 
Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518-20, 650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982). However, this is not 
to say that just because both parties have filed motions summary judgment, that the court should 
find or conclude that there are no triable issues of fact. Id. 
Further, our courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary judgment 
are those raised by the pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 111 P.3d 125 (2005). 
III. 
MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Both parties have filed various motions to strike portions of the affidavits submitted in 
support of the motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff has also filed a motion for the court 
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to allow a responsive affidavit of Garth McClure to contest the affidavit of Linda Havik. The 
motions are addressed below. 
Affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on 
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and must 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56( e ). These requirements "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusbry, 
I 
based on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." State v. Shama Resources Ltd. 
Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995); see also Sprinkler Irrigation Co., 
Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 696-97, 85 P.3d 667, 672-73 (2004); Dais v. 
Nissan Motor Corp. in US.A., 126 Idaho 162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994). 
A. Weisel Affidavit 
The Association seeks to have this court strike portions of the Affidavit of Thomas 
Weisel (11 3-4) on the basis of relevancy. In these two paragraphs Weisel testifies thatlthe 
enforcement of the 1983 Agreement injures his property rights as to Lot 13, because he all ges 
he is precluded from developing that lot based on the CC&R's and he further testifies as to the 
value of what was Lot 13. Relevant evidence means "evidence having a tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. Rule 401. Whether evidence 
proffered by Mr. Weisel is relevant is necessarily determined by the factual and legal analysis 
below. To the extent that such evidence is not relevant, it is not considered by the Court in the 
analysis below. 
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B. McClure Affidavit 
The Association seeks to strike portions of the Affidavit of Garth McClure on the basis 
that the affidavit "provides neither an expert opinion nor relevant evidence." The Court is 
satisfied for summary judgment that Mr. McClure has laid a sufficient foundation for his 
expertise in land use planning and his opinions in part are based on a review of public land use 
records. The testimony of Mr. McClure is relevant for the Court's analysis and the plaintiffs 
claim of changed conditions in Count VII of the complaint. 
C. Haavik Affidavit 
The plaintiff seeks to strike portions of the Haavik Affidavit on the basis that the 
evolution of Blaine County and Ketchum ordinances concerning accessory dwelling units is not 
relevant. This court would agree, except that the Blaine County ordinances for such dwelling 
units are relevant at the time of the 1983 Agreement. 
The plaintiff seeks to strike the testimony of Haavik relative to the opinions of McClure 
as to floor ratios and lot coverage on the basis of relevance. The testimony of Haavik is relevant 
to the extent it is offered to rebut the opinions of McClure. 
The plaintiff seeks to strike testimony of Haavik relative to compliance with zoning 
ordinances. The court would agree that since there are no allegations of noncompliance with 
building codes or zoning ordinances such testimony is not relevant. 
The remaining objections to the Haavik affidavit are relative to her opinions as to the 
development and build out of the subdivision. The objection is based on foundation and/or 
relevance. The court is satisfied that there has been an adequate showing of foundation and the 
testimony is in part to rebut the opinions of McClure. 
D. McClure Supplemental Affidavit 
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I.R.C.P. 56 does not specifically address the use of reply affidavits as part summary 
judgment proceedings. The rule does state that the "court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits." 
LR.C.P. 56(e). Further, the Court "may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just" LR.C.P. 56(t). In Baugh v. City of Milwaukee, 823 
F.Supp. 1452, 1456-57 (E.D. Wisc. 1993) stands for the proposition that reply affidavits 
responding to an opposing party's brief are permissible. This Court agrees that reply affidavits 
are permitted by Rule 56. However, the issue then becomes whether the reply affidavit raises 
new evidence, and if so, whether the objecting party may have additional time to respond to such 
affidavit(s). The federal court in Baugh addressed this issue: 
That is not to say that reply affidavits may raise new evidence. Where new evidence is 
presented in either a party's reply brief or affidavit in further support of its summary 
judgment motion, the district court should permit the nonmoving party to respond to the 
new matters prior to disposition of the motion, id., or else strike that new evidence. But, 
where the reply affidavit merely responds to matters placed in issue by the opposition 
brief and does not spring upon the opposing party new reasons for the entry of summary 
judgment, reply papers-both briefs and affidavits-may properly address those issues. 
Id at 1457. 
The McClure affidavit does not present new evidence and is merely offered to reply to 
the Haavik Affidavit and will be only considered as such. 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiff argues that he should be granted summary judgment for the following 
reasons: 
9 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1211 
1. That the Agreement lacks consideration because the improvements of Lot 14 
ultimately did not encroach into the setback between Lots 13 and 14. 
2. That the Agreement was based on a mutual mistake that the improvements would 
encroach into the setback between Lot 13 and 14. 
3. That the Agreement had a condition precedent, which consisted of the 
improvements encroaching into the setback between Lots 13 and 14. 
4. That even if there was consideration at the time the parties entered into the 
Agreement, the consideration later failed as a result of supervening events making the 
Agreement unenforceable. 
5. That the Agreement is not enforceable due to changed circumstances within the 
Subdivision. 
The defendant agues that it should be granted summary judgment for the following 
reasons: 
1. That contrary to the claim of the plaintiff, the Agreement was supported with 
consideration. 
2. That contrary to the claim of the plaintiff, there was no mutual mistake of fact at 
the time the parties entered into the Agreement. 
3. That there are no grounds that exist for rescinding the Agreement. 
4. That the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff are barred by the statute of 
limitations, Idaho Code§ 5-216. 
5. That the plaintiff is not entitled to two votes on Association matters. 
6. That the plaintiff's claim of changed circumstances is not supported factually or 
legally. 
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7. That the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of overpayment of his assessments in 
part is barred by the statute of limitations. 
A. Contract Interpretation and Enforcement 
Any contract is to be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. Wing v. 
Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984). The intent of the parties should, if possible, be 
ascertained from the language contained in the written contract, because usually this represents 
the best evidence of the parties' intent. Abel v. School Dist. No. 413, l 08 Idaho 982, 703 P.2d 
1357 (Ct. App. 1985). Oral statements and negotiations, which occurred prior to the execution 
of a written contract, are presumed merged therein and will not be admitted to contradict the 
plain terms of the contract. Galaxy Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 109 Idaho 692, 
7 IO P.2d 602 (1985). "If a written contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud 
or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or 
conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the 
contract." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465, 467 (2005). See also Valley Bank v. 
Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415,417 (1991). If a contract's terms are "clear and 
unambiguous, the determination of the contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law, 
and the meaning of the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain 
meaning of the contract's own words." City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 
604, 607, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995) (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court in Howard 
affirms the common law rule that the presence of a merger clause in a written contract 
conclusively establishes that the agreement is integrated and therefore the written agreement is 
subject to the parol evidence rule. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 141 Idaho 477, 480, 
111 P.3d 162, 165 (2005). 
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The Agreement at paragraph 4 expressly provides as follows: 
4. Sole and Only Agreement. This instrument contains the sole and only 
agreement of the parties hereto relating to the unification and development of Lot 13 and 
Lot 14 as described above, and correctly sets forth the rights, duties and obligations of 
each of the other as of its date. Any prior agreements, promises, negotiations or 
representations not expressly set forth in this Agreement are of no force and effect. 
Therefore unless there was a mistake at the time the parties entered into the Agreement, 
parole evidence is not admissible to alter the terms of the Agreement. 
1. Mutual Mistake 
Count I of the Amended Complaint seeks declaratory judgment based on "mutual 
mistake." The plaintiff argues that the Agreement was made between the Association and Weisel 
on the mistaken belief that the proposed improvements to Lot 14, i.e. the guest house, were going 
to encroach into the setback area between Lots 13 and 14. The plaintiff cites to the language used 
in the Agreement in paragraph 2. The Association argues that the language employed in the 
Agreement at paragraph 2, was merely the required finding by the Association in accordance 
with Article II, paragraph 17 of the CC&R's in order for the Association to approve the 
combination of two Lots and the elimination of the setbacks. 
If the Agreement does not reflect the true intent of the parties due to mutual mistake, then 
reformation or rescission of the instrument may be a proper remedy. 0 'Connor v. Harger 
Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008); Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 
69, 72-73, 415 P.2d 712, 715-16 (1966). "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the 
time of contracting, share a misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which 
the bargain is based." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). The mistake 
must be "so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of that party" and the "mistake 
must be common to both parties." O'Connor v. Hager Construction, Inc, supra. The party 
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alleging the mutual mistake has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. 
Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296, 527 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1974). 
Weisel wanted to combine Lots 13 and 14 so that he could develop the residence and 
outbuildings on Lot 14 as he intended. The Association was required to make a finding before 
allowing the combining of the two lots that if improvements were to be located in the setback 
areas that there would be no "unreasonable diminution of the view from other property." There 
is no dispute in the evidence that the County was requiring the two lots be combined as a 
condition of the approval of the variance request. The claim of the plaintiff that the Agreement 
was based on a mutual mistake of fact is without merit as a matter of law based on the 
undisputed evidence. However even if there were a mutual mistake at the time the parties 
entered into the Agreement, relief based on a mutual mistake would be barred by the statute of 
limitations, LC.§ 5-218(4), for the reasons set forth below. 
2. Lack of Consideration 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 29-103 "a written instrument is presumptive evidence of 
consideration." There is no dispute that Weisel and the Association entered into a written 
agreement on October 12, 1983. There being a presumption of consideration, it is the burden of 
Weisel to show the lack of consideration. See LC. § 29-104. Weisel must show a lack of 
consideration by a preponderance of the evidence. W L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 
103 Idaho 736,741,653 P.2d 791, 796 (1982). Our courts have distinguished between a "lack of 
consideration" and "failure of consideration. World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 
880, 728 P.2d 769 (1986). The failure of consideration "refers to the failure of performance of 
the contract" while the lack of consideration "applies to instances where there was no 
consideration to support the existence of a contract." Id at 884-85. 
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In Count II of the Amended Complaint the plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment based on 
lack of consideration on the basis that the improvements did not encroach into what would have 
been the set back area on Lot 14. In his deposition, Weisel testified that he thought his original 
plans had the guesthouse encroaching into the setback area of Lots 13 and 14. According to the 
deposition testimony of Mr. McLaughlin, the plans did not have the guesthouse encroaching into 
the setback area. On September 1, 1983, Mr. McLaughlin submitted to the Association Design 
Committee "addition and remodeling plans for the Weisel residence on Lots #13 and #14." On 
September 12, 1983, the Design Committee in writing "approves of the plans for the 
development of lots 13 and 14 ... pursuant to plans prepared by James McLaughlin, architect." 
On September 15, 1983 the Blaine County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) 
"considered [Weisel's] request for a Variance and Conditional Use Permit to construct servant 
quarters on lots 13 and 14 .... " As a condition of approval of the variance request, the 
Commission required "That a declaration or deed restriction be written satisfactory to the Zoning 
Administrator, which will not allow the construction of a residence upon lot 13." On September 
15, 1983, Weisel's attorney Roger Crist, prepared the Agreement between Weisel and the 
Association and mailed the Agreement to Weisel for his signature. The letter states "In essence, 
the Agreement provides that the homeowners association is approving your development plan 
and in return, you agree to comply with paragraph 17 of the subdivision declarations. You will 
not hereafter attempt to resubdivide your property." Weisel signed the Agreement on October 
12, 1983 and returned the signed Agreement to his attorney. On October 14, 1983, Mr. Crist sent 
a copy of the Agreement signed by Weisel to the Commission. Thereafter the Blaine County 
Commissioners approved the variance request as conditioned by the Commission. 
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"A promise for a promise is adequate legal consideration to support a contract." Eastern 
Idaho Production Credit Ass'n. v. Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 867, 606 P.2d 967, 971 
(1980). When Weisel purchased Lots 13 & 14, they were subject to the CC&R's which included 
the provision of Article II, ~ 17 relative to the effect of combining two adjoining lots. The 
Association promised to allow the combining of the two lots and Weisel promised not to later 
resubdivide the two lots. Based on the Agreement, the Association and its Design Committee 
approved the proposed development of Lot 13 and 14 in 1983 and approved what was built by 
Weisel between 1983 and 1985 and even approved more extensive development of Lot 14 
between 1993 and 1995. Further, Blaine County approved the variance request of Weisel to 
allow him to build a guest house in excess of the size limit imposed by the then existing County 
planning and zoning regulations. There is no evidence that the Association in any way failed to 
perform under the terms of the Agreement so there is no showing of a failure of consideration. It 
is also clear, that while the original design may or may not have contemplated an encroachment 
of the guest house into the set back between Lots 13 and 14, the Agreement was necessary at the 
time in order for Weisel to obtain the County's variance for the size of the guest house and the 
Agreement was supported by an exchange of promises by the parties. Weisel in his deposition 
admitted that the agreement was supported by consideration when he entered into it, although he 
admitted "It was pretty stupid on my part." (Depo. p. 99-101.). 
It is clear that it was the desire of Weisel in 1983 to combine lots 13 and 14 as a single 
parcel in accordance with Article II, paragraph 17 of the CC&R's. To do so, the approval of the 
Design Committee was required. The Design Committee made the findings it needed to make 
and approved Weisel's request to combine Lots 13 and 14. Mr. Weisel agreed in accordance 
with the CC&R's that he would not resubdivide the parcel in the future. "A promisee's 
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bargained for action or forbearance, given in exchange for a promise, constitutes consideration." 
McColrn-Traska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 501, 65 P.3d 519, 523 (2003). The 
Association promised to allow Weisel to combine his two lots if he promised not to split or 
resubdivide them in the future. These promises are adequate consideration and therefore the 
agreement is neither void nor voidable for lack of consideration. 
The claims of the plaintiff that the Agreement was not supported by consideration or that 
it failed for consideration are without merit as a matter oflaw based on the undisputed evidence. 
3. Rescission. 
In Count III, the plaintiff seeks to rescind the Agreement based on "failure of 
consideration and mutual mistake." (Amended Complaint, ,r 32.) Rescission is an equitable 
remedy aimed at restoring the parties to their pre-contract status quo. Blinzer v. Andrews, 94 
Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971). Rescission can be proper based on a mutual mistake or even a 
failure of consideration where such is material or fundamental to the creation of a contract. Murr 
v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). The court has 
determined that the relief sought based on mistake of consideration is without merit as a matter 
of law or is otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the claim for rescission 
based on mutual mistake and/or failure of consideration is without merit as a matter of law. 
Further, it is well established that a party seeking rescission "must act promptly once 
grounds for rescission arise." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004). 
"Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of 
rescission, the right of rescission is waived." Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201, 205, 923 P.2d 
446, 450 (1996). The evidence is clear that the plaintiff herein waited in excess of 26 years to 
rescind the Agreement and not less than four years to rescind the Agreement after he felt is was 
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inequitable to enforce the Agreements. It is clear that any claim for rescission is untimely as a 
matter of law. 
4. Condition Precedent 
"A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must occur, before 
performance under the contract becomes due." Woodworth, supra., 111 Idaho at 887, 728 P.2d at 
776. A condition precedent may be expressed in the parties contract; implied in fact from the 
conduct of the parties or implied in law where the court constructs a condition in order to obtain 
a just result. Id. Further, the existence and operation of a condition precedent presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. Id. 
The plaintiff argues that construction of the improvements within the setback between 
Lots 13 and 14 was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the Agreement and that because 
the improvements were not constructed within the setback, the Agreement is not enforceable. 
The claim that the location of the guesthouse within the setback lines was a condition precedent 
to the enforcement of the Agreement is not a claim or issue raised by the pleadings. The 
Amended complaint does not allege expressly or implicitly the failure of a condition precedent 
and therefore is not a basis to grant or deny summary judgment. VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 
440, 111 P .3d 125 (2005). Even if such a claim were raised, it is clear that the location of the 
guesthouse within the setback lines was not a condition precedent. By the very terms of the 
Agreement and upon execution and recording of the Agreement, the two lots were combined, the 
setback lines were removed and the two lots became a single parcel. 
The Agreement in paragraph 2 stated as follows: 
2. Removal of Setbacks. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Declaration of the 
Beaver Spring Subdivision, the Association's Design Committee has reviewed said plans, 
and has determined that the improvements to be constructed in the setback lines along the 
common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 will not cause unreasonable diminution of the 
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view from other lots. The parties, therefore, agree that the setback lines along the 
common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14 are herby removed and are of no further force 
and effect. 
The plaintiffs argument that the Agreement contains a condition precedent is based on one 
portion of a sentence contained in paragraph 2, " ... the improvements to be constructed in the 
set back lines along the common boundary of Lot 13 and Lot 14." The court must construe the 
Agreement as a whole in arriving at the intent of the parties and must give the language used, its 
plain and ordinary meaning. The parties do not argue that the Agreement is ambiguous. There is 
no dispute that, based on the Agreement, the Association approved the proposed development as 
it agreed. There is no dispute that by the terms of the Agreement and the words used that the Lot 
line between Lots 13 and 14 "are hereby removed and of no further force and effect." 
The claim that the Agreement and the enforcement of the Agreement was subject to a 
condition precedent is without merit as a matter of law based on the undisputed evidence. 
B. Statute of Limitations. 
The defendant argues that the first and second claims for declaratory judgment and the 
third claim for rescission are barred by the statute of limitations. See I.C. § 5-216. In Barnett v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 Idaho 246, 580 P.2d 849 (1978), city employees brought an action to 
recover from an insurer certain contributions paid into a retirement program. The district court 
dismissed the employees claims based on the statute of limitations. The court found that the 
three year statute of limitations (LC. § 5-218) for fraud or mistake applied instead of the 5 year 
statute of limitations for written contracts (LC. § 5-216). employees alleged that the 
defendant had "made certain fraudulent misrepresentations which induced them to enter into the 
written agreement." The Barnett court stated that: 
The substance, not the form, of the action controls and determines the applicable Statute 
of Limitations .... "The test ... is not whether the fraud or mistake occurred in a contract 
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or independently of contract, but the test rather is whether the action seeks relief from or 
on account of fraud or mistake." Hillock v. Idaho Title and Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 450, 
126 P. 612,616 (1912) 
Id. at 247, 580 P.2d at 850 
It is clear that any claim for relief from the Agreement based on a mutual mistake would 
be governed by the three year statute of limitations provided for in Idaho Code § 5-218. Further, 
"where the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is 
voidable," not void. Thieme v. Worst, 113 Idaho 455, 459, 745 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Ct. App. 1987). 
It is clear that if Weisel and the Association held the mistaken belief that the development would 
encroach into the setback lines of Lot 13 and 14, such a mistaken belief was known or 
discovered by Weisel more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. Therefore any 
claim based on mistake would be barred by the three year statute of limitations. 
In Galvin v. Appleby, 78 Idaho 457,305 P.2d 309 (1956), the plaintiff had entered into a 
conditional sales agreement to purchase certain real property. After purchasing the property the 
plaintiffs discovered that the improvements they purchased encroached partly into the street right 
of way and the plaintiffs were compelled by the city to remove the encroaching structures. The 
plaintiffs sought rescission or in the alternative damages. The defendant's argued that the 
plaintiffs relief was barred by the statute of limitations. I.C. §§ 5-216, 5-218. The district court 
found that the evidence established that the plaintiffs first knowledge of the encroachments was 
on December 29, 1952 and that the action was filed on January 18, 1954 and therefore the statute 
of limitations did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court. 
Weisel was aware in 1985 that his development did not encroach into the setback 
between Lot 13 and 14; between 1985 and 2001 Weisel knew or should have known of the 
development that was going on in the Subdivision; and Weisel knew or should have known of 
19- MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1221 
the increase in value of the Lots from 1985 to 2001. In fact Mr. Weisel knew in 2004 that it was 
a mistake for him to have entered into the Agreement. 
Under any analysis of the facts of this case, the relief sought by Weisel is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
C. Changed Conditions. 
The plaintiff in Count 7 of his complaint seeks to have the court set aside the Agreement 
on the basis that there has been a significant change in conditions relative to the development of 
the Lots within the subdivision. In this regard, the plaintiff argues that there has been a radical 
change in the density of development, that it would be inequitable to allow the Association to 
continue enforcement of the Agreement and to restrict Weisel's ability to develop Lot 13. 
Specifically the plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the Association "has permitted 
and acquiesced in the construction of large residences and outbuildings on other lots in the 
subdivision similar to and in excess of the size of plaintiffs residence and outbuildings." 
(Amended Complaint,,; 46.) The plaintiff further alleges that 
The reasons for and the purpose of the Agreement are no longer served, have been 
frustrated, and have been rendered obsolete, and the consideration, if any, provided by 
the Defendant has been rendered valueless by its own actions and the changes in the 
subdivision. Due to the above changes, the continued validity and enforcement of the 
Agreement is oppressive and inequitable to Weisel. 
(Amended Complaint,,; 50). 
The CC&R's of the Association since they were originally recorded in 1978 have 
continually provided in Article II, paragraph 17 as follows: 
17. Two or more adjoining Lots, or other parcels of property of the same land 
classification which are under the same ownership may be combined and developed as 
one parcel. Setback lines along the common boundary line of the combined parcels may 
be removed with the written consent of the Design Committee, if the Design Committee 
finds and determines that any improvements to be constructed within these setback lines 
will not cause unreasonable diminution of the view from other property. If setback lines 
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are removed or easements changed along the common boundary lines of combined 
parcels, the combined parcels shall be deemed one parcel and may not thereafter be split 
and developed as two parcels. 
The plaintiff in Count 7 of his Amended Complaint seeks to set aside the Agreement and 
not Article II, paragraph 17. The evidence in the record shows that Weisel's architect, 
McLaughlin, submitted to the Association plans for the development of Lot 13 and 14 on 
September 1, 1983 and that the Association approved his plans for the development of Lots 13 
and 14 on September 12, 1983. The record further shows that Weisel agreed to combine Lots 13 
and 14 and that the setback lines were removed between the two lots. The agreement was signed 
by Weisel on October 12, 1983. It is clear from the CC&R's that once two parcels were 
combined and the setback lines were removed, that Weisel could not thereafter split Lots 13 and 
14 and develop it as two parcels. Neither the Agreement nor Article II, paragraph 17 preclude 
development of improvements on what was Lot 13, they only preclude Weisel from again 
splitting and developing what was Lot 13 as a separate parcel. Weisel is not precluded from 
constructing improvements on the area that was Lot 13, provided the improvements can be 
constructed in accordance with the CC&R's. It was Weisel who chose to locate all of his 
improvements on what is Lot 14. 
Our courts have not directly addressed the issue of the enforceability of a restrictive 
covenant where there has been shown to have been a change in conditions subsequent to the 
recording of a restrictive covenant. However, our courts have implicitly recognized such a 
theory. See Ada County Highway District v. Magwire, I 04 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237 (1983). The 
court in Magwire upheld a condemnation award based on the likelihood the property would be 
rezoned. In doing so the court stated as follows: 
Normally, a change in zoning will occur if there has been sufficient change in the 
surrounding neighborhood. However restrictive covenants can only be declared 
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m1enforceable because of a change within the restricted area itself. Exchange Nat'/. Bank 
v. City of Des Plains, 32 Ill. App.2d 722, 336 N.E.2d (Ill.App. 1975). If a particular 
subdivision is subject to restrictive covenants restricting its use to residential, and the 
subdivision itself has not changed, then changes outside of the subdivision standing 
alone, even though adjacent, do not invalidate the restrictions. Id. An increase in noise or 
traffic in the surrom1ding area, or even within the subdivision itself, is not enough to 
indicate a sufficient change in the character of the neighborhood to invalidate the 
restrictions. Cordogan v. Union Nat'/. Bank, 64 Ill.App.3d 248, 21 Ill.Dec. 18, 380 N.E.2d 
1194 (Ill.App. 1978); Eilers v. Alewel, 393 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1965). The fact that a 
particular piece of property would increase in value if used for a different purpose than 
that allowed in the covenant is not enough to invalidate the covenant. Cordogan v. Union 
Nat 'l. Bank, supra.,· Eilers v. A/ewe/, supra. " 
Id. at 659, 662 P.2d at 240. 
Restrictive covenants may be rendered invalid or unenforceable where there has been 
such a radical change in the character of the neighborhood within and surrounding the 
restricted area that the original purpose of the covenant has been defeated, it is no longer 
of substantial value to the benefited land, and its enforcement would be unduly 
oppressive to the burdened land. 
76 A.LR. 5th 337. 
"Covenants restricting the free use of land are valid and enforceable in Idaho." Berezowski v. 
Schuman, 141 Idaho 532, 535, 112 P.3d 820, 823 (2005). Our courts have also recognized that 
such covenants are in "derogation of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes" 
and it is only when a covenant is ambiguous that "all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the 
free use of land." Id. In this case, Weisel is not alleging that the Agreement preventing the 
development of Lot 13 is in anyway ambiguous. It is clear that a restrictive covenant may be set 
forth in CC&R's or a deed or a separate written agreement. Our courts apply "the general rules 
of contract construction to covenants" that relate to the use ofreal property. Best Hill Coalition 
v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813,817,172 P.3d 1088, 1092 (2007). 
While our courts have recognized the doctrine of "changed conditions" they have not yet 
established the standard for such changed conditions so as to warrant not enforcing a restrictive 
covenant. It is clear that it is the plaintiff (Weisel) who has the burden to prove such changed 
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conditions. What is clear is that the courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the issue 
would require that the party who seeks to invalidate a restrictive covenant has the burden to 
prove a "radical change in condition." See Citizens Voices Assoc. v. Collings Lakes Civic Assoc., 
934 A.2d 669 (N.J. Supr. 2007); Perelman v. Casiello, 920 A.2d 782 (N.J. Supr. 2007); 
Tippecanoe Assoc. II, LLC v. Kimco Lafayette 671, Inc., 811 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. App. 2004); 
Country Club Dist. Homes Assn. v. Country Club Christian Church, 118 S.W.3d 185 (Mo.App. 
2003); Pietrowski v. Dufrane, 634 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. App. 2001); Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 
807 (Utah 2007). 
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Country Club Dist. Homes Assoc. established the 
standard for "changed conditions" as follows: 
To establish changed conditions warranting not enforcing a restrictive covenant, 'the 
burden rests on the defendant to prove: (1) The radical change in condition; (2) that as a 
result enforcement of the restrictions will work undue hardship on him; (3) and will be of 
no substantial benefit to the plaintiff.' Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 
328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545, 554 (1931). "No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to 
when changed conditions have defeated the purpose of restrictions, but it can be safely 
asserted the changes must be so radical as practically to destroy the essential objects and 
purposes of the agreement." Id. at 553. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals in Tippecanoe Assoc. II, LLC, supra, held that "a covenant 
that did not originally violate public policy can begin to violate public policy if the surrounding 
area changes in ways that 'are so radical in nature that the original purpose of the covenant has 
been defeated.'" 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Pietrowski, supra, held that "Courts of equity will not 
enforce such restrictive covenants where the character of the neighborhood has so changed as to 
make it impossible to accomplish the purpose intended by such covenants." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Swenson, supra, held that "Conduct of property owners 
within a development, however, may terminate and render unenforceable a particular covenant 
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where such conduct so substantially changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize 
the benefit of the covenant." 
Overall, this Court is of the opinion that the standard employed by the Missouri Court of 
Appeals appears to be the standard employed by the majority of the jurisdictions that have 
considered whether it is equitable to continue the enforcement of a restrictive covenant imposed 
upon real property. Therefore it is the burden of Weisel to prove (1) a radical change in 
condition; (2) undue hardship as a result of enforcement of the restrictions; and (3) will be of no 
substantial benefit to the Association. Further, whether a restrictive covenant is enforceable 
based on the doctrine of changed conditions is an equitable claim and as such there is not right to 
a jury trial and the trial court would be the trier of fact. See Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total 
Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 779 P.3d 323, 332 (2008) (no right to a jury trial 
in equitable actions). 
As to the claim of "changed conditions" within the subdivision, Weisel relies upon the 
Affidavit of Garth McClure and his analysis of the development of the Lots. Prior to the 
Agreement between Weisel and the Association, there were 21 Lots that ranged in size from 2.1 
acres to 4.02 acres. By reason of the combining of Lots 13 and 14 there are now 20 Lots within 
the subdivision. As part of his affidavit, Mr. McClure attached a report on the 20 Lots (Exhibit 
6) and Appendix "A" which describes what he perceives to be the development of each Lot. The 
affidavit also includes the dates of construction and the amount of the developed square footage 
for each Lot, as well as the improvements on each Lot. The Association as noted above has 
objected to the analysis conducted by McClure and has attempted to refute his characterization of 
the development with its Affidavits of Linda Haavik and various owners of some of the Lots. 
However, the question for this court is whether taking the affidavit and analysis of McClure at 
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face value, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Weisel, has the plaintiff 
created a triable issue of fact as to the claim of changed conditions. 
In examining Appendix A, Mr. McClure opines as follows: 
(1) That there are 10 Lots (Lot# 1, 2, 3, 7 A, 8, 9, 15, 21, 22) which consist of a "House 
& Attached Garage and/or Guest House." As to these 10 Lots there are no separate detached 
outbuildings. The development of the improvements on these Lots range generally from 4,491 
sq. ft. to 9,766 sq. ft., although there are two Lots that range from 11,684 sq. ft. to 13,426 sq. ft. 
These improvements were generally built between the years 1978 and 2000. 
(2) That there are 6 Lots (Lot # 5, 6, 12C, 18A, 19, 20A) which have a "House & 
Attached Garage" as well as one detached outbuilding, such as a guest house. The development 
on these 6 Lots ranges from 4,491 sq. ft. to 9,241 sq. ft., although there is one Lot that has 
development of 14,846 sq. ft. of which 13,366 sq. ft. consist of a main residence with attached 
garage and pool house. The detached out building is characterized as a 1,280 sq. ft. guest house. 
McClure admits that the guesthouse on Lot 5 is not 2,711 sq. ft. itself and that includes the 
garage but he does not identify the square footage and does not dispute the affidavit of Haavik 
that the guesthouse itself is only 961 sq. ft. 
(3) That there are 3 Lots (lots I IA, 13/14, 16) that have a House and Attached Garage 
and have two or more detached outbuildings. Lot I IA has development of 7,407 sq. ft. 
consisting of a 4,682 sq. ft. house and attached garage; a 1,250 sq. ft. detached guest house; a 
1,151 sq. ft. apartment; and a 324 sq. ft. Spa house. Lots 13 and 14 (Weisel's lots) have all of the 
development on Lot 14. The total development on Lot 14 is 19,266 sq. ft. consisting 12,770 sq. 
ft. for his house and attached garage; 1,631 sq. ft. for his detached guest house; 3,265 sq. ft. for 
his detached pool house/rec. building; 1600 sq. ft. for his detached pilot house/garage. Lot 16 has 
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development of 17,483 sq. ft. consisting of 13,179 sq. ft. for the house and attached garage; 
1,568 sq. ft. for a detached guest house; and 2,736 sq. ft. for a detached office and garage. 
However, according to McClure, the development of Lot 16 was in 1982 which was before 
Weisel entered into his Agreement with the Association to combine of Lots 13 & 14. 
It is clear from the Amendments to the CC&R's over the years that the Association has 
made a concerted effort to control and reduce the extent of development of the Lots. The 
Amendments to the CC&R's indicate an effort to reduce the number of detached structures as 
well as to limit the Lots for a "single family residence." They have also attempted to control 
development in order to maintain the rural environment of the subdivision. In 2008 the 
Association limited to total development of any Lot to 15,000 sq. ft. The existing development 
by Weisel on Lot 14 has been in existence since at least 1995 and far exceeds the development 
that would be permitted for any Lot by current CC&R's. By McClure's analysis, there are only 
two lots that exceed the limitation of l 5,000 sq. ft. (Lot l 3 and 16) and Lot 16 was developed in 
1982, before Weisel entered into his Agreement with the Association. 
Philip Ottley, who was on the Design Committee at the time the Agreement was 
approved, testified that one of the concerns of the Association is that they wanted to limit the 
number of "single family residences" in the subdivision to 21 and the committee was concerned 
that given the size of the proposed guest house for Lot l 4 there would in effect be "two single 
family residences" located on Lot 14 and it was for this reason the Association and Weisel 
entered into the development restriction for Lot 13. The Association was concerned about 
density in terms of the number of single family residences permitted within the subdivision. 
According to the deposition of McLaughlin, Weisel was willing to remove the lot line between 
Lots 13 and 14 so he would not have to go through the re-platting process so as to speed up 
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construction of his proposed improvements. According to Mr. Weisel he purchased Lot 14 in 
1982 and purchased Lot 13 in 1983. In his deposition, Weisel had little recollection as to the 
reason for combining Lots 13 and 14, except that it was for the approval of his three outbuildings 
to be constructed on Lot 14, although he did testify that he thought about what the Association 
was proposing and he agreed to their proposal. However, Weisel cannot contest the fact that the 
County was requiring unification of the two Lots in order to approve his variance request for his 
proposed guesthouse. He had his attorney draft the Agreement and he signed it. He admitted that 
"I agreed not to build on Lot 13." Mr. Weisel also testified that it is his opinion "that the other 
lots have similar, if not greater, density than I have built" and that the land values have increased 
making Lot 13 more valuable today than in 1983. In his deposition Weisel said that he defines 
density as the "square footage as a percent of total square footage of the lot" regardless as to how 
the buildings are used. However, if the Court were to focus solely on Weisel's definition of 
density, it is clear from the analysis of McClure that the extent of development of Lot 14 is the 
exception and not the general characterization of development of the Lots in the subdivision. It 
is clear that the extent of the development of the vast majority of the Lots within the subdivision 
are modest by comparison to the development of Lot 14. 
Weisel knowingly entered into the Agreement with the Association and agreed that, in 
exchange for the approval of his development plans, he would not thereafter split the parcel or 
develop the parcel as two separate lots. There is nothing ambiguous about what he agreed to. 
The Agreement did not prevent him from developing his proposed improvements on what 
was Lot 13 as well as Lot 14. It was Weisel and his architect who elected to construct the 
improvements on Lot 14. There is no evidence that any other property owner in the subdivision 
had combined adjoining lots and was later permitted to split the single parcel and develop two 
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separate parcels. lt is clear from the evidence that the Association has approved the 
improvements made to Lot 14 by Weisel in reliance upon not only the Agreement but also the 
express terms and conditions of Article II, paragraph 17 of the CC&R' s as originally constituted 
and amended over the years. The evidence presented by the plaintiff does not establish that there 
has been (1) a radical change in condition of the subdivision; (2) that as a result enforcement of 
the restrictions will work undue hardship on him, since mere increase in value of Lot 13 is not a 
basis to invalidate a restrictive covenant and Weisel is not precluded from developing 
improvements on the combined parcel provided they are in compliance with the CC&R's. It is 
clear from all of the evidence presented to the Court that enforcement of the restrictive covenant 
is still of benefit to the Association, since the Association still has an interest to limit the number 
of single family residences as well as the overall development of the individual Lots. 
D. Breach of Contract 
The plaintiff in Counts IV, V, and VI asserts claims for breach of contract, quasi-estoppel 
and reimbursement relative to his voting rights on Association matters and the payment of 
Assessments. The Association and it's CC&R's have always afforded to each Lot owner one 
vote on Association matter and each Lot owner was assessed on a pro rata basis for the cost of 
maintenance of the Association. The assessments are not based on the value of improvements to 
the lots. lf the lot owner was the owner of two lots, he was afforded two votes. In 1986 the 
Association amended Article V, paragraph 2 to read as follows: 
2. There is and shall be one (1) membership in the Association for each Lot. The 
owner or owners of each Lot or other property area automatically becomes the owner or 
owners of the membership for that Lot or other property area and automatically have the 
benefits and are automatically subject to the burdens attributable to such membership. 
Each membership is and shall always be appurtenant to the title to a particular Lot or 
other property area and shall automatically pass with the transfer of title to the same. 
Each membership is entitled to one (1) vote in matters submitted to a vote of the 
membership of the Association. If two (2) or more Lots are combined under single 
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ownership, as provided by paragraph 17 of Article II, above, with permanent restrictions 
encumbering the combined Lots to permit the construction of only one ( 1) single family 
residence and other improvements as herein permitted for a single Lot, the combined Lots 
shall thereafter become and be treated as a single Lot entitling the owner to a single 
membership and one (1) vote in the Association. 
The CC&R' s from their inception have continually defined the term "Lot" in Article 1, 
paragraph 1 as follows: "Lot. As used herein, a Lot shall be any tract described in a recorded 
instrument or shown on a recorded plat." The Agreement between the Association and Weisel 
was recorded by the parties and is sufficient to constitute a recorded instrument within the 
definition of a Lot for purposes of the CC&R's. 
As to Count IV of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he "owns two (2) lots, 
Lots 13 and 14 and further alleges that "Lots 13 and 14 were never unified as contemplated by 
the Agreement, and the setback requirements along the common boundary between Lots 13 and 
14 were never violated or removed." (Amended Complaint,~~ 35-36.) For the reasons set forth 
above, the plaintiffs claim that the two lots were never "unified" and the setbacks were never 
"removed" is not supported by the evidence nor by the terms of the Agreement and Article II, 
paragraph 17. The combination and unification of the two lots was accomplished upon the 
signing and recording of the Agreement by the parties. The clear and unambiguous terms of 
Article V, paragraph 2 limits Weisel to one vote on Association matters. The Association did not 
breach the voting rights of Weisel. 
As to Count V and VI, the plaintiff alleges and the evidence supports the conclusion that 
the Association had been allowing the plaintiff two votes on Association matters and was 
collecting Assessments based on two lots rather than one lot after the unification of the two lots 
in October, 1983. On this basis the plaintiff alleges that the Association is estopped from 
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denying him two votes on the theory of quasi estoppel and that he is entitled to recover the 
excess assessment payments. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies if (1) the Association took a different position than 
its original position, and (2) either (a) the Association gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to Weisel; (b) Weisel was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the Association to maintain an inconsistent position from one it had 
already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 
668 (2008). As for the voting rights exercised by Weisel, while the evidence shows that after the 
unification of the two lots the Association mistakenly allowed Weisel two votes on Association 
matters, the subsequent determination that Weisel should only be entitled to one vote did not 
cause either an advantage or disadvantage to either party. So as to the issue of Weisel's voting 
rights the theory of quasi estoppel does not apply. 
In Count VI Weisel seeks reimbursement of the excess Association Assessments he paid 
after the unification of the two lots. There is no dispute that Weisel, after unification of the two 
lots, should have only paid one Assessment but in fact the Association mistakenly charged 
Weisel two Assessments. The Association does not dispute that Weisel is entitled to 
reimbursement from the Association for the excess Assessments paid by Weisel that are not 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. In tum the plaintiff argues that the Association should be 
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as to the claim of reimbursement. 
However, for equitable estoppel to apply, the plaintiff would have to show that the Associations 
conduct caused the plaintiff from seeking reimbursement at an earlier date. Johnson v. McPhee, 
147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009). The plaintiff relies upon an out of state case, 
Commonwealth v. Soffer, 544 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1988), however, it is clear that the conduct that 
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gave rise to the claim of equitable estoppel in that case was based on misrepresentations made by 
the party who was asserting the statute oflimitations as a bar. The Court has not been pointed to 
any evidence in the record of any conduct of the Association that prevented Weisel from seeking 
reimbursement in a timely manner. 
The parties do not dispute that the Association Assessment are subject to a five (5) year 
statute of limitations. Therefore, it is clear that Weisel may seek affirmative relief for 
reimbursement of excess Association Assessments paid by him within five (5) years prior to the 
filing of his complaint, but any additional claims for affirmative relief would be barred by the 
five year statute of limitations. However, while some of Weisel's claims for reimbursement as 
affirmative relief may be barred by the statue of limitations, that is not to say that he may not be 
entitled to equitable relief and to assert his affirmative claims defensively as a setoff as against 
any future Association Assessments levied against his Lot. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 
687-688, 23 P.3d 147, 149-150 (2001); Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 30 P.3d 300 (Ct. 
App. 2001). 
Therefore, while Weisel's claim for reimbursement of excess assessments would be 
partially barred by the statue of limitations, there does remain a legal question not addressed by 
the parties as to asserting such a claim defensively as a setoff as to future assessments. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the courts reasoning set forth above the court finds that there are no triable 
issues of fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as 
follows: 
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1. As to Counts I through V, VII of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. 
2. As to Count VI of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this / lR day of rltro>b 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
On April 2, 2010 the plaintiff filed his Motion to file an Amended Complaint to assert a 
cause of action for Setoff, as a result of the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment entered on March 16, 2010. On April 6, 2010 the court granted to the 
defendant 14 days to file any objection to the motion to amend and further granted to the plaintiff 
7 days to reply to any such objection by the defendant. The court also advised counsel that upon 
conclusion of the briefing the motion would then be decided by the court without oral argument. 
The briefing was completed on April 23, 2010. 
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I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On March 16, 2010 the court entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Cross Motions for 
Swnmary Judgment, wherein the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant as 
to Counts I through V and VII of the plaintiffs amended complaint. The plaintiff in Count VI of 
his amended complaint sought reimbursement from the defendant for a portion of the 
assessments that he had paid after the unification of his two lots. The defendant did not dispute 
that plaintiff was entitled for reimbursement of the excess assessments that were paid within the 
applicable statute of limitations. The court as to Count IV concluded that the reimbursement was 
limited to those excess assessments paid by the plaintiff within 5 years of the filing of the 
complaint, however, the court did determine that there may be a legal question as to whether 
those excess assessments that were barred by the statue of limitations could be used by the 
plaintiff as a setoff as to any future assessments. Based on this court summary judgment decision 




On April 20, 20 l O the defendant filed its objection to the motion to amend on the basis 
"ripeness". The defendant argues that there is no need for court action since the defendant is 
willing to negotiate the issue with the plaintiff and the plaintiff has rejected its attempt to 
negotiate. The defendant does not object to the timeliness of the plaintiff's motion based on the 
court's scheduling order and the defendant does not object that the granting of the motion would 
be prejudicial to the defendant based on the current trial date of May 5, 20 I 0. 
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III. 
STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. I.R.C.P. 15(a). Whether to grant the motion is a matter of 
discretion for the Court. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 881, 42 
P.3d 672, 674 (2002). In considering a motion to amend pleadings our courts have recognized 
that the appropriate standard is an abuse of discretion and that in the interest of justice, courts 
should favor liberal grants of leave to amend. Wickstrom v. N Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 
725 P.2d 155 (1986). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
The trial in the above entitled matter is currently set for May 5, 2010. The sole issue 
raised in the proposed second amended complaint is whether the plaintiff is equitably entitled to 
a setoff for the excess assessments paid by the plaintiff which are otherwise barred by the statue 
of limitations relative to any future assessments the defendant may charge to the plaintiff. There 
is no dispute that the plaintiff, after unification of his two lots, was charged annually for two 
assessments when in fact he should have only been charged one assessment. It is further 
reasonable to assume that the plaintiff will be charged for annual assessments in the future by the 
defendant. 
The defendant argues that the cause of action for setoff is not "ripe" and relies on the 
holding in Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). In Mannas, the plaintiff 
sought a claim for indemnification of back sales taxes that had not been paid to the Idaho State 
Tax Commission, arising out of his purchase of stock in a closely held company that later 
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became insolvent. The court held that the claim for indemnification for back sales taxes was not 
ripe because there was "no indication that the Idaho State Tax Commission has dunned Mannos 
back taxes". The court stated as follows: 
"Ripeness is a fundamental prerequisite to invoke this Court's jurisdiction-a harm 
must be sufficiently matured to warrant judicial intervention. (citation omitted) 
The ripeness doctrine requires a 'plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents 
definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 
3) that there is a present need for adjudication."' 
Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho at 936, 155 P.3d at 1175 
A. Does the case present definite and concrete issues? 
There is no dispute between the parties that Weisel was charged and paid twice the 
amount of assessments then he was required to pay after unification of his lots and that Weisel 
would have been entitled to reimbursement but for the statue of limitations. There is also no 
dispute that the CC&R's as presently constituted provides for the "levy of annual assessments" 
and if any owner shall fail to pay the assessment levied by the Association that the Association 
"shall have a lien ... against the property to which such membership is appurtenant for the amount 
due and not paid, ... " (Article V ., ,r's 3 & 4, Third Amendment and Restatement of Declaration of 
Restrictions). It is clear to this court that there are "definite and concrete issue" relative to 
Weisel's right to a setoff and his obliga!ion to pay future assessments. 
B. Does a real and substantial controversy exist? 
The Association has stated its willingness to "negotiate the set off issue". The 
Association has not stated and does not argue that Weisel is in fact entitled to a setoff or the 
amount of the setoff that Weisel may be entitled too. In Mannas the court stated there was no 
indication that the State Tax Commission was going to assess Mannas with any back sales•taxes. 
In this case there can be no doubt that Weisel will some time in the future be assessed an annual 
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levy by the association and the Association has not conceded that Weisel is entitled to a setoff to 
the extent of the non-reimbursed assessments that he paid. A willingness to negotiate does not 
resolve the controversy that clearly exists. It is clear to this court that a real and substantial 
controversy does in fact exist between Weisel and the Association as to his entitlement to a setoff 
and the amount of that setoff. 
C. Is there a present need for adjudication? 
The issue is before the court and if the issue is not now decided then Weisel and the 
Association will be engaged in litigation over this issue potentially on an annual basis. To litigate 
this issue annually is not a good use of judicial resources. Further, the court can anticipate that 
there will be changes in the makeup of the Association Board. This issue needs to be adjudicated 
and resolved by the parties now and not in the future. 
Based on the foregoing, the motion to amend should be granted by this court. 
V. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set for the above, the plaintiffs motion for leave to file a Second 
Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The Second Amended Complaint is deemed filed as of the 
date of this order. Since the court has granted the motion to amend and since the sole 
remaining issue is the equitable theory of setoff, the court hereby sua sponte will strike the 
request for a jury trial and the trial set for May 5, 2010 will be conducted as a court trial. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this di day of d,?< ~ / , 2010. 
/ 
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Plaintiff, THOMAS WEISEL (hereinafter "Weisel"), an individual, by and thr9ugh his 
I 
attorney, Fritz X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & Haemmerle, P.L.L.C., and for causes of action 
against Defendant, BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. ("Association"), an 
Idaho corporation, alleges upon information and belief as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Weisel is the record title holder of real property located at 114 Adams Rib Lane, 
Ketchum, Idaho by Warranty Deed to Weisel, recorded February 19, 1982, as Instrument No. 
223948, records of Blaine County, Idaho, which is more particularly described as follows: 
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Lot 14, Beaver Springs Subdivision, Blaine County, Idaho, according to the official plat 
thereof recorded in Book 17 of Plats, page 12, records of Blaine County, Idaho. 
("Lot 14") 
2. Weisel is also the record title holder of real property located at 112 Adams Rib 
Lane, Ketchum, Idaho by Warranty Deed to Weisel, recorded January 21, 1983, as Instrument 
No. 234690, records of Blaine County, Idaho, which is more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 13 of Beaver Springs Subdivision, Blaine County, Idaho, as shown on the official 
plat thereof, recorded February 10, 1978 in Book 17 of Plats, page 12, records of Blaine 
County, Idaho 
("Lot 13", Lot 13 and Lot 14, also referred to as "Lots 13 and 14") 
3. Association is an Idaho nonprofit corporation in good standing, with its principal 
place of business in Blaine County, Idaho. 
ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
4. The Declaration of Restrictions of Beaver Springs Subdivision was recorded April 
6, 1978, as Instrument No. 181805, records of Blaine County, Idaho ("Declaration") covering 
real property described as Beaver Springs Subdivision, Blaine County, Idaho ("Beaver Springs"). 
The Declaration is attached and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit A. 
5. Among other things, the Declaration: 
a. established a setback requirement that no building could be constructed 
less than fifteen feet from the side boundary line of any lot. Subsequent amendments to the 
Declaration have not changed this setback requirement; 
b. allowed a total of five structures to be built on a Lot, and established no 
maximum size for those structures; 
c. did not reduce the number of votes a lot owner was entitled to following 
the unification of two or more lots pursuant to the Declaration. 
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6. At the request of Weisel, architect James McLaughlin prepared a development 
plan for Lot 14 ("Development Plan"). In addition to the existing main residence, the 
Development Plan provided for three outbuildings, consisting of a barn, detached garage, and a 
guest house ("Guest House"). No plans were prepared for the development of Lot 13. 
7. The Guest House under the Development Plan did not violate the setbacks 
established by the Declaration, between Lots 13 and 14, as shown by a survey dated October 22. 
2004, conducted by Benchmark Associates, P.A., an Idaho licensed civil engineering, planning 
and surveying professional corporation, a copy of which is attached and incorporated into this 
Complaint as Exhibit B. The Guest House was the building closest to the common boundary 
between Lots 13 and 14, but at all times was, and still is, 33.9 feet from the common boundary 
between Lots 13 and 14. This setback was, and still is, more than double the required setback 
between Lots 13 and 14. There has been no change to the setbacks since that time and the 
structures on Lot 14 continue to be within the setbacks established by the Declaration and all of 
its amendments. 
8. The Beaver Springs Design Review Committee (4'Design Committee") approved 
the Development Plan on September 12, 1983, without any conditions or limits. A letter 
indicating such approval from the Association to Blaine County is attached and incorporated into 
this Complaint as Exhibit C. 
9. Thereafter, on October 12, 1983, Weisel and the Association entered into an 
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement was recorded December 7, 1983, as Instrument No. 
246208, records of Blaine County, Idaho. The Agreement is attached and incorporated into this 
Complaint as Exhibit D. 
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10. At the time of the Agreement, there were no encroachment into the setbacks by 
any part of the proposed Development Plan, there was nothing in the Declaration prohibiting the 
proposed Development Plan, and the proposed Development Plan had already been 
unconditionally approved by the Association. Yet, the Agreement removed the setback lines 
along the common boundary of Lots 13 and 14, unified Lots 13 and 14 into a single parcel, and 
prohibited the single parcel from being split and/or developed as two separate parcels in the 
future. 
11. Lots 13 and 14 have never been unified and the setback lines along the common 
boundary of Lots 13 and 14 have remained in place. 
12. At all times Weisel paid dues and assessments for both Lots 13 and 14 and the 
Association accepted such payment for both lots. 
13. The Association invoiced Weisel and accepted payment from Weisel for two lots 
from the time he purchased Lots 13 and 14, until 2006. 
14. On November 14, 1986, the First Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictions 
of Beaver Springs was recorded as Instrument No. 278727, records of Blaine County, Idaho 
("First Amended Declaration"), a copy of which is attached and incorporated into this Complaint 
as Exhibit E. The First Amended Declaration eliminated any reference to the developer of the 
Beaver Springs Subdivision and made other changes and additions to the Declaration. 
15. The First Amended Declaration also amended paragraph 2 of Article V of the 
Declaration, so that when two or more lots were combined pursuant to paragraph 17 of Article II, 
the combined lots were to be treated as a single lot entitling the owner to a single membership 
and one vote in the Association. 
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16. The First Amended Declaration did not apply retroactively or state that it applied 
retroactive! y. 
17. Following the adoption of the First Amended Declaration, the Association 
continued to permit Weisel to have two votes on Association matters, one vote for Lot 13 and 
one for Lot 14 and Weisel at all times registered both votes, until 2006. 
18. Beaver Springs was annexed to the City of Ketchum on September 17, 1990, 
through the execution of the Beaver Springs Annexation Agreement and Agreement for Services 
("Annexation Agreement"), a copy of which is attached and incorporated into this Complaint as 
Exhibit F. The Annexation Agreement does not contain any restriction on Lot 13. 
19. On January 31, 2005, the Second Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictions 
of Beaver Springs was recorded as Instrument No. 515751, records of Blaine County, Idaho 
("Second Amended Declaration"), a copy of which is attached and incorporated into this 
Complaint as Exhibit G. The Second Amended Declaration amends, restates, supercedes and 
replaces the Declaration and the First Amended Declaration in their entirety. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT ONE 
(Declaratory Judgment -Mutual Mistake) 
20. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 19, 
as if fully restated herein. 
21. Both the Association and Weisel entered the Agreement on the mistaken belief 
that the proposed improvements under the Development Plan would violate the setback 
restrictions established in the Declaration, that Weisel needed the approval of the Association to 
eliminate the setback line from Lot 14, and that Lots 13 and 14 had to be unified into one parcel 
pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1 7 of the Declaration. 
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22. The mistaken belief that the Development Plan violated the setback requirements 
on the common boundary between Lots 13 and 14 and that the only way to remove such setbacks 
was to unify the lots into one lot was a fundamental mistake that led to and formed the basis for 
the Agreement. 
23. The Benchmark Survey confirms that there never was a violation of the setback 
restrictions along the common boundary between Lots 13 and 14. 
24. The Agreement would never have been entered into but for the mistaken belief by 
both parties that the Development Plan violated the setback restrictions. 
25. Based on the mutual mistake of the parties, the Agreement is void and 
unenforceable. 
COUNTTWO 
(Declaratory Judgment- Lack of Consideration) 
26. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 25, 
as if fully restated herein. 
27. Under the Agreement the Association permitted Weisel to ignore the setback 
requirements established in the Declaration in return for Weisel's agreement to unify Lots 13 and 
14 and never separate the two lots. 
28. The Association's promise to permit the violation of setback requirements along 
the common boundary between Lots 13 and 14 was illusory as the proposed improvements were 
never within the setbacks nor was there ever a violation of the setback requirements. As such, 
there was a lack of consideration by the Association in connection with the Agreement. 
29. The Development Plan never violated any setback requirements contained in the 
Declaration or any subsequent amendments thereto. As such, Weisel did not receive any benefit 
from the Association for his agreement to combine the lots into one parcel. 
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31. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 30, 
as if fully restated herein. 
32. Because of the failure of consideration and mutual mistake, the Agreement should 
be rescinded and declared null and void. 
COUNTFOUR 
(Breach of Contract) 
33. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 32, 
as if fully restated herein. 
34. The Association's Declaration states that property owners are entitled to one (1) 
vote per lot. 
35. Weisel owns two (2) lots, Lots 13 and 14. 
36. Lots 13 and 14 were never unified as contemplated by the Agreement, and the 
setback requirements along the common boundary between Lots 13 and 14 were never violated 
or removed. 
37. In January of 2006, the Board of Directors of the Association, by resolution, voted 
to reduce Weisel from two votes to one vote for both Lots 13 and 14, and informed Weisel of 
this by a letter (misdated 2005) enclosing the resolution. That letter and resolution are attached 
and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit H. 
38. The failure of the Association to allow Weisel two votes, one vote per lot, 




39. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 38, 
as if fully restated herein. 
40. By the Association's own admission in Exhibit H, for approximately twenty years 
after the Agreement, the Association continued to accord Weisel two votes on Association 
matters and continued to collect annual dues from Weisel for both Lots 13 and 14. 
41. The annual dues Weisel paid for over 22 years for the two lots is an amount to be 
proven at trial, but on information and belief, is less than Twenty-Five Thousand and 00/100 
Dollars ($25,000.00). 
42. Based upon the Association's position treating the lots as two separate lots, 
collecting dues on the two separate lots, and according two votes for each lot, and Weisel's 
compliance with such position, it would be unconscionable to allow the Association to now take 
the position that the two lots are one and that Weisel is entitled to only one membership and one 
vote. Weisel is entitled to two memberships and two votes on Association matters and the 
Association is estopped from asserting otherwise. 
COUNT SIX 
(Reimbursement) 
43. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 42, 
as if fully restated herein. 
44. If the Court finds that there is one Lot, then Weisel is entitled to reimbursement 
from the Association in a sum to be proven at trial, but on information and belief, does not 
exceed Twenty-Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) in overpaid dues and fees. 
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COUNT SEVEN 
{Declaratory Judgment- Changed Circumstances) 
45. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 44, 
as if fully restated herein. 
46. Since the Agreement was entered into, the Association has permitted and 
acquiesced in the construction of large residences and outbuildings on the other lots in the 
subdivision similar to and in excess of the size of Plaintiff's residence and outbuildings. 
47. Since the Agreement was entered into, the Declaration for the Association has 
been amended to specifically permit large residence and outbuildings on lots in the subdivision 
of a size similar to that of Plaintiff's buildings on Lot 14 and the existing buildings in the 
subdivision. 
48. Since the Agreement was entered into, large residences and outbuildings have 
been constructed on other lots in the subdivision similar to Plaintiffs with no development 
restrictions on them as imposed on Plaintiff in the Agreement. 
49. Due to the construction of large outbuildings and residences on the lots in the 
subdivision and the changes in the Declaration permitting large residences and outbuildings, the 
size of Plaintiff's residence and outbuildings is similar to that of the rest of the lots in the 
subdivision and to that permitted under the Declaration. 
50. The reasons for and the purposes of the Agreement are no longer served, have 
been frustrated, and have been rendered obsolete, and the consideration, if any, provided by the 
Defendant has been rendered valueless by its own actions and the changes in the subdivision. 
Due to the above changes, the continued validity and enforcement of the Agreement is 
oppressive and inequitable to Weisel. 
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51. As such, Weisel seeks a declaration from this Court that the Agreement is invalid 
and unenforceable. 
COUNT EIGHT 
(Declaratory Judgment- Setoffi 
52. Weisel repleads each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 51, 
as if fully restated herein. 
53. After the Agreement was entered into, Weisel paid dues and assessments for both 
Lots 13 and 14 and the Association accepted such payment for both lots. 
54. The Association invoiced Weisel and accepted payment from Weisel for two lots 
from the time he purchased Lots 13 and 14, until 2006. 
55. If the Court determines that Lots 13 and 14 were unified by the Agreement, as an 
alternative to Count Six. Weisel seeks a declaration from this Court that he has the right to setoff 
the total amount of dues and assessments he paid to the Association for a second lot from 1984 
through 2005 against future Association dues and assessments on the unified lot. 
DEMAND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
56. As a result of the Defendant's actions, the Plaintiff has had to retain the services 
of attorneys. For services rendered, the Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs should he 
prevail in this action pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120 and 12-121, and pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and pursuant to any agreement of the parties. In case of default, the 
Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs of $5,000. 
RIGHT TO AMEND 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this complaint in any respect as motion practice 
and discovery proceed in this matter. 
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WHEREFORE, Thomas Weisel prays for this Court to enter Judgment against 
Defendant, as follows: 
A. On Count One, for a Declaratory Judgment that the Agreement is unenforceable 
on the basis of mutual mistake; 
B. On Count Two, for a Declaratory Judgment that the Agreement is unenforceable 
for lack of consideration; 
C. On Count Three, for an Order of the Court rescinding the Agreement; 
D. On Count Four, for an order finding that the Association breached the Declaration 
by allowing the Plaintiff only one (1) vote; 
E. On Count Five, alternatively, for judgment declaring that the Association is 
estopped from denying that the Plaintiff is the owner of two memberships in the Beaver Springs 
Owners Association, Inc., one for Lot 13 and one for Lot 14, and is entitled to one (1) vote for 
each membership; 
F. On Count Six, alternatively if the Court does not find in the Plaintiff's favor on 
Counts Four or Five, for judgment not to exceed Twenty-Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars 
($25,000.00) for reimbursement of excess dues and fees paid to the Association. 
G. On Count Seven, for a Declaratory Judgment that the reasons for and the purposes 
of the restriction are no longer served, have been frustrated, and have been rendered obsolete, 
and the consideration, if any, provided by the Defendant has been rendered valueless by its own 
actions and the changes in the subdivision, so that the Agreement is no longer valid and 
enforceable. 
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H. On Count Eight, for a Declaratory Judgment that Weisel has the right to setoff the 
total amount of dues and assessments he paid to the Association for a second lot from 1984 
through 2005 against future Association dues and assessments on the unified lot. 
I. Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-12-120 and 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54, for 
reasonable attorney fees, which amount shall be Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in the event 
judgment is entered by default, and for all costs incurred herein; and 
J. For other such relief as the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this :l__ day of IJAY'I: ( , 2010. 
' 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2- day of ;{},,.11.-( , 2010, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Edward Lawson 
Erin F. Clark 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
-----~··--·-··--· 
[c..<: U.S. Mail ... , / 
[ ~ Via Facsimiled,- ~ - ,....., _.., 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
Fritz X. Haemmerle 
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FRITZ X. HAElv.IMERLE 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
400 South Main St., Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Tel: (208) 578-0520 
FAX: (208) 578-0564 
E-mail: fxh@haemlaw.com 
ISB # 3862 
Attorney for Plaintiff, THOMAS WEISEL 
MAY 0 5 2010 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing) 
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Case No. CV-09-124 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, Thomas (Thom) Weisel ("Weisel"), by and through his attorney 
of record, Fritz X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & Haemmerle, P.L.LC., and the Defendant, Beaver 
Springs Owners Association, Inc. ("Beaver Springs"), by and through Lawson, Laski, Clark & 
Pogue, P.L.L.C., and based on the allegations and various causes of action described in the Second 
Amended Complaint, hereby STIPULATE and AGREE for entry of Judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiff is awarded judgment on Count VI of his Complaint against defendant, 
Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. in the amount of $3,000.00, together with 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT -1 
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prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,000.00, for a total of $4,000.00. 
2. That plaintiff is awarded judgment on Count VIII of his second amended complaint 
against defendant Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. and thereby it is hereby 
declared that plaintiff, or the Thomas W. Weisel Trust Under Trust Agreement dated 
February 27, 1998, as Amended, or any other trust approved by the defendant, has the 
equitable right of offset against sums due the defendant, if any, in the amount of 
$17,000.00. 
3. The written agreement ("Agreement") between plaintiff and defendnnt, dated October 
12, 1983 and recorded in the records of Blaine County, Idaho as Instrument No. 246208, 
was not entered into based on a mutual mistake of fact, is supported by consideration 
and is otherwise valid and enforceable. Accordingly plaintiffs lots 13 and 14, as more 
particularly described in the Agreement, shall be deemed and remain as a single parcel 
and developed as a single parcel, and plaintiff is responsible for one annual assessment 
and has one vote on matters to be voted upon by members of the Beaver Spring Owners' 
Association. 
4. Notwithstanding the form of Judgment or otherwise, each side retains the right to argue 
for attorney's fees and costs. 
5. Notwithstanding the form of Judgment or otherwise, each party retains the right to file 
an appeal. 
IT IS SO STIPULATED. / 
Date:~ -~£__ __  ....:-==-:...._ ___ :::::---._ 
Fntz X. Haemmerle, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 2 
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Edward Lawson, 
Attorney for Defendant 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - 3 
1257 
___ , .. _____ _ 
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MAY 1 1 2010 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing in) 
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Case No. CV ~09-124 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came on for hearing on February 16, 2010, before the Honorable John K. 
Butler on the cross motions for summary adjudication. Fritz X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & 
Haemmerle appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, Thomas Weisel. Edward A. Lawson and Erin F. 
Clark of Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC appeared on behalf of the defendant, Beaver 
Spring Owners Association, Inc. 
The Court having considered the pleadings filed in support of nnd in opposition to the 
motion for summary adjudication, together with the argument of counsel, for the reasons recited 
in the Memorandum Decision, dated March 16, 2010, and pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1) Plaintiff is awarded judgment on Count VI of his Complaint against defendant, 
Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. in the amount of $3,000.00, together with prejudgment 
interest thereon in the amount of $1,000.00, for a total of $4,000.00. 




against defendant Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. and thereby it is hereby declared that 
plaintiff, or the Thomas W. Weisel Tmst Under Trust Agreement dated February 27, 1998, as 
Amended, or any other trust approved by the defendant, has the equitable right of offset against 
sums due the defendant, if any, in the amount of $17,000.00. 
3) The written agreement ("Agreement") between plaintiff and defendant, dated 
October 12, 1983 and recorded in the records of Blaine County, Idaho as Instrument No. 246208, 
was not entered into based on a mutual mistake of fact. is supported by consideration and is 
otherwise valid and enforceable. Accordingly plaintiff's lots 13 and 14, as more particularly 
described in the Agreement, shall be deemed and remain as a single parcel and developed as a 
single parcel, and plaintiff is responsible for one annual assessment and has one vote on matters 
to be voted upon by members of the Beaver Spring Owners' Association. 
4) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 1 and 2 above, Plaintiff's complaint is 
nereby dismissed in its entirety and plaintiff shall take nothing thereby; except notwithstanding, 
each party retains their respective rights under the pleadings filed to pursue claims for attorney's 
fees and costs. 






CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ll. day of M.fi, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indi~elow, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Fritz X. Haemmerle, Esq. 
Haemmerle & Haemrnerle, PLLC 
400 South Main Street, Suite 102 
PO Box 1800 
Hailey.ID 83333 
Edword A. Lawson, Esq. 
Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC 
675 South Main Street, Suite A 
PO Box 3110 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
JUDGMENT-3 
Clerk 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
_==:::: Telecopy - (208) 578-0564 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy - (208) 725-0076 
1260 
I03S3-00I 
FRITZ X. HAEMMERLE ORIGINAL 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
400 South Main St., Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
tel: (208) 578-0520 
FAX: (208) 578-0564 
ISB # 3862 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant. license 
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-
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Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing) 
in his sole and separate property, ) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
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Case No. CV-09-124 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee: L(4) - $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., ("Beaver Springs") AND ITS ATTORNEY, EDWARD LAWSON AND ERIN CLARK, OF 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C., P.O. BOX 3310, KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340 
AND THE CIERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITIED COURT 
1. The above-named Appellant, Thomall Weisel ("Weisel"), appeals the Court's 
Judgment Dated May 11, 2010 ("Decision"), including the memorandum decision on cross-motions 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
} 
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for summary judgment dated March 16, 2010, the costs and attorney fee rulings stemming from the 
Decision, and all other rulings made subsequent to the Decision, Honorable John K. Butler, District 
Judge for the Fifth Judicial District, in and for the Com1ty of Blaine, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph 1 is appealable pursuant to l.A.R. 1 l(a)(l). 
3. Issues on Appeal: Whether the trial court erred in denying Weisel's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granting Beaver Spring's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 1-V 
and Count VII, said rulings raising the following issues: 
a. Whether the 1983 Agreement between Weisel and Beaver Springs was 
supported by adequate consideration? 
b. Whether the 1983 Agreement was based upon the fundamental mutual mistake 
that the improvements were located in or to be located in the setback? 
c. Whether the construction of the improvements in the setback was a condition 
precedent to Weisel's agreement with Beaver Springs not to develop Lot 13? 
d. Whether the consideration for the 1983 Agreement failed by the subsequent 
actions of Beaver Springs? 
e. Whether Beaver Springs' approval of development on the other lots in the 
Subdivision without any restriction on development on those lots has frustrated 
the original intent of the Agreement and supports its extinguishment? 
f. Whether there are necessary parties that prevent Weisel from obtaining 
Declaratory Judgment? 
g. Whether Weisel is entitled to one or two votes? 
h. Whether Weisel is entitled to attorneys fees and costs incurred in the District 
Court and on appeal. 
4. No order has been issued sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: the oral argument from the hearing on February 16, 2010 on the Cross Motions for 
Summary J udgrnent. 
(c) The Appellant does not request preparation of the transcript in a compressed 
format. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and the following documents, 
charts, or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
(a) Depositions, with Exhibits to the Depositions of: 
a. Thomas Weisel with Exhibits 1-44 
b. James McLaughlin with Exhibits 1-12 
c. Phillip Ottley with Exhibits 1-9 
d. Robert Smith with Exhibits 1-10 
e. Jean Smith with Exhibit 11 
f. William Fruehling with Exhibits 45-59 
g. Jim Dutcher with Exhibits 65-67 
(b) Affidavits: 
a. Affidavit of Fritz Haemmerle, with attached Exhibits 1-3 
b. Affidavit of Tammy Robison, with attached Exhibit A-B 
c. Affidavit of Garth McClure, with attached Exhibits 1-9, those being: 
i. Exhibits 1-5 - aerial photos 
ii. Exhibit 6 - Report with attached Appendices A-C containing 
surveys, aerial photographs and data 
iii. Exhibit 7 - Application for lot line shift and amended plat 
iv. Exhibit 8 - Survey 
v. Exhibit 9 - Curriculum Vitae 
d. Affidavit of Garth McClure in Response to Linda Haavik, with attached 
Exhibits 1-2 
e. Affidavit of Sandy Cady, with attached Exhibits A-C 
f. Affidavit of James McLaughlin, with attached Exhibits A-B 
g. Affidavit of Tim Graves, with attached Exhibit A 
h. Affidavit of Ben Worst, with attached Exhibit A 
i. Affidavit of Kathleen Rivers, with attached Exhibits 1-15 
J. Affidavit of Valdi Pace, with Exhibits A-B 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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(c) Appellant's Brief, Response Brief, and Reply Brief lodged or filed in the District 
Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter at the address 
shown in the Certificate of Mailing; 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript, to-wit: $300.00; 
(c) That the estimated fee ($100.00) for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record 
has been paid; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this L£ day of June, 2010. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _j£_ day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Ed Lawson 
Erin Clark 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Candace Childers 
Court Reporter 
233 W. Main St. 
Jerome, ID 83338 
_x_ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney(s) at his offices in 
Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number 
______ ., and by then mailing copies of the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
fritzx.iiaelTIIIlerl~-----
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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208 725 0076 Line 1 Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue 
Edward A. Lawson, Esq. ISB 2440 
Erin F. Clark, Esq. ISB 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
Post Office Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc. 
11· a.m 06-29-2010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing in ) 
his sole and separate property, ) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
VS. 







ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent ) -------------------" 
Case No. CV-09-124 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S 
REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT, THOMAS WEISEL, AND ms ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, FRITZ HAEMMERLE, AND THE CLERK OF OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Defendant/Respondent Beaver Springs Owners 
Association, Inc. ("Beaver Springs") in the above entitled proceeding hereby requests pursuant to 
I.AR. 19 the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record in addition to that required 
to be included by the I.AR. and the notice of appeal. 
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1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed 12/28/09. 
2. Affidavit of Erin Clark in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 12/28/09. 
3. Affidavit of Vicki Rosenberg in Support of Defendant's Motion for Swnmary 
Judgment, filed 12/28/09. 
4. Affidavit of William Fruehling in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 12/28/09. 
5. Affidavit of Custodian of Records of Blaine County Planning and Zoning, filed 
12/28/09. 
6. Second Affidavit of Custodian of Records of Blaine County Planning and Zoning, 
filed 1/11/10. 
7. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/lO. 
8. Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed 2/2/10. 
9. Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Thomas Garth 
McClure, filed 2/2/10. 
10. Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Thomas Weisel, 
filed 2/2/10. 
11. Affidavit of Karen Roseberry in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
12. Affidavit of Linda Haavi.k in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
13. Affidavit of Kiril Sokoloff in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
14. Affidavit of Janet Jarvis in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
15. Affidavit of Jeff Greenstein in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
16. Affidavit of Rachel Martin in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/10. 
17. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response Brief to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 2/9/10. 
I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of 
the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED th.is 29th day of June 2010. 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
By.f.L(o~ 
Erin F. Clark 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21h day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Fritz X Haemmerle, Esq. 
Haemmerle & Haemmerle, PILC 
400 South Main Street, Suite 102 
PO Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Clerk of the Court 
Blaine County District Court 
201 2nd Ave. S., Suite 110 
Hailey ID 83333 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ ,9remight Mail 
___L'Telecopy - (208) 578-0564 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Qlzernight Mail 
_/T_TP.e}l,,ecopy- (208) 788-5512 
Erin F. Clark 
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Case No. CV-2009-124 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
On July 6, 2010, the cross motions for attorney fees and costs came on regularly for 
hearing. The plaintiff was represented by counsel, Fritz X. Haemrnerle. The defendant was 
represented by counsel, Ed Lawson. After considering the briefs, evidence, and argument of 
counsel the Court took the matter under advisement for a written decision. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action was filed by the plaintiff seeking in part declaratory judgment as to 1) the 
enforceability of a 1983 Agreement which combined two of the plaintiff's lots into a single lot, 
2) a determination as to whether the plaintiff's voting rights had been denied, and 3) recovery of 
an overpayment of assessments. 
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After substantial discovery had been conducted by the parties, the Court heard cross 
motions for summary judgment, and on April 26, 2010, the Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court, as to Counts I through V, VII 
of the plaintiff's complaint, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and as to 
Count VI of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted in part and denied in part. 
On April 26, 2010, the Court granted plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint to 
allege a claim of setoff. On May 5, 2010, the parties entered into a Stipulation for Entry of 
Judgment. On May 11, 2010, the Court entered Judgment in accordance with the stipulation of 
the parties. 
On May 17, 2010 the defendant filed its Motion for Costs and Fees together with its 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees and the affidavit of Erin Clark in support. The defendant seeks 
an award of attorney fees based on contract, i.e. paragraph 5 of the October 12, 1983 Agreement 
[the Agreement]. On May 25, 2010, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum and Affidavit of Costs, 
Disbursements and Attorney Fees. The plaintiff seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, and paragraph 5 of the Agreement. On May 27, 2010 the 
plaintiff filed his Objection to Defendant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs. The defendant did 
not file a specific objection to the Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed by the plaintiff. 
II. 
STANDARD 
It is within the Court's discretion to determine the prevailing party, if any, and to award 
the amount of costs and attorney fees based on a reasoned analysis of the law with application to 
the outcome in a specific case and within the outer boundaries of this discretion. Sanders v. 
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Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). 
B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did 
not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the 
parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B). 
Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by statute or contract. I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(e)(l); Heller v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,578,682 P.2d 524, 531 (1984). Therefore, it is the 
burden of the party requesting attorney fees to establish an underlying basis for such an award 
and the party requesting attorney fees is required to state the basis for such an award in the 
affidavit of counsel in support of such an award. LR.C.P. Rule 54(e)(5); Eighteen Mile Ranch, 
LLCv.NordExcavating&Paving,lnc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-21, 117P.3d 130, 134-35(2005). 
Where a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees the amount of such an award is generally a 
matter of discretion for the trial court, taking into consideration the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3). Property Management West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 894 P.2d 130 (1995); Daisy 
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000). 
When a party fails to timely object to a request for attorney fees, the party waives the 
right to contest the amount of the fees requested, however, the failure to object to attorney fees 
when they are not authorized by statute or rule does not result in a waiver of the right to object to 
an improper award of attorney fees. Allison v. John M Biggs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567, 826 P.2d 916 
(1992); Fearless Ferris Wholesale, Inc., v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132, 721 P .2d 731 (Ct. App. 
1986). Further, where a party has failed to object to an award of costs or fees, the court still has 
the discretion to examine the amounts requested and the "court is permitted to examine the 
3 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: A TIORNEY FEES AND COSTS 1272 
reasonableness of the time and labor expended by the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and 
need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney." Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Stonebreaker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Lastly, when a party has asserted multiple claims and seeks attorney fees pursuant to a 
statute or contract, it is the burden of the party requesting attorney fees to "isolate or separate the 
fees attributable" to either the contract or statute that authorizes an award of fees. Weaver v. 
Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887 (1996); Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 
72, 78-79, 910 P.2d 744, 750-751 (1996). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Prevailing Party 
The defendant obviously prevailed as to the Counts where the plaintiff sought a 
declaratory judgment concerning the enforcement of the Agreement, as well as the plaintiffs 
voting rights after execution of the Agreement. The plaintiff prevailed partially as to his 
overpayment of assessments and the parties stipulated to a setoff on the amended claim of setoff. 
The determination of which party is a prevailing party is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. JR. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 582. 
977 P .2d 196 (1999); IRCP 54( d)(l )(B). In this regard, the Court recognizes that the issue of 
prevailing party is a matter of discretion and that the Court must act within the outer bounds of 
that discretion through an exercise of reason. 
The Court notes that, effective July 1, 2004, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(B) 
was amended so that the court should take a "more global view of the case" in regards to its 
determination of the prevailing party. Highlights of the 2004 Rule Changes, Catherine Derden, 
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Staff Attorney, Idaho Supreme Court Rules Advisory Committee. "In determining which party 
prevailed in an action where there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the 
court determines who prevailed 'in the action'. That is, the prevailing party question is examined 
and determined from the overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 
148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) (citing, Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)). However, the court 
would note for purposes of this analysis, that this case did not involve competing claims and 
coW1terclaims. All of the claims were asserted by the plaintiff and the defendant only defended 
against the claims of the plaintiff. 
In this case, the plaintiff sought many forms of relief, most of which related to the 
enforceability of the 1983 Agreement, wherein the plaintiff combined two of his lots into a single 
lot. The plaintiff sought to challenge enforceability of the Agreement based on four ( 4) causes 
of action (Mutual Mistake; Lack of Consideration; Recession and Changed Circumstances). As 
to each of these causes of action, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant. In 
two causes of action for breach of contract and quasi estoppel, the plaintiff sought the right of 
two votes in concerns of association matter. As to each of these causes of action, summary 
judgment was granted in favor of the defendant. In one cause of action, the plaintiff sought 
reimbursement for an over payment of assessments that he had made since 1983 (in a sum less 
than $25,000.00). Subsequent to the Court's summary judgment decision, the plaintiff amended 
his complaint to seek the right of setoff as to future assessments of the association for those 
amounts that were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court granted summary judgment on 
the plaintiff's claim of reimbursement, to the extent that the amounts sought were not barred by 
the statute of limitations. The parties ultimately stipulated that the plaintiff was entitled recover 
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the sum of $3,000.00 from the defendant, plus $1,000.00 for prejudgment interest on the 
reimbursement claim and $17,000.00 on his claim of setoff. 
It is clear to this Court that the enforceability of the Agreement was the impetus of this 
litigation, and that the causes of action based on voting rights and monetary damages were no 
more than a mere afterthought. Based on the analysis of the claims and defenses asserted by the 
respective parties, the Court finds that the defendant prevailed as to those claims directly or 
indirectly related to the Agreement, as well as its enforceability. As to the monetary claim of 
damages and setoff, the plaintiff and defendant each prevailed in part, in that the plaintiff sought 
to recover not more than $25,000.00 on his reimbursement claim, although a substantial portion 
of that claim was barred by the statue of limitations, but some was recoverable in terms of a 
setoff. Therefore, the plaintiff overall is the prevailing party as to his monetary claims and the 
defendant is the prevailing party as to those claims related to declaratory judgment. The Court 
will therefore determine that the plaintiff prevailed in part on its monetary claim of 
reimbursement and the defendant prevailed as to the declaratory judgment claims .. 
B. Costs as a Matter of Right 
The plaintiff seeks to recover costs as a matter of right, consisting of his filing fee, 
service fees, and deposition costs for the total sum of $3,096.02. The defendant did not file a 
specific objection to the plaintiffs costs as a matter of right, however, the defendant seeks to 
recover costs as a matter of right for filing fees, service fees, deposition costs, and expert fees in 
the total sum of $7,026.53. As indicated above, this action was filed by the plaintiff for the 
primary purpose of having this Court set aside the Agreement. The costs incurred by the parties 
were directly related to the plaintiffs claim that the Agreement was not enforceable. Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(A) provides that "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, 
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costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court." The defendant, for the reasons stated above, is entitled to recover its filing 
fees, service fees, and deposition costs in the total sum of$ 3,096.53. The Court will address the 
amounts sought for Linda Haavik, below. 
The Court hereby denies costs as a matter of right for the plaintiff, on the basis that those 
costs were incurred for the primary purpose of setting aside the Agreement upon which the 
plaintiff did not prevail. 
The defendant seeks to recover the sum of $3,930.00 as "expert witness cost" for Linda 
Haavik based on the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Agreement. For the reasons set forth in 
Section D.2. infra, paragraph 5 is not applicable to the recovery of fees or costs in this action. 
Further, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8), a party is only entitled to recover expert witness 
costs for an expert who "testifies at a deposition or at a trial." In this case the witness did not 
testify and therefore there is no basis, as a matter of right, to recover such costs. The expert 
witness cost is hereby denied. 
The defendant is therefore awarded costs as a matter of right in the sum of $3,096.53 and 
the plaintiffs costs as a matter ofright are denied. 
C. Discretionary Costs 
Both parties seek an award of discretionary costs. The discretionary costs sought by the 
plaintiff totals $30,165.70 and are directly related to the plaintiffs claim that the Agreement was 
not enforceable; there is no showing that those costs have any relationship to his monetary claim. 
The plaintiff is denied recovery of his discretionary costs because he did not prevail on the claim 
that they are related to. 
The defendant seeks recovery of $962.90, which 1s described to be "Association 
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bookkeeper costs" incurred for the bookkeeper's services m "gathering documents and 
information requested" by the plaintiff. Discretionary costs are to only be awarded if they are 
"necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred." I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l)(D). There is no 
showing that this cost is "exceptional" and therefore discretionary costs for defendant are denied. 
D. Attorney Fees 
1. Plaintifrs Attorney Fees 
The plaintiff prevailed in part on his monetary claim for reimbursement and also 
prevailed on his "equitable claim" of offset. However there is no statute that authorizes the 
recovery of attorney fees based on an equitable setoff. As to the monetary claim, the plaintiff 
seeks attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1) which provides in part that, "in any 
action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be 
taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount 
to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees .... " As a condition for this award, "written demand 
for the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant not less than ten ( 10) days 
before commencement of the action .... " The plaintiff apparently made a written demand for 
$25,000.00 or less at least 10 days prior to filing the complaint. However, the action, which 
consisted of eight (8) causes of action, had only one cause of action potentially covered by Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(1). When a party has asserted multiple claims and seeks attorney fees pursuant to 
a statute or contract, it is the burden of the party requesting attorney fees to "isolate or separate 
the fees attributable" to either the contract or statute that authorizes an award of fees. Weaver v. 
Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887 (I 996); Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 
72, 78-79, 910 P.2d 744, 750-51 (1996). The plaintiff would have this Court award one seventh 
(I /7) of his total attorney fees. However, the affidavit of counsel is conclusory and does not 
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contain sufficient detail to "isolate or separate the fees." It is clear to this Court that the 
overwhelming amount of the attorney fees were attributable to the claims upon which the 
plaintiff did not prevail or for which there is no basis for an award of fees. Further, the affidavit 
of counsel and the attorney time set forth in the invoices does not adequately separate the 
attorneys time as to the various claims to allow this court to make a reasoned determination as to 
the amount of attorney time expended on the "reimbursement claim". 
The plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney fees based on paragraph 5 of the Agreement. 
However, the Agreement has no direct bearing on the issue of the plaintiff's monetary claim, nor 
does it address the assessments due and owing, and only deals with the combination of two lots. 
The assessments are governed by the CC&R's and the plaintiff has not asserted the provisions of 
the CC& R's as a basis for recovery. 
Lastly, the plaintiff seeks recovery based on Idaho Code § 12-121. For the plaintiff to 
recover, he would have to prove that the defense of the monetary claim was frivolous, which is 
not the case since the defendant had a valid statute of limitations defense to the majority of the 
monetary claim and the plaintiff did not raise a setoff claim until late in this litigation and had 
not even demanded such prior to the commencement of the litigation. 
Therefore the plaintiff's request for attorney fees is denied. 
2. Defendant's Attorney Fees 
The defendant seeks to recover attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Agreement, 
which provides as follows: 
5. Enforcement. The parties hereto agree that in the event litigation should 
be commenced or in the case of default in performance of any of the terms or 
conditions of this Agreement, the provisions can be enforced by specific 
performance, injunction or other equitable remedies provided by law, and the 
party adjudged by the Court to have been in default shall be responsible for the 
payment to the other of all costs and expenses of enforcement of this Agreement, 
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including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Both parties agree that the interpretation of this provision is a matter of the law of contracts. 
The interpretation of a contract begins with the language of the contract itself. Cristo 
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). Any contract is 
to be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 68 8 
P .2d 1172 (1984). The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained from the language 
contained in the written contract, because usually this represents the best evidence of the parties' 
intent. Abel v. School Dist. No. 413, 108 Idaho 982, 703 P .2d 1357 (Ct. App. 1985). If a 
contract's terms are "clear and unambiguous, the determination of the contract's meaning and 
legal effect are questions of law, and the meaning of the contract and intent of the parties must be 
determined from the plain meaning of the_ contract's own words." City of Idaho Falls v. Home 
Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 607, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995) (internal citations omitted). The 
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is dependent upon whether it is reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations. Cristo Viene, supra. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law. Potlatch Educational Assoc. v. Potlach School District No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 
226 P.3d 1277 (2010). If the Court determines that a contract is ambiguous and the parties' 
mutual intent cannot be understood from the language of the contract, the intent of the parties 
then becomes a question for the trier of fact. Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n., 125 
Idaho 866,870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 1994). However, when a contract provision is found 
by the Court to be ambiguous, the "determination of the parties intent is to be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under 
which it was made, the objectives and purpose of the particular provision, and any construction 
placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct and dealings." JR. Simplot v. 
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Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). 
The question for this Court is under what circumstances is a party entitled to an award of 
attorney fees or costs. The defendant argues that paragraph 5 is ambiguous by the use of the 
word "or" in the second sentence and that the agreement should be construed against the plaintiff 
as the drafter. The defendant would therefore have this Court construe paragraph 5 to mean that 
if either parties were to commence litigation, that the prevailing party would be entitled to 
attorney fees and costs and by necessity would have this Court ignore the term "default." The 
plaintiff on the other hand argues that the term default is not ambiguous, and paragraph 5 does 
not apply because he has never been in default, and he was not adjudged to have been in default. 
This Court must find that an ambiguity is created in the second sentence of paragraph 5 
by use of the word "or." While it is true it is not for this Court to rewrite the contract for the 
parties, it is the duty of this Court to determine the parties' intent. The Court must therefore look 
at the whole contract. In this regard, the contract provides, in essence, that the Association 
approved the plaintiffs development and in exchange for such approval the plaintiff agreed to 
combine his two lots as one and agreed not to split them in the future. The Agreement at 
paragraph 5 is entitled "Enforcement" and, given the objective and purpose of the agreement, it 
is clear that the parties intended a legal mechanism in the event that either party did not follow 
through with their obligations under the terms of the Agreement. For example, if the Association 
did not approve the development after execution of the agreement, it would have been in default, 
or if the plaintiff attempted to sell or develop two lots he would have been in default. The 
Agreement also provides that each party would have equitable remedies available to them to 
compel compliance with the terms of the Agreement. This Court must conclude that the parties 
intended that, after commencement oflitigation, if one of the parties was "adjudged by a court to 
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have been in default", then the defaulting party would be responsible for the other party's 
"reasonable attorney fees." The term "default" has a plain and ordinary meaning: "The omission 
or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty" or the "to fail to perform a contractual 
obligation" Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The litigation over the Agreement did not 
allege that any party had failed to comply with its respective obligations or duties under the 
terms of the Agreement. Further, the Court did not "adjudge any party to be in default." This 
was not an action to "enforce the agreement" but was only an action to "determine or test the 
enforceability of the agreement". Given the nature of the litigation, the Agreement does not form 
the basis for an award of attorney fees. See Thieme v. Worst, 113 Idaho 455, 745 P.2d 1076 (Ct. 
App. 1987); Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1982). Therefore, the 
defendant's request for attorney fees based on paragraph 5 of the Agreement must be denied. 
The defendant also now seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to the CC&R's. 
However, this was not specified in their original memorandum of fees and costs or the affidavit 
in support. As indicated above, the party requesting attorney fees is required to state the basis 
for such an award in the affidavit of counsel in support of such an award. I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(5); 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-721, 117 
P .3d 130, 134-135 (2005). Further, this action was not based on a violation of the CC&R' s or 
the enforcement of the CC&R' s. The action was based on an Agreement that was separate and 
apart from the CC&R's. Therefore, the defendant's request for attorney fees is denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs is 
DENIED; the defendant's motion for costs as a matter of right in the sum of $3,096.53 is 
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GRA"-JTED and defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs is otherwise DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Ji(; day of ~Tu!c-( , 2010. 
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correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION REPATTORNEY FEES AND 
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Fritz X. Haemmerle 
Attorney at Law 
P .0. Box 1800 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Edward A. Lawson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
CE!lbJ\ 
Deputy Clerk\ 
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Case No. CV-09-124 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
This matter came on for hearing on February 16, 2010, before the Honorable John K. 
Butler on the cross motions for summary adjudication. Fritz X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & 
Haemmerle appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, Thomas Weisel. Edward A. Lawson and Erin F. 
Clark of Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC appeared on behalf of the defendant, Beaver 
Spring Owners Association, Inc. 
On May 11, 2010, the Court Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Count VI of 
his Complaint in the amount of $3,000.00, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the 
amount of $1,000.00, for a total of $4,000.00. The Court also entered Judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff on Count VIII of his second amended complaint and declared that plaintiff has the 
equitable right of offset against sums due the defendant, if any, in the amount of $17,000.00. 
On July 6, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the parties cross motions for attorney 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - I 
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fees and costs. Upon considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court denied 
Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs and granted Defendant's motion for costs as a 
matter of right in the sum of $3,096.53. The Court denied the remainder of Defendant's motion 
for attorneys' fees and costs. As a result, the May 11, 2010 Judgment is hereby amended, 
pursuant to which it is: 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1) Plaintiff is awarded judgment on Count VI of his Complaint against defendant, 
Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. in the amount of $3,000.00, together with prejudmgnet 





Defendant is awarded costs against plaintiff Thomas Weisel in the amount of 
Therefore, plaintiff is awarded the total sum of $903.47 against defendant. 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment on Count VIII of his second amended complaint 
against defendant, Beaver Spring Owners Association, Inc. and thereby it is hereby declared that 
plaintiff has the equitable right of offset against sums due the defendant, if any, in the amount of 
$17,000.00. 
5) The written agreement ("Agreement") between plaintiff and defendant, dated 
October 12, 1983 and recorded in the records of Blaine County, Idaho as Instrument No. 246208, 
was not entered into based on a mutual mistake of fact, is supported by consideration and is 
otherwise valid and enforceable. Accordingly plaintiff's lots 13 and 14, as more particularly 
described in the Agreement, remain unified as a single lot and plaintiff is responsible for one 
annual assessment and has one vote on matters to be voted upon by members of the Beaver 
Spring Owners' Association. 
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6) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 1 above, Plaintiff's complaint is 
hereby dismissed in its entirety and plaintiff shall take nothing thereby. 
DATED this _/_L day of &4 i:1;.010. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2, day of /h,10. 2010, I caused to be served a true 
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400 South Main Street, Suite 102 
PO Box 1800 
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675 South Main Street, Suite A 
PO Box 3110 
Ketchum, Idaho 83 340 
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Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
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Supreme Court Case No. 37800 
District Case No. CV-09-124 
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR 
CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD 
On the 1st day of September, 2010, Appellant was served with a copy of the Clerk's Record 
on appeal in this case. After reviewing the Record, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a), the 
above-named Appellant, Thomas Weisel, by and through his attorney of record, Fritz X. 
Haemmerle, objects to and requests correction of the Clerk's Record prepared in this case in the 
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
ll.E8 
following respects: 
1. On the Caption, the wrong Judge is listed. The appeal is from decisions of Judge K. 
Butler, not Robert J. Elgee. 
2. Volume 4 of 6, p. 718-723 -The original aerial photos were large size photos. In 
the record they are only 8½ x 11 copies and are difficult to decipher. Appellant 
requests that pp. 718-723 be replaced with copies that are the same size as the 
original aerial photos. 
3. Volume 4 of 6, p. 716 refers to Exhibit 9, Garth McClure's curriculum vitae, 
attached to his affidavit. Exhibit 9 is not included in the Record. 
4. Volume 4 of 6, p. 737 - Appendix A to Exhibit 6 of Garth McClure's Affidavit -
This page is not copied correctly in the copy of the Record served on Appellant. 
Appendix A was a landscape sized spreadsheet that included 18 columns. The one 
in the copy of the Record that was served on Appellant has only 7 columns. The 
middle 11 columns are not included in the service copy of the Record. 
5. Volume 4 of 6, p. 739 - Appendix B to Exhibit 6 of Garth McClure's Affidavit -
This page is not copied correctly in the copy of the Record served on Appellant. 
Appendix A was a landscape sized spreadsheet that included 18 columns. The one 
in the copy of the Record that was served on Appellant has only 7 columns. The 
middle 11 columns are not included in the service copy of the Record. 
Pursuant to I.AR. 29(a), this Objection and Request for Correction of Clerk's Record is 
filed within 28 days of service of the Record, and a notice of hearing in the District Court is filed 
with this Objection and Reiuest. 
1u1-
DATED thi~ day of September, 2010. 
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
/~9 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, PILC 
By: ,/20:-~ 
l -Fritz X. Haemmerle ----
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
11. ')o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the:2:!l day of September, 2010, I served a true and 




LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Blaine County District Court Clerk 
206 1st Avenue S, Ste 200 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
_x__ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s) at his offices in 
Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number 
_____ , and by then mailing copies of the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD - 4 
ORIGINA~ 
FRITZ X. HAEMMERLE 
HAEMl\.fERLE & HAKMMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
400 South Main St., Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
tel: (208) 578-0520 
FAX: (208) 578-0564 
ISB # 3862 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
FLLED ~~ /,(f: 
K 
SEP 2 4 2010 
~lynn Drage, Clerk District 
vOUrt Blain0 County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDI CAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing) 
in his sole and separate property, ) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS 



















TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
Supreme Court Case No. 37800 
District Case No. CV-09-124 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 19, 2010, at 3:00 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the Blaine County Courthouse, Hailey, Idaho, the attorney for the 
named Defendant will call his Objection to the Clerk's record on Appeal. 
DA TED this 2+ day of September, 2010. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
l'c'l2... 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this:Jf_ day of September, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Ed.Lawson 
Erin Clark 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Blaine County District Court Clerk 
206 1st Avenue S, Ste 200 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
_x_ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post 
office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s) at his offices in 
Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number 
_______ ., and by then mailing copies of the same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
l8 725 0076 Line 1 Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue 
Edward A. Lawson, &q. ISB 2440 
Erin F. Clark, Esq. ISB 6504 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
675 Sun Valley Road, Suite A 
Post Office Box 3310 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 725-0055 
Facsimile: (208) 725-0076 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc. 
11: · Sa.m. 10-19-2010 
FILED P~.'. ~ 
OCT 1 9 2010 
tlynn Dr~ge, Clerk District 
ourt Blame Cof!nty, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing in ) 
his sole and separate property, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-09-124 
DEFENDANT'S NON-
OPPOSIDON TO PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST 
FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S 
RECORD 
COMES NOW Defendant Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc., by and through its 
counsel of record, Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, hereby states that it has no opposition to 
Plaintiff's Objection to and Request for Correction of Clerk's Record. 
DATED this \q day of October, 2010. 
LAWSON LASKI CLARK & POGUE, PLLC 
By: 74£&/~ 
Edward A. Lawson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDANTS NON-OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO AND 
REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S RECORD · l 
10353-001 
2 /3 
aensoo76 Line 1 Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue 11: ·3Sa.m. 10-19-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Fritz X. Haemmerle, Esq. 
Haemmerle & Haemmerle, PLLC 
400 South Main Street, Suite 102 
PO Box 1800 
Hailey.ID 83333 
DEFENDANT'S NON-OPPOSITlON TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO AND 
REQUEST FOR CORRBCT1ON OP CLERK'S RECORD· 2 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 





Tl-iomas Wilson Weisel 
vs. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
201 2ND A VENUE SOUTH, SUITE 106 
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333 
Case No: CV-2009-0000124 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc., ID Corp. 




Tuesday, December 07, 2010 0 I :30 PM 
John K Butler 
District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
*PARTIES REQUESTING TO APPEAR VIA TELEPHONE CONFERENCE MUST GET COURT 
APPROVAL PRIOR TO THE HEARING DATE 
ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to utilize the 
provisions of l.R.C.P. 40( d)(l )(G). Notice is also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 40( d)( 1 )(A) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l )(C). The panel of alternate judges consists 
of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Brody, Butler, Crabtree, 
Elgee, Stoker, Wildman, Higer, Hurlbutt, Meehl, St. Clair and Wood. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. 1 further certify that copies of this Notice were s~rved as follows on December I st, 2010. 
Copy to: Edward A. Lawson P.O. Box 3310, Ketchum, ID, 83340 (Defense Attorney); 
Copy to: Fritz X. Haernrnerle Po Box 1800, Hailey, ID, 83333 (Plaintiff Attorney) 
L._Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 1st, 2010 
JoLynn Drage 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: SrID~\ 
DOC22cv 7/96 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man dealing) 
in his sole and separate property, ) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-124 
ORDER GRA.NTING OBJECTION TO 




BEA VER SPRINGS OWNERS 












) _______________ ) 
On September 24, 2010, the Plaintiff/Appellant, Thomas Weisel, by and through 
Fritz X. Haemmerle of Haemmerle & Haemmerle, PL.LC., filed his Objection to and 
Request for Correction of Clerk's Record ("Motion"). On October 19, 2010, the 
Defendant/Respondent, Beaver Springs Owners Association, Inc., by and through its 
counsel, Edward A Lawson of Lawson Laski Clark & Pogue, PLLC, filed a Non-
Opposition to Plaintiff's Objection and Request for Correction of Clerk's Record. Based 
on the non-opposition to the Motion; now therefore 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Objection to the Clerk's Record is 
GRANTED, and that the record be corrected as set forth in the Motion, 
specifically: 
a. Volume 4 of 6, p. 718-723 The original aerial photos were large size 
photos. In the record they are only 8 ½ x 11 copies and are difficult to 
decipher. Appellant requests that pp. 718-723 be replaced with copies 
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S 
RECORD-1 
that are the same size as the original aerial photos. 
b. Volume 4 of 6, p. 716 refers to Exhibit 9, Garth McClure's curriculum 
vitae, attached to his affidavit Exhibit 9 is not included in the Record. 
c. Volume 4 of 6, p. 737 Appendix A to Exhibit 6 of Garth McClure's 
Affidavit - This page is not copied correctly in the copy of the Record 
served on Appellant. Appendix A was a landscape sized spreadsheet that 
included 18 columns. The one in the copy of the Record that was served 
on Appellant has only 7 columns. The middle 11 columns are not 
included in the service copy of the Record. 
d. Volume 4 of 6, p. 739 - Appendix B to Exhibit 6 of Garth McClure's 
Affidavit - This page is not copied correctly in the copy of the Record 
served on Appellant. Appendix A was a landscape sized spreadsheet that 
included 18 columns. The one in the copy of the Record that was served 
on Appellant has only 7 columns. The middle 11 columns are not 
included in the service copy of the Record. 
DATED this ( day of De 
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF CLERK'S 
RECORD-2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4 day of December, 2010, I served a true 
and correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attomey(s) named below in 
the manner noted: 
Fritz X. Haemmerle 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P .L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Ed Lawson 
Erin Clark 
LAWSON, LASKI, CLARK & POGUE, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s) at his 
offices in Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number 
1J5 ..-00i" f 61:8 · 05L,,'llnd by then mailing copies of the same in the United 
States Mai , postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
Clerk 




Deposition of Thomas Weisel 
Deposition of James McLaughlin 
Deposition of Phillip Ottley 
Deposition of Robert Smith 
Deposition of Jean Smith 
Deposition of William Fruehling 
Deposition of Jim Dutcher 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Dated this _L day of ~<U'" , 2010. 
Cryst 
Exhibit List - 1 
I~\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man ) 
Dealing in his sole and separate property, ) Supreme Court No. 37800 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
vs. ) 
) 
BEAVER SPRINGS OWNERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, 11\JC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Respondent. ) 
) 
______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of tt,e 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause 
and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this_\_ day of ~bo..r , 2010. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THOMAS WEISEL, a married man ) 
Dealing in his sole and separate property, ) Supreme Court No. 37800 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant ) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vs. ) 
) 
BEAVER SPRINGS OWNERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Respondent. ) 
) _____________ ) 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by 
United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
Fritz Haemmerle 
PO Box 1800 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Edward Lawson 
P.O. Box 36310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Defendant / Respondent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this _____ day of ~ , 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 
1303 
